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

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From the Editor:

In this issue . . .

BARRY M. BLECHMAN and TAMARA COFMAN WITTES examine the uses of military threats and military interventions in the Bush and first Clinton administrations. Based on case studies and interviews with U.S. decision makers, they conclude that domestic and international political constraints are preventing U.S. leaders from making threats decisive enough to persuade foreign leaders to comply with U.S. demands.

GARY C. JACOBSON analyzes the 1998 U.S. congressional elections to determine why voters strongly endorsed the political status quo despite the president's involvement in a scandal that led to his impeachment by the House of Representatives.

JAMES BURK challenges the hypothesis that public support for peacekeeping missions vanishes once casualties are taken. He identifies logical problems with the underlying theory and shows that its empirical predictions are not supported in the critical cases of Lebanon and Somalia.

LEONARD W. LEVY discusses English and American history to determine the sources and development of the U.S. Constitution's Fourth Amendment barring unreasonable searches and seizures. He concludes that general warrants and warrantless searches were the norm until the American Revolution, when specific warrants began to emerge, especially in Massachusetts.

MICHAEL McFAUL explains why Russia's change from communist rule has been so protracted and conflictual in comparison with other democratic transitions. He focuses on the strategic interaction of individual actors, rather than cultural or historical factors, to build an explanation for Russia's troubled transition.

JAMES J. WIRTZ reviews H. R. McMaster's *Dereliction of Duty*, which argues that the Joint Chiefs of Staff failed to devise an effective strategy in Vietnam. He questions McMaster's claim that the Joint Chiefs quickly recognized that U.S. forces had only limited prospects for success in Southeast Asia and failed to inform the Johnson administration about their reservations concerning American military intervention in Southeast Asia.

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Defining Moment: The Threat and Use of Force in American Foreign Policy

BARRY M. BLECHMAN
TAMARA COFMAN WITTES

The use of military force has been a difficult subject for American leaders for three decades. Ever since the failure of American policy and military power in Vietnam, it has been hard for U.S. policy makers to gain domestic support for the use of force as an instrument of statecraft. U.S. military power has been exercised throughout this thirty-year period, but both threats of its use and the actual conduct of military operations have usually been controversial, turned to reluctantly, and marked by significant failures as well as successes. The American armed forces are large, superbly trained, fully prepared, and technologically advanced. Since the demise of the Soviet Union, U.S. forces are without question the most powerful by far on the face of the earth. Their competence, lethality, and global reach have been demonstrated time and again. Yet with rare exceptions, U.S. policy makers have found it difficult to achieve their objectives by threats alone. Often they have had to use force—even if only in limited ways—to add strength to the words of diplomats. And at more times than is desirable, the failures of threats and limited demonstrative uses of military power have confronted U.S. presidents with difficult choices between retreat and all-out military actions intended to achieve objectives by the force of arms alone.

In the 1980s, most U.S. military leaders and many politicians and policy makers drew a strong conclusion from the failure of U.S. policy in Vietnam.

BARRY M. BLECHMAN is the founder and president of DFI International and the cofounder and chairman of the Henry L. Stimson Center. This article was prepared initially for the National Academy of Sciences. TAMARA COFMAN WITTES is a university fellow and doctoral candidate in the Department of Government, Georgetown University. Her dissertation concerns techniques for ethnic conflict resolution. She also writes on coercive diplomacy and U.S. counterterrorism policy.

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This viewpoint was spelled out most clearly by then Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger in 1984: force should only be used as a last resort, he stated, to protect vital American interests and with a commitment to win. Threats of force should not be used as part of diplomacy. They should be used only when diplomacy fails and, even then, only when the objective is clear and attracts the support of the American public and the Congress.[1]

General Colin Powell, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was and remains a proponent of what was called the Weinberger doctrine. "Threats of military force will work," he says, "only when U.S. leaders actually have decided that they are prepared to use force." In the absence of such resolution, U.S. threats lack credibility because of the transparency of the American policy-making process. For this reason, "the threat and use of force must be a last resort and must be used decisively."[2] Powell has argued that any use of force by the United States should accomplish U.S. objectives quickly while minimizing the risks to U.S. soldiers.[3]

Other U.S. policy makers have taken a more traditional geopolitical view, believing that the U.S. failure in Vietnam needs to be understood on its own terms. Regardless of what was or was not achieved in Southeast Asia in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the United States, they believe, can and should continue to threaten and to use limited military force in support of diplomacy to achieve limited ends without resorting to all-out contests of arms. In the words of then Secretary of State George Shultz in December 1984, "Diplomacy not backed by strength will always be ineffectual at best, dangerous at worst."[4] Moreover, Shultz insisted, a use of force need not enjoy public support when first announced; it will acquire that support if the action is consonant with America's interests and moral values. In 1992, Les Aspin, then chairman of the House Armed Services Committee and later secretary of defense, branded the Weinberger doctrine an "all-or-nothing" approach. He asserted that the United States should be willing to use limited force for limited objectives and that it could pull back from such limited engagements without risk.[5] From this perspective, force should be used earlier in a crisis, rather than later, and need not be displayed in decisive quantities. The limited-objectives school describes the threat of force as an important and relatively inexpensive adjunct to American diplomatic suasion.

As the Soviet Union disintegrated and the cold war came to an end, this debate began to wane. U.S. policy makers began to wrestle with an array of

[1] Remarks by Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger to the National Press Club, 28 November 1984, published as Department of Defense News Release No. 609–84.

[2] Interview by Barry Blechman with General Colin Powell, 21 February 1997.

[3] Colin L. Powell, "Why Generals Get Nervous," *New York Times*, 8 October 1992; and Colin L. Powell, "U.S. Force: Challenges Ahead," *Foreign Affairs* 72 (Winter 1992–1993): 32–45.

[4] George Shultz, "The Ethics of Power" (address given at the convocation of Yeshiva University, New York City, 9 December 1985), *Department of State Bulletin*, 1–3 February 1985.

[5] Les Aspin, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee (address to the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, Washington, DC, 21 September 1992).

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problems that were individually less severe than the threat posed by the USSR but collectively no less vexing. The military situation changed drastically as well. U.S. military power reigned supreme, and the risk that a limited military intervention in a third nation could escalate into a global confrontation quickly faded. During both the Bush and first Clinton administrations, it became increasingly evident not only that there were many situations in which limited applications of force seemed helpful but that in the complicated post-cold war world, opportunities for the pure application of Secretary Weinberger's maxims were rare. During this eight-year period, numerous challenges to American interests emerged that were too intractable for diplomatic solutions, that resisted cooperative multilateral approaches, and that were immune not only to sweet reason but to positive blandishments of any sort. Unencumbered by cold war fears of sparking a confrontation with the powerful Soviet Union, American policy makers turned frequently to threats and the use of military power to deal with these situations, sometimes in ways that conformed to the Weinberger guidelines but more often suggesting that—rightly or wrongly—the press of world events drives policy makers inevitably toward Secretary Shultz's prescriptions for limited uses of force in support of diplomacy.

The United States sometimes succeeded in these ventures and sometimes failed. Success rarely came easily, however; more often, the United States had to go to great lengths to persuade adversaries to yield to its will. Even leaders of seemingly hapless nations or of factions within devastated countries proved surprisingly resistant to American threats. Often U.S. leaders had to make good on threats by exercising U.S. military power. These further steps usually worked; but even when the United States conducted military operations in support of its post-cold war policies, the results were not always as clean and easy, or their consequences as far reaching, as decision makers had hoped. Given the overwhelming superiority of U.S. military power during this period, these results are hard to understand.

Indeed, even the greatest military success of the U.S. armed forces in the post-cold war period—the expulsion of the Iraqi occupation army from Kuwait in 1991—became necessary because U.S. diplomacy, including powerful threats of force, failed. Despite the most amazing demonstration of U.S. military capabilities and willingness to utilize force if necessary to expel the Iraqi military from Kuwait, despite the movement of one-half million U.S. soldiers, sailors, and air men and women to the region, the call-up of U.S. reserve forces, the forging of a global military alliance, even the conduct of a devastating air campaign against the Iraqi occupation army and against strategic targets throughout Iraq itself, Saddam Hussein refused to comply with U.S. demands and his troops had to be expelled by force of arms. The United States was not able to accomplish its goals through threats alone. The Iraqi leader either disbelieved the U.S. threats, discounted U.S. military capabilities, or was willing to withstand defeat in Kuwait in pursuit of grander designs.

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Why was this the case? Why has it been so difficult for the United States to realize its objectives through threats of using military force alone? Why have U.S. military threats not had greater impact in the post-cold war period, and why have limited uses of force in support of diplomacy and in pursuit of political aims not been able to accomplish U.S. goals more often? Is this situation changing as it becomes indisputably clear that the United States is the only remaining military superpower? Or have history and circumstance made U.S. military superiority an asset of only narrow utility in advancing the nation's interests through diplomacy?

To answer these questions, we examined all the cases during the Bush and first Clinton administrations in which the United States utilized its armed forces demonstratively in support of political objectives in specific situations. There are eight such cases, several of which include multiple uses of force. In two of the cases, Iraq and Bosnia, threats or uses of force became enduring elements in defining the limits of the relationship between the United States and its adversary.

Actually, the U.S. armed forces have been used demonstratively in support of diplomatic objectives in literally more than a thousand incidents during this period, ranging from major humanitarian operations to joint exercises with the armed forces of friendly nations to minor logistical operations in support of the United Nations or other multinational or national organizations. Moreover, the deployment and operations of U.S. forces in Europe and in Southwest and East Asia on a continuing basis throughout the period are intended to support U.S. foreign policy by deterring foreign leaders from pursuing hostile aims and by reassuring friends and allies. In some cases, the presence of these forces, combined with the words of American leaders, may have been sufficient to deter unwanted initiatives. The presence of U.S. troops in South Korea, for example, is believed to deter a North Korean attack. We did not look at such cases of continuing military support of diplomacy in which "dogs may not have barked."[6] Instead, we looked only at the handful of specific incidents in which U.S. armed forces were used deliberately and actively to threaten or to conduct limited military operations in support of American policy objectives in specific situations.[7]

[6] A database listing all uses of the American armed forces since the end of the cold war was prepared by Defense Forecasts International (DFI) for the U.S. Air Force. It is based largely on official unpublished documents prepared by the major U.S. Air Force commands and other official data. For additional information, please contact Oliver Fritz, DFI International, 11 Dupont Circle, NW, Washington, DC 20036.

[7] In principle, there may also have been cases in which the United States achieved it ends through verbal threats alone, threats not backed by deliberate military activity. Some have suggested, for example, that President Bush was successful in preventing greater Serbian oppression in Kosovo through verbal warnings alone. In that specific case, however, Bush's warnings were given weight both by U.S. military activity in support of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia and in enforcing the embargo on arms shipments to the region and by the deployment of U.S. troops to Macedonia. Overall, the authors could not identify any cases of verbal threats unaccompanied by military activity during this period, successful or unsuccessful, and would be grateful for any suggestion of such incidents.

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We did not examine such military threats prior to the Bush administration, because, as noted above, the cold war placed significant constraints on U.S. uses of force. We believe that the demise of the USSR altered the global political and military environments so fundamentally as to make prior incidents irrelevant to understanding the effectiveness of contemporary military threats. The puzzle we seek to explain is the frequent inability of the United States to achieve its objectives through threats and limited uses of military power despite the political and military dominance it has enjoyed since 1989.

We supplemented published information about the cases with interviews with key U.S. policy makers during this period, including individuals who served in high positions in the Pentagon and at the State Department. At times these individuals are quoted directly. More often, their perspectives provide background and detail in the accounts of the incidents.[8]

We have concluded that the U.S. experience in Vietnam and subsequent incidents during both the Carter and first Reagan administrations left a heavy burden on future American policy makers. There is a generation of political leaders throughout the world whose basic perception of U.S. military power and political will is one of weakness, who enter any situation with a fundamental belief that the United States can be defeated or driven away. This point of view was expressed explicitly and concisely by Mohamed Farah Aideed, leader of a key Somali faction, to Ambassador Robert Oakley, U.S. special envoy to Somalia, during the disastrous U.S. involvement there in 1993–1995: "We have studied Vietnam and Lebanon and know how to get rid of Americans, by killing them so that public opinion will put an end to things."[9]

Aideed, of course, was proved to be correct. And the withdrawal from Mogadishu not only was a humiliating defeat for the United States but it also reinforced perceptions of America's lack of resolve and further complicated U.S. efforts to achieve its goals through threats of force alone.

This initial judgment, this basic "default setting" conditioning foreign leaders to believe that U.S. military power can be withstood, has made it extremely difficult for the United States to achieve its objectives without actually conducting military operations, despite its overwhelming military superiority. With the targets of U.S. diplomacy predisposed to disbelieve American threats and to believe they can ride out any American military initiative and drive away American forces, it has been necessary for the United States in many incidents to go to great lengths to change these individuals' minds. Reaching this defining moment—the point at which a foreign decision maker comes to the realization that, despite what may have happened in the past, in the current situation U.S.

[8] The individuals interviewed include Richard Cheney (secretary of Defense, 1989–1993); William Perry (secretary of Defense, 1994–1997); Walter Slocombe (undersecretary of Defense for policy, 1994–present); Colin Powell (chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1989–1993); Strobe Talbott (deputy secretary of State, 1994–present); James Steinberg (director of policy planning, Department of State, 1994–1996).

[9] Letter from Robert Oakley to Barry Blechman, 7 August 1997.

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leaders are committed and, if necessary, will persevere in carrying out violent military actions—has become a difficult challenge in U.S. diplomacy. It also creates a large obstacle to resolving conflicts and protecting U.S. interests while avoiding military confrontation.

How Threats are Evaluated

There is a rich literature on the use of force in world affairs and a considerable body of writing on the particular problems of the use of American military power in the post-cold war period.[10] There is also a large body of memoirs and contemporary histories testifying to the perceptions of American decision makers in particular incidents.[11]

The authors of this literature have made any number of observations as to the conditions that facilitate the effective use of military threats. Typically, these conditions are not proposed as prerequisites for effective threats but merely as elements that make it more likely that threats will succeed. We therefore term these variables "enabling conditions." The large number suggested in the literature, many of which differ from one another only in nuance, can be grouped into two broad categories. Most enabling conditions shape the credibility of the U.S. threat in the mind of the targeted foreign leaders; these include both conditions pertaining to the context in which the U.S. threat is made and to the character of the threat itself. Quite apart from the credibility of the U.S. threat, however, some demands are more difficult for foreign leaders to comply with than others, and some of the enabling conditions directly affect this perception of how costly it would be to comply with the demands. Together, the credibility of the threat and the degree of difficulty of the demands shape the targeted leader's evaluation of the likely cost of complying or of not complying

[10] Some voices in this debate include Christopher M. Gacek, *The Logic of Force: The Dilemma of Limited War in American Foreign Policy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995); Alexander L. George, "The Role of Force in Diplomacy: A Continuing Dilemma for U.S. Foreign Policy" in Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, eds., *Force and Statecraft*, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); Alexander L. George and William E. Simons, eds., *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994); Bruce W. Jentleson, "Who, Why, What and How: Debates Over Post-Cold War Military Intervention" in Robert J. Lieber, ed., *Eagle Adrift: American Policy at the End of the Century* (New York: Longman's, 1997); Lori Fisler Damrosch, ed., *Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993); Aspen Strategy Group, *The United States and the Use of Force in the Post-Cold War Era* (Queenstown, MD: Aspen Institute, 1995); and Joshua Murachik, *The Imperative of American Leadership: A Challenge to Neo-Isolationism* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1996).

[11] Some examples are James A. Baker and Thomas M. Defrank, *The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace, 1989–1992* (New York: Putnam, 1995); Colin Powell with Joseph E. Persico, *My American Journey* (New York: Random House, 1995); Dan Quayle, *Standing Firm: A Vice-Presidential Memoir* (New York: HarperCollins, 1994); H. Norman Schwarzkopf with Peter Petre, *It Doesn't Take a Hero: General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, the Autobiography* (New York: Bantam Books, 1992); Bob Woodward, *The Commanders* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991); and George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, *A World Transformed* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998).

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FIGURE 1
Evaluations of Threats



with U.S. demands. The balance between the cost of compliance and the cost of defiance represents the potency of the U.S. threat.[12] These relationships are expressed in Figure 1 and are discussed further below.

Enabling Conditions

The context in which a threat is made and the character of the threat itself together shape the credibility of the threat. The degree of difficulty of a demand is evaluated through this credibility screen to determine the likely costs of compliance and noncompliance.

Context of the threat. In previous work on this subject, Stephen Kaplan and Barry Blechman determined that coercive uses of military power by the United States were most likely to be successful when the United States acted in an appropriate historical context, when there was precedent for its demands and ac-

[12] This term was first suggested by Alexander George. See his discussion of credibility and of the magnitude of demands in George and Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*.

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tions. This stands to reason. We know from experience that reaffirmations of long-standing positions are more likely to be taken seriously than declarations of new demands, particularly when the credibility of the traditional claim has already been tested through force of arms and found to be genuine. Targets of new claims of U.S. vital interests may quite naturally want to test the claimant's seriousness. Such a challenge, when it occurs, means that the threat is ineffective, and the goals of the U.S. demands must be asserted through direct military action. Precedents may also have negative effects; as we shall see, the fact that U.S. military power was resisted successfully in Vietnam and elsewhere by weaker military powers seems to have adversely affected the credibility of U.S. military threats in recent years.[13]

A second contextual factor believed to shape the credibility of U.S. military threats is the presence or absence of broad public support for military action and, particularly, whether or not there is wide support among members of Congress. Obviously, as in the case of Vietnam, domestic dissent raises the possibility either that the United States will not act on its threats if challenged or that even if it does act, the force of public opinion will sooner or later, probably sooner, compel a retreat. This does not necessarily mean that any dissent negates a president's threats; the effect of dissent presumably depends on the importance attributed to it by the intended target. Since Vietnam there only rarely has been broad public support for U.S. initiatives involving the threat or use of military force—at least prior to the actual and successful conduct of the operation—there is usually evidence that foreign leaders can cite in persuading themselves and their people that the Americans can be made to back down.[14]

The presence or absence of third-nation support for the U.S. position is a third contextual factor that seems to influence perceptions of the credibility of a U.S. threat. Allies' protests can curtail the willingness of the United States to act on its threats or to persevere in any military action needed to respond to a challenge for fear of incurring high costs in more important relationships. This factor has become increasingly important in assessments of threats or uses of force in recent years, as the United States has become increasingly reluctant to act without allies in the new types of situations that have emerged following the cold war. As with all the enabling conditions, what matters is not the reality of allied support but the targeted leader's perception of this factor. In explaining Saddam Hussein's disbelief of American threats during the Persian

[13] See Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, *Force Without War* (Washington: DC, Brookings Institution, 1978); Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice G. Stein, *Psychology and Deterrence* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985); Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966). Some scholars argue that forceful precedents are useful only when they reflect core U.S. interests; for example, see Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974).

[14] For discussion of the role that public opinion plays in America's ability to take effective military action abroad, see Jentleson, "Who, Why, What and How"; and J. Holl, "We the People Here Don't Want No War" in Aspen Strategy Group, *The United States and the Use of Force*.

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Gulf conflict, for example, former Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney cited Hussein's belief that the United States could never carry out military operations in Iraq itself because—in Hussein's view—the Arab nations allied with the United States would make clear that in such circumstances they would have to leave the coalition.[15]

A final contextual factor often said to influence the credibility of U.S. threats is the reputation of the president and other high-level U.S. officials. The scholarly literature is mixed in its assessments of the importance of this factor, however, and the case studies examined for this project shed no light on the subject; no discernible difference could be seen in responses to threats by Presidents Bush or Clinton that would seem to pertain to the incumbent's reputation. More basic attributes of U.S. credibility and of the situation itself seem to have been more important.

Character of the threat. Other factors contributing importantly to the credibility of threats reflect the manner in which they are conveyed. A sense of urgency must be part of the threat or the targeted leader can believe that a strategy of delay and inaction will be effective in avoiding compliance. The establishment of deadlines appears to be particularly important.[16] In 1989 Panamanian strongman Manuel Noriega understood well that the United States would prefer to see him removed from power and democracy restored. But because the United States endorsed negotiations by the Organization of American States (OAS) with Noriega and never articulated an "either-or" threat of Noriega's forcible removal, he apparently interpreted U.S. rhetoric as bluster and dismissed stepped-up American military exercises in the Panama Canal zone as "mere posturing."[17]

Verbal threats are also more effective when accompanied by tangible military actions—steps that indicate the seriousness of the U.S. undertaking. Not only can movements or other actions by military units demonstrate actual capabilities, thus lending verisimilitude to threats, but by demonstrating the U.S. president's willingness to pay a price for the situation, they add credibility to his verbal demands. In this respect the greater the commitment demonstrated by the action, the more likely the threat is to be successful. Thus, Blechman and Kaplan[18] found the deployment of forces on the ground in the potential theater of operations to be a more effective means of making threats credible

[15] Interview by Barry Blechman with Richard Cheney, 15 January 1997. See also Janice G. Stein, "Deterrence and Compellence in the Gulf, 1990–1991: A Failed or Impossible Task?" *International Security* 17 (Fall 1992): 2; and George and Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*.

[16] George and Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*.

[17] See R. L. Grant, *Operation Just Cause and the U.S. Policy Process*, RAND Note N-3265-AF (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1991); Frederick Kempe, *Divorcing the Dictator: America's Bungled Affair with Noriega* (New York: Putnam, 1990); and J. B. Treaster, "Noriega Military Command Belittles General," *New York Times*, 27 December 1989.

[18] Blechman and Kaplan, *Force Without War*.

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than the movement of naval forces, as ground deployments demonstrate a willingness to pay the political price by putting U.S. soldiers, or air men and women, at risk. Similarly, the mobilization of military reserves has been an effective means of adding credibility to threats. Disrupting the lives of U.S. citizens by placing them on active duty, separating them from their families and workplaces, indicates indisputably the president's willingness to pay a high political price to get his way.

Difficulty of the demand. The context and character of a threat determine its credibility in the mind of the target. But whether a foreign leader chooses to comply with a U.S. demand is also conditioned by the degree of difficulty of the demand itself. To be effective, a demand must obviously be specific, clearly articulated, and put in terms that the target understands. There is no shortage of cases in which the targets of military threats simply did not understand what was being asked of them and therefore could not have acted to satisfy U.S. demands even if they had wanted to.[19]

In addition, a demand can be more or less onerous for the targeted leaders to contemplate. In part, this evaluation will depend on the demand's specific content: What is, in fact, being demanded? At the extreme, some demands may not be satisfiable by the target. In some cases the United States (and other nations) have misread situations, demanding actions that the target of a threat was not capable of delivering. This may have been the case in U.S. relations with the Soviet Union over the Middle East in the 1960s and 1970s, for example, where the United States threatened repeatedly but seems to have misjudged the Soviet Union's ability to influence certain Arab nations and factions.[20]

The inclusion of positive incentives in the overall U.S. diplomatic strategy is an important way of improving the targeted leader's perception of a U.S. demand. Not only do positive incentives change perceptions of the content of a demand itself, they also provide a political excuse for the target to do what it might have wanted to do anyway: back down and accept the U.S. demand.

A targeted leader's perception of the difficulty of a demand also will be affected by the degree of visibility of the retreat required. Regardless of substance, an act of compliance that can be taken invisibly is far easier to accept, as it may not convey additional political costs. A retreat that is visible and humiliating may often be perceived as something to be resisted at any cost.[21]

[19] Paul G. Lauren, "Coercive Diplomacy and Ultimata: Theory and Practice in History" in Alexander L. George and Willaim E. Simons, eds., *Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, suggests that ultimatums are the most explicit and precise method of communicating demands and that they may lessen the chances of misperception or miscalculation by the opponent.

[20] Lawrence L. Whetten, *The Canal War: Four Power Conflict in the Middle East* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1974).

[21] On the effect that degree of difficulty and losing face have on the effectiveness of threats, see George and Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*.

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It has been demonstrated in many studies that threats or limited uses of force are more likely to be effective when the behavior demanded of a target requires only that the target not carry out some threatened or promised action. This is a subset of the visibility factor: deterrent threats are more likely to succeed than compellent threats; the latter require the target to carry out a positive and, therefore, usually visible action. In the case of deterrent threats, on the other hand, it is usually unknown, and unknowable, whether or not in the absence of U.S. threats the target would have carried out the action being deterred. Would the Soviet Union have attempted to seize West Berlin in the late 1950s or early 1960s if the United States had not threatened to contest such an initiative with military force? No one can say with certainty. Thus, deterrent threats may appear to be more successful, because they are sometimes used to deter actions that would not be carried out in any event. Moreover, in those deterrent cases in which the initial threatened action would otherwise have been carried out, it is easier politically for the target to back down, as it need not be done in public; the target can always claim that, regardless of the U.S. threat, it would not have acted in any event. When the U.S. threat requires a positive act on the part of the target (for example, withdrawal from Kuwait), the retreat is publicly evident and could have dire consequences in national or regional politics.

Potency of the Threat

All of these enabling conditions—context of the threat, character of the threat, and degree of difficulty of a demand—contribute to a targeted leader's understanding of the cost of complying or of not complying with U.S. demands. In Alexander George's phrase, an effective threat must be potent relative to the demand. This means that the target must perceive that the threat, if carried out, would result in a situation in which the target would be worse off than if it complied with the U.S. demand. If, for example, the demand is that a ruler give up the throne, the only potent threat is likely to be that otherwise the ruler will be killed or that a situation would be created in which the ruler might be killed. Any threat less potent would likely be seen—even if it was carried out—as resulting in a situation no worse, and possibly better, than that which would have resulted from satisfying the demand. This evaluation, of course, will be filtered through the target's perception of the credibility of the threat: How likely it is that the anticipated punishment will be carried out? If the threat is perceived to be wholly incredible, the anticipated cost of noncompliance will be low. If the context and character of the threat add verisimilitude, however, the difficulty of the demand will be weighed carefully relative to the cost of noncompliance, and a sufficiently potent threat should produce compliance in a rational opponent.

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Case Studies

All these enabling conditions were examined for each of the eight major cases in which military force was threatened or used in limited ways in support of diplomacy during the Bush and first Clinton administrations. Although the authors examined each case extensively, only a brief summary of each can be presented in this article; the summaries highlight the key findings.

Panama, 1989–1990[22]

The Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega was an agent of U.S. policy in Central America for many years. In the late 1980s, however, his value declined with settlement of the Nicaraguan insurgency, and he became increasingly and more openly involved with the Colombian drug cartels. After he was indicted in the United States in February 1988 for drug trafficking and money laundering, first the Reagan administration and then the Bush administration decided to seek his removal from office. As tensions grew between the two countries in 1988 and 1989, the Panamanian Defense Forces, one key source of Noriega's power, began to harass U.S. military personnel in the country and in the Canal Zone, as well as to step up repression of the democratic opposition in Panama.

Because of the upcoming presidential election, the U.S. government did not initiate serious pressures against Noriega until 1989. Beginning in April of that year, however, the United States tried to make clear that it considered Noriega an illegitimate ruler and that it wanted him to step down. It renewed economic sanctions against Panama, gave Panamanian opposition parties $10 million in covert assistance toward their effort in the scheduled May presidential elections, and provided election observers. After Noriega manipulated the elections, the United States initiated a variety of diplomatic actions, including recalling its ambassador. The Bush administration worked through the Organization of American States (OAS) to negotiate Noriega's resignation and also carried out a series of military exercises and other actions in the Canal Zone intended to make the U.S. military presence there more visible. Noriega continued to refuse to comply with U.S. demands, however, and survived a coup in which the United States played a minor role. When a U.S. naval officer was murdered in December 1989, President Bush quickly authorized the U.S. armed forces to invade Panama, capture Noriega, and bring him to the United States for trial.

In this case, therefore, both diplomacy and military threats failed, necessitating the direct use of military force in war to accomplish the U.S. objective. Why was this the case? The main reasons appear to be related to the context and character of the threat itself. Despite any number of statements by U.S.

[22] Sources used for this case study include contemporaneous news reports; Powell with Persico, *My American Journey*; Baker and DeFrank, *The Politics of Diplomacy*; Grant, *Operation Just Cause and the U.S. Policy Process*; Woodward, *The Commanders*; and Kempe, *Divorcing the Dictator*.

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leaders indicating that they believed Noriega should step down and that they considered him an illegitimate ruler, it was never stated clearly and definitively that the United States would be willing to invade the country and throw Noriega out if he did not comply with the demand to relinquish office.[23] In short, no cost was ever specified for noncompliance with U.S. demands; hence, a potent threat was never made. The United States demanded that Noriega leave office, and although a threat to expel him by force might have been inferred from U.S. statements, it was never stated explicitly. Nor was any deadline set for his compliance with the demand to relinquish office; Noriega was permitted to defer action for months without any obvious penalty. Likewise, U.S. verbal demands were not directly supported by tangible military actions. Although reinforcements were sent to the Canal Zone and some exercises were held there, they were all downplayed by U.S. officials and explained by a general concern for the security of the Canal Zone in light of deteriorating U.S.–Panamanian relations.[24] Colin Powell has stated that the limited military actions taken by the United States in 1988 and 1989 probably reinforced Noriega's preexisting perception that the United Sates was irresolute and that he could persevere.[25] When the invasion force was assembled, it was done in secrecy and never displayed publicly or brandished in support of an ultimatum that Noriega surrender or face forceful expulsion. This approach, of course, was dictated by the Weinberger maxims of how to use military power effectively.

It was harder for U.S. officials to threaten effectively in this case, because the demand was extremely difficult for the target to contemplate. Noriega was being told to relinquish office; this was not a deterrent, but rather a compellent situation. Only a clear and potent threat might have had a chance of success, and in this case the target really did not understand that he faced a serious threat of U.S. action.

In the Panama case, in short, there was no defining moment because of the U.S. failure to make clear its compellent threat. The United States did not explicitly state the action it was prepared to take if its demand was not satisfied. Nor did it demonstrate a credible willingness to enforce the demand. No deadline for action by Noriega was established. The U.S. target, Noriega, never had to contemplate the seriousness of the U.S. resolve until it was too late for him to yield. U.S. leaders failed to press him into a defining moment.

U.S. Relations with Iraq, 1990–1996[26]

Eight months after the successful military operation in Panama, the Bush administration faced a far greater challenge in the Persian Gulf. In this case the

[23] President Bush even stated in a news conference on 13 October 1989 that using force in Panama was "a stupid argument that some very erudite people make." (Transcript printed in *New York Times*, 14 October 1989).

[24] Kevin Buckley, *Panama: The Whole Story* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991).

[25] Interview by Barry Blechman with General Colin Powell, 21 February 1997.

[26] Sources used in this case study included for the Persian Gulf crisis, Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, *The Gulf Conflict, 1990–1991* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); BBC World

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threat of force was a central element of the U.S. strategy from nearly the outset of the crisis. President Bush and all other senior officials stated repeatedly and unequivocally that if Saddam Hussein did not withdraw Iraqi forces from Kuwait, the United States was prepared, with the help of its allies, to expel them by force of arms. The threat was made increasingly credible throughout the remainder of 1990 by the mobilization and deployment of an enormous U.S. and allied military force in the region, an operation that could have left no question in Hussein's mind about the president's willingness to run huge political risks to implement the threat. Furthermore, the president's credibility was strengthened by the forging of a broad coalition that backed the American action, including Arab nations as well as traditional U.S. allies, by authorization of the allied military action by the UN and of U.S. military action by Congress, and by the establishment of a clear deadline for compliance that imparted a definite sense of urgency. Finally, the United States initiated an air campaign prior to launching its ground offensive, providing even more evidence of its military prowess and will and offering a final opportunity for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait rather than be thrown out.

The context and character of the U.S. threat would have predicted success. Yet all these measures failed; in the end, U.S. and allied armies had to invade Kuwait and compel the Iraqi retreat by force of arms. Why? Because of the opacity of the Iraqi regime, the answer may never be clear, although several possibilities come to mind.

Despite their visible display in the theater of operations, Hussein may still have underestimated U.S. military capabilities relative to Iraq's. He may have believed that the war would be far less one sided, causing sufficient U.S. casualties for Bush to end (or to be forced by U.S. and allied opinion to end) the hostilities short of the full expulsion of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. If so, he would have been counting heavily on the considerable opposition in the United States to the use of force prior to the authorizing legislation, as well as the obvious fragility of the coalition that had been brought together for the war.[27] He also simply may not have understood the extent of U.S. and allied power. Then Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney believes, for example, that Hussein's subordinates were afraid to bring him bad news or negative evaluations, as he was known to treat such messengers as traitors.[28]

Alternatively, the U.S. threat might simply not have been potent enough relative to the demand being made. The United States never threatened to un-

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Service, *Gulf Crisis Chronology* (Essex, UK: Longman Current Affairs, 1991); Ofra Bengio, ed., *Saddam Speaks on the Gulf Crisis: A Collection of Documents* (Tel Aviv, Israel: Moshe Dayan Center, 1992); Baker and Defrank, *The Politics of Diplomacy*; Woodward, *The Commanders*; and Powell with Persico, *My American Journey*. For the post-1991 incidents, sources included Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) transcripts of statements by Iraqi officials, statements by U.S. officials, and contemporaneous Western news reports.

[27] Bengio, *Saddam Speaks on the Gulf Crisis*.

[28] Interview by Barry Blechman with Richard Cheney, 15 January 1997.

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seat Hussein or to destroy his regime if Iraqi occupation forces were not withdrawn from Kuwait.[29] The threat was deliberately restricted to the destruction or expulsion of Iraqi forces in Kuwait, in part because Arab coalition members would not or could not support a more ambitious threat to destroy the Iraqi regime. From Hussein's perspective, in the context of his strategic vision, a military defeat while retaining power might have seemed preferable to an ignoble retreat. He might first have miscalculated and believed that the United States would not act to expel him from Kuwait; but subsequently, when he realized the error, he might have figured that in terms of his overall goals in the region and in terms of the likelihood of his being able to hold on to power in Baghdad, it would be better to be defeated militarily by the overwhelming forces that had been arrayed against him than to knuckle down to U.S. demands.[30] If this was the case, only a credible threat to destroy Hussein and his regime would have been potent enough to have achieved the objective—liberating Kuwait—without the direct use of military forces in war. In the absence of such a potent threat, Hussein never had to face a defining moment.

Because of this ambiguous outcome—military triumph for the United States but political survival for Saddam Hussein—threats and uses of force have remained a central element in U.S. relations with Iraq since the Gulf War ended. Immediately following the war, the United States and its allies, acting through the UN, intervened on the ground to protect the Kurds in Iraq's north and established no-fly zones in both the north and the south to protect the Kurds and the Shi'a minority from Iraq's air force. Both actions were accompanied by covert support for rebellious elements in the two regions intended to destabilize the Hussein regime. The no-fly zones have been enforced through combat air patrols and occasionally by air and missile strikes against radars, surface-to-air missiles, and command facilities.

Such an incident during the first Clinton administration took place in September 1996, when the United States once again struck at air defense sites in the south of Iraq, this time in response to an Iraqi intervention in a conflict between two Kurdish factions in the north. The United States maintained that the Iraqi military action was unacceptable and responded both by reinforcing its forces in the Gulf region and by launching cruise missile attacks on newly rebuilt Iraqi air defense sites in the south. The United States took no action directly in the Kurdish region. When Hussein seemed to defy U.S. injunctions regarding the need for Iraq to respect the no-fly zone in the south, the United States threatened more devastating air strikes against Iraq and moved aircraft into the region that would be capable of carrying them out. Hussein seemed to comply with the U.S. demand.

[29] There have been some suggestions, however, that the United States made such a threat to deter the Iraqis from using chemical weapons. See James Baker's comments on his Geneva meeting with Tariq Aziz in January 1991, in *The Gulf War*, a BBC/WGBH Frontline coproduction, written and produced by Eamonn Matthews (Seattle: PBS Video, 1996).

[30] Stein, "Deterrence and Compellence in the Gulf," 2.

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In an odd incident earlier in the Clinton administration, the United States launched cruise missile attacks against Iraq in retaliation for a plot by Iraqi intelligence agents to assassinate former President Bush during a visit to Kuwait. The plot was uncovered before the assassination attempt could be made, but the United States retaliated anyway to punish Iraq and deter future incidents. The cruise missile attacks, which included a strike on an Iraqi military intelligence headquarters said to be implicated in the plot, were intended to indicate to Hussein that such acts of terror and similar covert operations would not be tolerated.

An even more dramatic threat of American military force in the Persian Gulf took place in August 1994, when in response to the movement of Iraqi armored forces toward Kuwait, the United States deployed substantial quantities of naval and land-based air and ground forces to the Persian Gulf and stated that it would resist any new invasion with force. The United States had been building up its capabilities and facilities in the Gulf ever since the 1991 war and used the occasion of the Iraqi armored movements to reinforce its presence there to deter any new invasion of Kuwait. The Iraqi units withdrew soon after the U.S. reinforcements arrived, and the Clinton administration claimed that its threats had succeeded. This claim is uncertain, however, as many observers maintained that the Iraqi leader could not possibly have contemplated an invasion given the experience in 1991, the much weaker state of the Iraqi armed forces, and the much greater preparedness of the United States and its allies three years later.

This sequence of incidents presents interesting evidence about the difficulty of utilizing military threats. In each episode the United States was apparently successful: the no-fly zones have generally been respected; there have been no publicly known Iraqi terrorist plots directed against American targets since U.S. retaliation for the planned assassination of Bush; and there have been no further overt threats against Kuwait since 1994. Yet in the larger strategic sense, the United States has failed. U.S. interests would be served most effectively either by the fall of the Hussein regime or by a radical change in Hussein's behavior such that he complies willingly with U.S. wishes. But the Hussein regime continues to skirt UN resolutions and the terms of the agreement that ended the war, continues to terrorize its minority populations, continues to behave belligerently towards Kuwait and other states in the region, and periodically continues to challenge the United States politically. In short, the United States has had to settle for a lesser objective: containment. In the words of one U.S. official, U.S. diplomacy and military activity have served at best "to put Hussein back in the box."

This failure has occurred despite the fact that most of the enabling conditions surrounding U.S. policy are positive. There is now precedent for the actions, the U.S. public is very supportive, and the allies have generally cooperated; when they have not, the United States has been willing to act unilaterally. All the enabling conditions that determine the context and character of the

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threats are positive. While the demands made have varied in their degree of difficulty, none has been onerous. The failure, then, appears to be the result of the potency of the threat relative to the demand. As in the Gulf War, the United States and its allies have not been willing to make and, if necessary, carry out the one threat that might accomplish their long-term strategic interest. It is evident that the United States is not willing to topple the Hussein regime through force of arms or even to enforce its more far-reaching demands.

The weakness of the U.S. and allied position became evident in the 1996 incident. In response to Iraq's military action against a Kurdish faction in the north, which U.S. leaders termed unacceptable, the United States was only willing to stage symbolic attacks against Iraqi air defense facilities in the south—far from the scene of the Kurdish conflict. This time, most of the allies were unwilling to go along with the action, and open dissent weakened the coalition. The crisis worsened for a time as Hussein seemed to defy U.S. demands about the southern no-fly zone. While he ultimately gave in, the broader U.S. strategic objective of containment was threatened. Hussein reasserted control over significant territory in the north and dismantled the Kurdish opposition. Once again, U.S. demands were not sufficiently potent to bring Hussein to a defining moment.

In late 1997, Hussein barred U.S. citizens from the UN teams inspecting Iraq for weapons of mass destruction in compliance with the agreements ending the war. He also refused to permit inspections of certain types of sites, such as presidential palaces. Although Hussein seemed to relent on the first issue, in January 1998 Iraqi officials refused to allow a particular inspection team, led by an American who Iraq claimed was a spy, to carry out its work. The United States and some of its allies threatened once again to carry out air strikes, and eventually UN Secretary Kofi Annan was able to negotiate an agreement to resume inspections that once more averted major confrontation but failed to resolve the underlying issues.[31]

Somalia, 1992–1995[32]

The disastrous U.S. intervention in Somalia probably did more to undermine worldwide perceptions of the efficacy of U.S. military power than any event in recent memory. Among other things, American actions in Somalia influenced the calculations of leaders in Haiti and Bosnia as they confronted U.S. threats simultaneously.

[31] See postscript for information on later developments.

[32] Primary sources for this case study include FBIS transcripts of Radio Mogadishu broadcasts; contemporaneous news reports; Baker and DeFrank, *The Politics of Diplomacy*; Powell with Persico, *My American Journey*; and Barry M. Blechman and J. M. Vaccaro, *Towards an Operational Strategy of Peace Enforcement: Lessons from Interventions and Peace Operations* (Washington, DC: Defense Forecasts International, 1995).

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In Somalia, largely as a result of inattention at political levels, the United States allowed its military forces to transform their original humanitarian mission into a coercive activity intended to enforce a peaceful settlement of the underlying political conflict by disarming factions in a particular section of the country. When one faction resisted and killed twenty-four members of the Pakistani component of the United Nations peacekeeping force, the United States launched a low-level military offensive directed specifically against that faction. When U.S. forces suffered a tactical defeat in October 1993, Washington suddenly curtailed its objectives and announced that it would withdraw virtually all U.S. forces from the country.[33]

Once U.S. forces assumed the larger political role, the mission became extremely difficult. Most of the enabling conditions with respect to the context of the threat were negative. There was no significant precedent for U.S. involvement in Somali politics, and the American public did not support the mission beyond its initial humanitarian boundaries. Other countries with troops participating in the UN mission were extremely reluctant to undertake any actions implying a threat of conflict. The degree of difficulty of the demand escalated sharply once the U.S. offensive against Mohamed Farah Aideed began. Finally, because of the shifts in objectives, the U.S. demands were unclear—to U.S. officials and the U.S. public as well as to the Somali targets. Also, the Somali leaders were constrained by their mutual competition, as well as by internal conflicts within their respective factions, making it unclear whether compliance with U.S. demands was ever feasible.

Nonetheless, the character of the threat suggested potency. A clear sense of urgency was implied, and positive inducements for compliance were supplied. Yet the threat and use of force both failed. The clearest reason was noted previously and stated by the faction leader, Aideed, to the U.S. negotiator. Based on his understanding of recent U.S. history, he believed that the United States could not sustain a campaign against him in the face of casualties. The lack of precedent for the U.S. action in Somalia and the dissension already evident in the United States and among its allies served to confirm his preexisting view that the United States could not sustain its threats against even nominal opposition. The U.S. threat was not credible because contextual factors reinforced the target's preexisting judgment about U.S. credibility.

Macedonia, 1992–Present[34]

The deployment of U.S. and other nations' ground forces to Macedonia to deter any extension of the Bosnian war to that nation, or any other ethnic confla-

[33] U.S. forces initially entered Somalia in December 1992 as part of a multilateral mission, UNITAF, intended to secure the delivery of food and other relief supplies that would end the famine and prepare the way for a broader UN force. Having accomplished this limited mission, in May 1993 UNITAF gave way to UNOSOM II, which included only 4,500 U.S. troops. UNOSOM II's mission included disarming the various clan factions that were making the reestablishment of a central government impossible. U.S. forces and the entire UN peacekeeping mission had withdrawn from Somalia by March 1995.

[34] This and the following case study on Bosnian policy are based on public statements by President Clinton and then Secretary of State Warren Christopher, news reports, and extensive FBIS transcripts

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gration, represents an apparent success for U.S. military threats. Despite their reluctance to become involved in Bosnia itself, first the Europeans and then the United States were willing to deploy troops to Macedonia as a means of guaranteeing their involvement should the conflict spread. The deployment also was intended to strengthen warnings to Serb leaders not to tighten oppression of the Albanian population in Kosovo. In a way, the unwillingness of U.S. leaders to take decisive action in Bosnia at the time made Macedonia seem more important in the eyes of Washington decision makers. It was a means of demonstrating some on-the-ground involvement and a willingness to prevent a widening conflict, thereby, it was hoped, earning some credits with the Europeans.

In this case, virtually all the enabling conditions were positive. There was support in the Congress, unanimity among the allies, the demand was stated clearly and reinforced by military actions, and the threat (automatic involvement in any extension of the Bosnian conflict) was potent relative to the demand. Its self-implementing nature intrinsically conveyed a sense of commitment and urgency.[35]

Of course, the U.S. threat with respect to Macedonia had another great advantage. It was intended to deter hostile actions whose likelihood was not clear. Whether or not the Serbs or anyone else might have tried to extend the Bosnian conflict to Macedonia absent the allied deployment of ground forces there is anyone's guess. The threat might have worked, because the degree of difficulty of the demand was low. Compliance with the demand required no visible action; in fact, it might have required no action at all.

Bosnia, 1992–Present

The Bosnian war and its accompanying humanitarian tragedies bedeviled both the Bush and the Clinton administrations. Throughout the conflict, threats and limited applications of force have been used for tactical purposes with mixed results. Early in the conflict, the United States and its allies established a no-fly zone to protect their humanitarian shipments and forces, and the threat of selective air strikes was employed to remind the Serbs of these rules, generally with some tactical success. On the other hand, the United States and its allies, working through the UN, threatened and used limited amounts of force repeatedly in efforts to protect the so-called safe areas from Serb encroachments and subsequent mass murders. These efforts failed miserably, climaxing with the occupation of Zepa and Srebrenica in 1995 and the murder of thousands of their residents.

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of Croatian, Bosnian Serb, Serbian, and Bosnian TV and radio broadcasts containing statements by leaders of these groups.

[35] There have been virtually no complaints from the Congress about the Macedonian deployment despite the fact that U.S. troops serve under UN command—a hot issue among conservatives. Of course, the support would probably disappear quickly if the troops in Macedonia appeared in danger of entering combat.

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On the strategic level from the earliest days of the Clinton administration, U.S. leaders repeatedly threatened a deeper level of involvement in the conflict if Serb forces did not comply with various resolutions. The United States also deployed a considerable number of forces to the Adriatic and to Italian air bases, helping to enforce sanctions against Serbia and an arms embargo in Bosnia, as well as carrying out the limited strikes mentioned above. But the vagueness of the U.S. strategic threats encouraged Serb intransigence and continued Serb efforts to seize additional territory. The appearance of a lack of American resolve was compounded by clear indications that the Untied States was not willing to deploy ground forces to Bosnia and that the allies were willing to deploy troops but not to place them in danger, as would be required by any serious effort to compel Serb compliance with Western demands. Not until August 1995, following the atrocities in Zepa and Srebrenica and the successful Croat offensive against the Serbs, did the United States and its allies make a serious effort to pressure the Serbs into entering peace negotiations by carrying out repeated air strikes against a variety of targets. Soon thereafter, the Dayton talks were begun and the peace agreement now being implemented was concluded. Whether the Serbs were brought to the peace table by the Croat offensive, the new allied will to end the conflict suggested by the air campaign, or their own weariness with war and sanctions is anyone's guess. Whether the peace will last is an even greater unknown. In the post-Dayton phase, of course, the United States and its allies again used military force, deploying ground troops of the Implementation Force, or IFOR, throughout Bosnia to help keep the peace. IFOR was successful in ensuring that the parties observed the military aspects of the Dayton Accords and completed its mission in December 1996. It has been succeeded by a smaller force known as the Stabilization Force, or SFOR.

In the end, therefore, U.S. strategic threats appear to have been successful in persuading the Serbs to stop fighting and start talking, or at least were coincident with success. But this one success capped a long period of clear failure, consistent with the negative values of most of the enabling conditions in this case. All the contextual variables were negative: there was no precedent for U.S. involvement in the former Yugoslavia, the Congress and the American people were starkly divided as to the wisdom of U.S. involvement, and the allies were obviously reluctant to risk the lives of their soldiers. The credibility of the threat was strengthened by the deployment of forces, but the actual uses of these forces were so limited as to convey a message of reluctance and weakness rather than of strength. This is certainly the view of Undersecretary of Defense Walter Slocombe, who has said that "UNPROFOR's mistake was tolerating hostile behavior. It should have slapped down the people who were shooting at them."[36]

[36] Interview by Barry Blechman with Walter Slocombe, 27 January 1996.

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Similarly, the enabling conditions pertaining to the final demand made of the Serbs were mainly negative. The U.S. demand to halt the war was not articulated clearly until the final air offensive, and no sense of urgency was conveyed until then. The U.S. objective was to compel participation in a peace process, rather that deter certain actions, requiring a positive and visible step by the target. And that target—Serbia's president—often was unable to deliver the Serb leaders in Bosnia even when he wanted to meet the U.S. demands.

The enabling conditions only turned positive, for the most part, following the massacres at Zepa and Srebrenica and the beginning of the massive NATO air strikes. As the air strikes continued, they not only raised the cost of noncompliance but also encouraged the development of a sense of urgency among Serb leaders. At this point, the choice became clearer to the Serbs—peace or destruction of the military infrastructure of the Bosnian Serbs. Given other conditions at the time, particularly the successful Croatian ground offensive that was changing the entire strategic situation and the evident weariness with the war in Serbia, the U.S. threats at last gained the potency necessary to achieve their objective. Then Secretary of Defense William Perry in fact believes that he can identify the defining moment: a visit by the chiefs of the U.S., British, and French armed forces to Bosnian Serb military leaders in Belgrade on 23 July 1995 to convey the new resoluteness of the NATO nations in the aftermath of the Srebrenica massacres.[37]

The picture that thus emerges with respect to the efficacy of U.S. military threats in Bosnia is mixed. For the most part the threats failed, mainly because the element central to their potency—a willingness to deploy U.S. ground troops and to utilize European forces already on the ground—was missing. Seeing the disarray in the United States and the dissension among the allies, the Serbs had little reason to comply. Only when the NATO allies, reacting to the murders in Srebrenica and the Croat offensive, made clear that they would be willing to act more forcefully did the Serbs perceive a real cost to their noncompliance and begin to take the allies' threats seriously.

Haiti, 1994–1996[38]

Haiti presents a similar picture: ineffective threats and excessively limited military actions showed U.S. irresoluteness for a considerable period of time but were followed by a potent threat that finally achieved its objective. The crisis in Haiti actually began in 1991, when a military coup expelled the country's first elected president, Jean Bertrand Aristide. The United States pursued a diplomatic strategy to reinstall the president, accompanied by sanctions for more than two years. Only when the Governor's Island agreement that would

[37] Interview by Barry Blechman with William Perry, 21 January 1997.

[38] Sources for this case study included Powell with Persico, *My American Journey*; contemporaneous U.S. news reports; and FBIS transcripts of Port-au-Prince Radio Metropole.

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have permitted Aristide to regain office failed in the fall of 1993 and the Haitian military government turned back a U.S. ship delivering the lead element of a UN peacekeeping force, did the United States threaten to overthrow the military government and reinstall Aristide by force, if necessary.

The turning away of the U.S. ship followed closely on the defeat of U.S. forces in Somalia, a coincidence that was particularly harmful to the efficacy of U.S. threats.[39] For the next eight months the United States made numerous demonstrations of its military capabilities through deployments of Navy and Marine forces off the island and by staging exercises intended to show practice for an invasion. Yet the Haitian ruler, General Raoul Cedras, with virtually no means of defending himself if the United States did invade, refused to back down. Finally, President Clinton received authorizations to utilize military force from the OAS and the UN and set a deadline for the invasion. Still, the Haitian ruler refused to back down. It was only when he received word that U.S. airborne troops had left their bases and that the operation was actually under way that he accepted a U.S. offer, conveyed by a delegation chaired by former President Jimmy Carter, to step down with some semblance of dignity and a guarantee of safety.

It should have been easier to make effective threats in the Haitian case than in Bosnia. While U.S. opinion tended to oppose the use of American forces in both cases, there was ample precedent for U.S. interventions in Haiti and the Caribbean, and most other hemispheric nations were supportive. The demand was clear, the target could easily comply, the threat was potent relative to the demand, and U.S. military power was displayed with great visibility. There were also positive inducements for compliance: U.S. representatives offered to provide for the personal safety of the Haitian dictator and his family.

Why, then, was it so difficult to make a threat that worked? Why was it necessary to actually launch a huge invasion force before Cedras would believe that Clinton was truly committed to his ouster? Two factors relating to the context of the U.S. threat seem to have been essential. First, the opposition of much of the American public and Congress to invasion plans may have conveyed hope to Cedras that Clinton could not possibly go through with his threats. Indeed, knowing that he would be defeated, Clinton did not seek congressional authorization for the invasion. Second, particularly in view of this opposition, Cedras may have taken heart from the recent American behavior in Somalia, as well as from his success in compelling the ship carrying UN peacekeepers to withdraw.[40] He may have believed that even if the United States did invade, all

[39] D. Ribadeneira, "Life as Usual for Haiti Troops: At Military Headquarters in Capital, No Signs of Concern," *Boston Globe*, 15 May 1994; A. Downie, "U.S. Diplomats in Haiti Threatened, Ship Delayed," *Reuters*, 11 October 1993; A. Downie, "Tense Standoff in Haiti over U.S. Troopship," *Reuters North American Wire*, 12 October 1993.

[40] According to a wire service report, Downie, "U.S. Diplomats in Haiti Threatened," Haitian paramilitaries demonstrating in Port-au-Prince chanted, "We're going to make a second Somalia here!" and UN envoy Dante Caputo said that the Haitians were "trying to create an atmosphere where it would be a disaster, a blood bath, if foreign troops came."

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his forces would have to do would be to inflict some casualties and the Americans would withdraw. If this is the case, the persuasiveness of the Carter mission,which made clear both the magnitude and commitment of the U.S. effort and provided positive inducements for compliance, was essential in increasing the potency of the U.S. threat and bringing Cedras to his defining moment.

Korea, 1994–1996[41]

The Korean case is probably the most successful use of military threats during this period. Essentially in this case, threats of military force were used as one element in a strategy that concentrated mainly on using economic instruments—both positive and negative—to halt the North Korean nuclear weapons program. While threats were not the most prominent element of the strategy, they clearly played a role, enforcing boundaries on Pyongyang's choices. According to Walter Slocombe, when Pyongyang tried to counter the U.S. threat to impose economic sanctions by stating that such an action would constitute an act of war, the United States made clear that it was willing to escalate along with North Korea through visible efforts to increase its readiness for war on the peninsula.[42]

The threats generally were vague in character and articulated indirectly. Neither the president nor other high-ranking U.S. officials threatened explicitly to destroy North Korea's nuclear facilities, but the administration let it be known that it was considering military options and reinforced the message by strengthening its presence in South Korea with air defense missiles and other items. Consultations with the U.S. commander in Korea to discuss military options were held with a fair amount of publicity. The fact that prominent Republicans, such as former National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, were calling for military strikes reinforced the message that the administration could not rule out direct military action if negotiations failed.

Enabling conditions in this case were generally positive for effective threats. The U.S. interest and willingness to use force in Korea had strong precedent, public opinion and the Congress supported the need to do something about North Korea's nuclear weapons program, the demand was clear, and the threat was supported by visible military actions. The major negative condition was that the U.S. ally, South Korea, was reluctant to see the crisis get out of control, as it faced the possibility of major casualties if combat resumed on the peninsula.

In the end, North Korea probably ended its nuclear program because it had gotten what it wanted—an economic payoff and, more importantly, the beginning of a dialogue with the United States that might lead eventually to normal

[41] Sources for this case study include North Korea, *The Public Perspective* 5 (July/August, 1994): 5; statements by President Clinton, Secretary of Defense Perry, and other U.S. officials; and contemporaneous news reports.

[42] Interview by Barry Blechman with Walter Slocombe, 27 January 1996.

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relations. Still, U.S. officials believe that Pyongyang took the U.S. threats seriously and that they played some role in bringing about the so-far positive outcome.

Taiwan, 1996[43]

The final case is an odd one—more symbolic than real. In 1996, China staged a series of military exercises and missile tests near Taiwan as the latter moved toward an election in which opposition parties were campaigning on a platform that demanded independence from the mainland. The Chinese actions were apparently intended to intimidate the Taiwanese and to remind all other parties—particularly the United States—that China would not tolerate de facto Taiwanese independence indefinitely and especially would not tolerate overt steps toward a de jure sovereign status. In response, the United States sent an aircraft carrier task group through the straits that separate Taiwan from the mainland and later in the crisis deployed a second carrier near the island. The U.S. actions apparently were intended to remind China of the American interest in preventing Taiwan's unification with the mainland by force.

Both parties' actions, of course, were shadowboxing. China was probably not seriously contemplating invading Taiwan. It does not have the means to accomplish that goal, and Taiwan could probably defend itself against an invasion without U.S. help. Moreover, the fallout from such an action would set back China's economic development immensely, as well as antagonize neighboring states (especially Japan) and trigger massive armament programs on their parts—a counterproductive outcome from China's perspective.

But if China's threat was not serious, neither was that of the United States. Despite a great deal of hype in the news media, both countries apparently understood that they were playing on a stage, making points for world opinion and for domestic audiences. Both Chinese and American statements explicitly discounted any risk of a U.S.–Chinese military confrontation and anticipated continued relations in the future.[44] In this sense the U.S. threats were effective; the target, however, was not China but Taiwan and domestic U.S. audiences.

Conclusions

The results of the case studies discussed above are summarized in Table 1. The cases are arrayed in rows, moving chronologically from top to bottom. The outcomes of each case and a description of the enabling conditions constitute the columns.

[43] Sources for this case study include public statements by President Clinton, Secretary of State Christopher, and Secretary of Defense Perry; transcripts of State Department press conferences; and Chinese Foreign Ministry statements, including press conferences by Foreign Minister Qian Qichen.

[44] Burns, "Fallout from Taiwan Tensions: U.S. Cancels China Talks," *The Record*, 23 March 1996.

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TABLE 1

Enabling Conditions and Outcomes

	Credibility				*Degree of Difficulty*						
Case	*Precedent*	*Public Support*	*Third-Nation Support*	*Urgency*	*Tangible Military Action*	*Articulated*	*Content*	*Visibility*	*Positive Incentive*	*Potency*	*Outcome*
Panama	+	+	+	−	+	−	3	−	−	−	YB
Iraq (Strategic Outcome)	−	+	+	+	+	+	2	−	−	−	YB
DS/DS[a]	−	+	+	+	+	+	2	−	−	−	YB
South No-fly	−	+	−	+	+	+	2	−	−	+	YB
Kurds	−	+	−	+	+	−	2	−	+	−	YB
Terror	+	+	+	+	+	+	1	+	−	+	S
VW[b]	+	+	+	+	+	+	1	+	+	+	S
Somalia	−	−	−	+	+	−	2	−	−	−	F
Macedonia	−	+	+	+	+	+	1	+	+	+	S
Bosnia (Strategic Outcome)	−	−	+	+	+	−	2	−	+	+	YB
Lift/No-fly	−	+	+	+	+	+	2	+	+	−	YB
Sanctions	−	−	+	−	+	+	2	+	−	−	YB
Safe/Weapons[c]	−	−	+	−	+	+	2	+	−	−	F
Dayton	−	−	+	+	+	+	2	−	+	+	S
IFOR	+	+	+	+	+	+	1	+	+	+	S
Haiti	+	−	+	−	+	+	3	−	+	+	YB
North Korea	+	+	+	+	+	+	1	−	+	+	S
Taiwan	+	+	−	−	+	+	1	+	+	+	S

[a] Desert Shield/Desert Storm.

[b] Valiant Warrior (1994).

[c] Safe Havens/Weapons Exclusion Zones.

Notes: The enabling conditions are generally labeled positive, meaning that they favored a successful outcome from the U.S. perspective, or negative, meaning the opposite. The one exception is the content of the demand made, which is ranked from 1 (least difficult for the target) to 3 (most difficult for the target).

Outcomes are categorized as a success (S), failure (F), or "yes, but" (YB), meaning that the outcome eventually favored the United States, but that getting there left a great deal to be desired. The Iraq and Bosnia cases are rated both for their strategic outcome and for specific uses of force within each case.

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Overall, the use of military power by the United States clearly failed in only one of the cases—Somalia. U.S. threats to use military force clearly succeeded in three—Macedonia, North Korea, and Taiwan. In the four other cases—Panama, Iraq, Bosnia, and Haiti—the use of military power ultimately succeeded, but either success came only with great difficulty at considerable cost to other U.S. interests, or the United States was successful only in achieving its immediate objectives, not its longer-term strategic goals. In Panama, Bosnia, and Haiti, success came only after long periods of failure with high costs for the administration domestically and internationally; in Iraq each individual use of military power was successful, but the strategic situation remains unchanged and unsatisfactory from an American perspective; in Bosnia and Haiti the underlying political conflicts remain unresolved and easily reversible.

With respect to the enabling conditions, none alone appears to be a sufficient condition for success; nor can it be said for certain that any one condition—other than that the target indeed be able to fulfill the demand—is a prerequisite for success. Still, one noteworthy partial correlation can be seen between the difficulty of the demand and positive outcomes. In six of seven successes (counting individual uses of force within cases as well as overall cases), fulfillment of the U.S. objective demanded relatively little of the target. Typically, the actions required of the targets also tended to be less visible in these cases, with the exceptions of the action required of North Korea and of the Bosnian Serbs with respect to entering the Dayton negotiations. The U.S. posture in six of the seven successful uses of military power also included positive incentives, further reducing the difficulty of the demand as perceived by the target.

Enabling conditions pertaining to the credibility of U.S. threats, as determined by the context and character, present a less consistent pattern. There was precedent for U.S. action in only half of the cases, and the results were mixed in those cases with precedents and those without. Third-nation support and whether or not a sense of urgency was conveyed present no clear pattern. Tangible military actions were taken in all cases and hence shed no light.

The presence or absence of public support is more interesting. It was present in the three clear successes and absent in the one clear failure. The remaining four cases, which had mixed results, were also split with respect to public support. Public support for a threat evidently cannot guarantee its success, but an evident lack of public support apparently can make it difficult to make threats credibly. In Somalia and Haiti, as well as Bosnia for most of the conflict, the evident lack of public support in the United States for the policies being pursued by the administration seems to have given great comfort to the target of the U.S. action and encouraged him to attempt to stay the course. Evidence of public dissension was probably a factor encouraging Hussein to defy U.S. threats as well, and each of the former officials interviewed cited this factor as greatly complicating the use of military power by the United States.

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Looking beyond the scoreboard of results to the cases themselves, the question of potency also appears to be especially important. Potent threats relative to the cost of noncompliance were made in each of the clearly successful cases (Macedonia, North Korea, and Taiwan) and were not made in the one clear failure (Somalia). In the case of Iraq, as in Panama and in all but the so-far-final stage of the Bosnian conflict, the unwillingness of the United States to make threats that would clearly offer the target the prospect of an unacceptable cost seems to have been an important reason for the failure of U.S. policy.

The problem that the United States faces, therefore, is very clear. It is rare that it can both make potent threats and retain public support. Potent threats imply greater risks. And the American public's aversion to risk, particularly the risk of suffering casualties, is well known; the legacy of Vietnam is real. This is particularly true in the types of conflict situations that have arisen since the end of the cold war—where there is little precedent for American action, where American interests are more abstract than tangible, where the battle lines are uncertain, and where none of the contending parties wears a particularly friendly face.

Recognizing this public aversion to casualties or predicting such opposition in particular cases, American presidents have been reluctant to step as close to the plate as has been required to achieve U.S. objectives in many post-cold war conflicts. They have made threats only reluctantly and usually have not made as clear or potent a threat as was called for by the situation. They have understood the need to act in the situation but have been unwilling or perceived themselves as being unable to lead the American people into the potential sacrifice necessary to secure the proper goal. As a result, they have attempted to satisfice, taking some action but not the most effective possible action to challenge the foreign leader threatening U.S. interests. They have sought to curtail the extent and potential cost of the confrontation by avoiding the most serious type of threat and therefore the most costly type of war if the threat were challenged.

The American public's sensitivity to the human and economic costs of military action is a clear legacy of the Vietnam experience. But it has been reinforced since then by sharp reactions by the public and elected officials to the suicide bombing of U.S. Marines in Beirut and to the deaths of U.S. soldiers in Mogadishu. Both Bush and Clinton have been keenly cognizant of this sensitivity, and their attempts to threaten to use military power have been hesitant as a result.

This syndrome would impair the effectiveness of U.S. coercive diplomacy under any circumstances, but its deleterious effects are magnified by the impact of those same historical events on foreign leaders. Vietnam syndrome is not solely an American disease: its symptoms are visible abroad, when potential targets of U.S. threats see the American public's sensitivity to casualties as a positive factor in their own reckoning of the risks and benefits of alternative courses of action. A review of the evidence reveals that Bosnian Serb leaders,

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Haitian paramilitary leaders, Saddam Hussein, and Somalia's late warlord all banked on their ability to force a U.S. retreat by inflicting relatively small numbers of casualties on U.S. forces. That places American presidents attempting to accomplish goals through threats in a dilemma. Domestic opinion rarely supports forceful policies at the outset, but tentative policies only reinforce the prejudices of foreign leaders and induce them to stand firm. Vietnam's legacy abroad pushes foreign leaders' defining moments back, requiring greater demonstrations of will, greater urgency, more tangible actions by U.S. forces, and greater potency for threats to succeed. But Vietnam's legacy at home makes it much harder for U.S. presidents to take such forceful actions without significant investments of political capital.

As a result of this dilemma, American officials have often been unable to break through the preconceived notions of U.S. weakness held by foreign leaders to bring about a defining moment. Indeed, the cases in which decisive U.S. actions were taken only after long periods of indecision (especially Panama, Bosnia, and Haiti) may have only reinforced foreign leaders' preconceptions about America's lack of will. Until U.S. presidents show a greater ability to lead on this issue, or until the American people demonstrate a greater willingness to step up to the challenges of exercising military dominance on a global scale, foreign leaders in many situations will likely continue to see American threats more as signs of weakness than as potent expressions of America's true military power. As a result, they will likely continue to be willing to withstand American threats—necessitating either recourse to force to achieve American goals or embarrassing retreats in the pursuit of American interests abroad.

This suggests that American presidents have several options when considering potential uses of military power in support of diplomacy:

- They can pick their fights carefully, choosing to make public demands of other nations mainly in situations in which the actions they require will not be perceived by the target as excessively difficult and when they can leaven their threats with positive incentives to encourage compliance, as in the cases of Taiwan and North Korea.
- They can seek to "demilitarize" U.S. policy somewhat. Strategies close to those used in the Korean case may be more appropriate and more effective than the quick recourse to military threats seen in most of the other cases. Threats and limited military force have a clear role but more as reinforcing elements in policies dominated by economic, diplomatic, and political factors than as the primary policy instrument. In Haiti, ultimately a skilled diplomatic team backed by force, not the force itself, secured Cedras's removal from power. Given domestic constraints on U.S. ability to use military power in threats or in actuality, Presidents Bush and Clinton may have leaned too heavily on the armed forces to advance American interests in the immediate post-cold war world. Policies that deemphasize the role of force may be more appropriate more often.

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- When nonmilitary instruments of policy seem likely to be ineffectual but the U.S. president still perceives an imperative to act, and the foreign leader seems likely to perceive compliance with U.S. demands as onerous, the president must act decisively. In these situations the demand must be clear and urgent, the demonstration of military power incontrovertible, and the threat itself potent relative to the target's alternatives. The ultimate achievement of U.S. objectives in Desert Storm and at the end of the Bosnian and Haitian scenarios demonstrates that presidential decisiveness can be effective, even at the later stages of a crisis. Most importantly, in Colin Powell's words, "The president himself must begin the action prepared to see the course through to its end. . . . He can only persuade an opponent of his seriousness when, indeed, he is serious."[45]

Postscript

This article was prepared for publication in *Political Science Quarterly* at the midpoint of the second Clinton administration, precisely at a time when U.S. and British aircraft were carrying out an extensive bombing campaign in Iraq intended to weaken the Saddam Hussein regime and compel Baghdad to cooperate with UN inspectors seeking to verify destruction of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. This massive air campaign was the direct consequence of the intrinsic difficulties faced by the United States in making military threats and using force in limited ways and of specific problems faced by the Clinton administration in its second term.

Saddam Hussein escalated Iraq's testing of U.S. resolve on the inspections issue in late 1997. The United States responded with threatening rhetoric and diplomacy, but stepped back from threatened air strikes on several occasions—the last in November 1998 when the aircraft were already enroute, minutes away from their targets. Hussein's strategy of probe and withdraw, test and comply, has been highly effective. It is costly for the United States in tangible terms to prepare for military action, and costly in political terms to appear indecisive and vacillating. After employing tough rhetoric, the administration has repeatedly ended by appearing anxious for any excuse not to undertake military action. As a result, support for a tough stance on the inspections issue declined internationally, even in the United States itself. Hussein clearly understood and took advantage of Clinton's reluctance to use decisive force, and no doubt was emboldened further by the president's increasing political problems stemming from the Monica Lewinsky affair.

Whether or not the December air strikes will achieve their objectives remains to be seen, but so far there is no evidence of any new willingness on Hussein's part to comply, rather the opposite. The United States has become more open in its support for groups seeking to overthrow the current government of

[45] Interview by Barry Blechman with General Colin Powell, 21 February 1997.

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Iraq, but U.S. unwillingness to undertake clearly and unambiguously the only potent threat in this situation—to remove Hussein by force unless he complies—suggests that the Iraqi–U.S. conflict has not yet run its course.

What is clear is that the United States needs to strengthen its ability to threaten and use military forces in limited ways. It should be a high priority for any new administration to make clear that it recognizes the problems that have limited our effectiveness in the past and that it is charting a new course. To do otherwise would be to enforce the need for continued, long-term involvement in protracted conflicts, which over time impose costly financial and political burdens, and can only encourage adversaries in other nations to test American resolve. If the United States is to lead in world affairs, it must learn to use its military dominance in more adroit and more decisive ways.

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Impeachment Politics in the 1998 Congressional Elections

GARY C. JACOBSON

The final midterm congressional election of the twentieth century revealed how fine a line separates the remarkable from the ordinary in American electoral politics. In one sense, the results were stunning. For only the second time since the Civil War, the president's party increased its strength in the House at midterm.[1] Democrats gained five seats, leaving the Republicans with a narrow 223–211 majority.[2] Shocked and angered by their losses, House Republicans drove Speaker Newt Gingrich, architect of their historic 1994 victory, to resign. The parties broke even in the Senate, each taking three seats from the other to leave the Republican advantage at 55–45, but this outcome, too, was read as a Republican defeat. With Democrats defending most of the vulnerable seats, Republicans had entertained dreams of winning a filibuster-proof sixty-seat majority.[3]

From another perspective, however, there is little remarkable about what happened in 1998 and certainly nothing in the results to challenge our current understanding of congressional election politics. The national conditions that normally shape midterm elections worked about as past research would lead us to expect. The voters, for good and familiar reasons, delivered a ringing endorsement of the political status quo. What makes the election nonetheless in-

[1] The Democrats picked up seats in 1934 during the New Deal realignment; both parties added seats in 1902, when the House grew by twenty-nine seats, but the president's Republicans picked up fewer than the opposition Democrats and so were relatively weaker after the election.

[2] Bernard Sanders, the lone independent who normally votes with the Democrats, was also reelected.

[3] Karen Foerstel, "Senate: GOP on the March," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 24 October 1998, 2868–2872.

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TABLE 1

Results of the 1998 Midterm Congressional Elections

	Republicans	*Democrats*
HOUSE		
Seats in 105th Congress	228	206
Incumbents reelected	206	188
Incumbents defeated	5	1
Open seats retained	11	12
Open seats lost	6	5
Seats in 106th Congress	223	211
Net change	−5	+5
SENATE		
Seats in 105th Congress	55	45
Seats contested in 1998	16	18
Incumbents reelected	12	14
Incumbents defeated	2	1
Open seats retained	1	1
Open seats lost	1	2
Seats in 106th Congress	55	45
Net change	0	0

Source: Compiled by author.

teresting is, of course, that despite the president's involvement in a scandal that transfixed Washington and led the House to impeach him, the status quo that voters endorsed clearly included Bill Clinton in the White House.

That voters did opt for the status quo in 1998 is beyond question. Table 1 summarizes the results. Only six House incumbents met defeat, and only seventeen House seats switched party control; the first number ties and the second sets the record for least change in any midterm. Both Democratic and Republican incumbents enjoyed an average vote gain of 2.6 percentage points over 1996.[4] The 395 members returned to office in 1998 are the most for any midterm House election ever. Although turnover was proportionately higher in Senate contests, Senate seats switched hands as a consequence of local issues and personalities, not from any systematic demand for something different. The widespread desire for change evident in the high turnover of congressional seats in the previous three elections was thus conspicuously absent in 1998.[5] The contrast between the first and second midterm elections of the Clinton presidency could scarcely be starker.

The triumph of the status quo in 1998 is fully consistent with the fundamentals that a generation of research has shown to shape midterm election results. The president's party normally loses House seats, but the size of the party's loss varies widely in response to three basic conditions: how many seats the

[4] Based on nearly complete but preliminary vote totals reported in *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 7 November 1998, 3027–3035.

[5] Forty new members entered the House for the 106th Congress in 1999, compared to 115 in 1993, 86 in 1995, and 78 in 1997.

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president's party already holds; how well the economy is doing; and how great a proportion of the public approves of the president's performance. Although there is no consensus in the literature on the relative importance of each condition or on how they may directly or indirectly influence voters' decisions, there is no question that in some combination they explain a lion's share of the variance in midterm House seat swings.[6]

Considering only these conditions, the results of the 1998 elections are in no way extraordinary. After suffering a fifty-two-seat loss in 1994, Democrats regained a mere nine seats in 1996. Indeed, because Republicans had added another five seats from party switchers after the 1994 election and had made gains in special elections, House Democrats went into the 1998 elections with only two more seats than they had won in 1994. A party cannot lose seats it does not hold. Bill Clinton's stunted coattails in 1996 meant that Democrats had relatively few seats that might be vulnerable when he was no longer on the ticket, limiting the potential for Republican gains in 1998.

The economy and popular approval of the president also foretold very small Democratic losses. More than six years of steady if unspectacular economic growth had by 1998 brought both inflation and unemployment to thirty-year lows. The sum of the two rates, the so-called misery index displayed in Figure 1, fell to its lowest level in more than forty years. Real incomes rose,[7] interest rates fell, and the stock market boomed. The public took notice; by 1998, the proportion of the Gallup Poll's respondents who rated economic conditions "excellent" or "good" outnumbered those who rated them "fair" or "poor" two to one. The huge turnaround in the public's assessment of the economy during the Clinton administration is evident in Figure 2.[8]

American citizens hold the president responsible for managing the economy, so popular approval of the president's performance rises and falls with,

[6] Contributions to this large literature begin with Edward R. Tufte, "Determinants of the Outcomes of Midterm Congressional Elections," *American Political Science Review* 69 (September 1975): 812–826; and include Gerald H. Kramer, "Short-Term Fluctuations in U.S. Voting Behavior," *American Political Science Review* 65 (March 1971): 131–143; Francisco Arcelus and Allan H. Meltzer, "The Effects of Aggregate Economic Variables on Congressional Elections," *American Political Science Review* 69 (December 1975): 1232–1239; Bruce I. Oppenheimer, James A. Stimson, and Richard W. Waterman, "Interpreting U.S. Congressional Elections: The Exposure Thesis," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 11 (May 1986): 227–47; Alberto Alesina and Howard Rosenthal, "Partisan Cycles in Congressional Elections and the Macroeconomy," *American Political Science Review* 83 (June 1989): 373–398; Robert S. Erikson, "Economic Conditions and the Congressional Vote: A Review of the Macro-level Evidence," *American Journal of Political Science* 34 (May 1990): 373–399; Gary C. Jacobson, "Does the Economy Matter in Midterm Elections?" *American Journal of Political Science* 34 (May 1990): 400–407; Gary C. Jacobson, *The Politics of Congressional Elections*, 4th ed. (New York: Longman, 1997), 138–141; James E. Campbell, *The Presidential Pulse of Congressional Elections*, 2nd ed. (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1997), chaps. 4 and 7; Gary C. Jacobson and Samuel Kernell, *Strategy and Choice in Congressional Elections* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981).

[7] Real disposable income per capita was 8 percent higher in 1998 than it had been in 1994.

[8] The survey question was, "How would you rate economic conditions in this country today, excellent, good, only fair, or poor?"

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FIGURE 1
Misery Index, 1960–1998



Source: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics

among other things, the economy's performance.[9] It is safe to say that no president has benefited more from a robust economy than Bill Clinton. His level of public approval has risen in parallel with public satisfaction with the economy's performance, as Figure 3 demonstrates.[10] During 1998, Clinton's ratings hovered around the highest levels of his entire presidency. His standing in the final Gallup Poll taken before the election—66 percent approving of his job performance—was the highest for any president in any midterm pre-election poll since Gallup began asking the question more than fifty years ago. Again, the contrast with 1994 is striking.

The economy was by no means the only positive development contributing to public approval of Clinton's performance. Consider welfare dependency, crime, and the federal budget deficit—three central public concerns and hence political issues of recent years. Figures 4, 5, and 6 display the striking improvements on all three fronts during the Clinton administration. A strong economy and welfare reform have reduced the proportion of Americans on the welfare rolls by 46 percent since 1994. Violent crime is down 28 percent during Clinton's presidency and down 35 percent from its 1981 peak. The federal budget

[9] Douglas A. Hibbs, *The American Political Economy: Macroeconomics and Electoral Politics* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), chap. 5; Richard A. Brody, *Assessing the President: The Media, Elite Opinion, and Public Support* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991), chap. 5.

[10] The survey question was, "Do you approve or disapprove of the way Bill Clinton is handling his job as president?"

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FIGURE 2
The Public's Rating of Economic Conditions, 1992–1998



Source: Gallup Polls

has moved steadily from deficit to surplus during Clinton's watch. In light of these trends, it is no surprise that the public's broader satisfaction with the United States has risen throughout the Clinton years, as Figure 7 illustrates.[11]

These positive developments left the electorate with little reason to punish the president's party on election day. But neither did they pose any threat to incumbent Republicans. Clinton and his fellow Democrats could not claim exclusive credit for good times, because Republicans have controlled the Congress since 1994. Divided government divides credit or blame for the government's performance as well. Thus, as Clinton's approval ratings reached new heights, so did ratings of the Republican Congress. Figure 8 displays the trend in congressional performance evaluations. In early 1998, approval of Congress reached 57 percent, the highest level recorded in the twenty-five years the question has been asked. Incumbents of both parties benefited; in October, 58 percent of Gallup's respondents thought that most members of Congress deserved reelection, compared to 29 percent in 1992, 39 percent in 1994, and 55 percent in 1996.[12]

[11] The survey question was, "In general, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way things are going in the United States at this time?"

[12] The Gallup Poll, 9–12 October, 1998 at http://www.gallup.com/POLL_ARCHIVES/981012.htm. (All web sources cited in this article were downloaded by 11 November 1998.)

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FIGURE 3
Approval of Bill Clinton's Job Performance, 1993–1999



Sources: Gallup and CBS News/*New York Times* Polls

These basic conditions—few exposed Democratic incumbents, a strong economy, and a popular Democratic president—projected minimal Democratic losses. Indeed, they are quite compatible with small Democratic gains.[13] The only other midterm years in which the president's approval rating exceeded 60 percent and the economy was growing were 1962, when John F. Kennedy's Democrats lost a single seat; and 1986, when Ronald Reagan's Republicans lost five seats. Clinton enjoyed a higher pre-election approval rating than either one, and only Kennedy presided over a more robust economy. But popular satisfaction with the condition of the country and the record high public standing enjoyed by Congress and its members made Republican officeholders equally difficult to unseat. With conditions so favorable to the political status quo, neither party stood to make much in the way of gains.

The 1998 election results, then, are about what we would expect if no one had ever heard of Monica Lewinsky. But this, of course, brings us to the central puzzles posed by the 1998 elections: Why did transgressions that led special prosecutor Kenneth Starr to recommend and the House to initiate impeachment proceedings against Clinton fail to bring down the president's job ap-

[13] I estimated a variety of plausible models and got forecasts ranging from small Democratic gains to medium Democratic losses; no particular specification was superior on theoretical grounds, and all electoral forecasting models have very wide error bands. See Nathaniel Beck, "We Should be Modest: Forecasting the 1992 Election," *The Political Methodologist* (Fall 1992): 23–27.

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FIGURE 4
Percentage of U.S. Population on Welfare, 1960–1998



Source: Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for Children and Families

proval and, with it, congressional Democrats? How is it that a scandal that obsessed the Washington community throughout the election year could have so little apparent impact on the results? What, if any, impact did the scandal actually have? These are the intriguing questions posed by the 1998 elections, and the remainder of this article is devoted to considering some answers. The first step is to examine how the scandal may have affected some crucial decisions early in the election year.

Strategic Politicians in 1998

Kenneth Starr's investigation of Clinton, his wife, and his associates, then languishing in its forty-first month, got a new lease on life when allegations surfaced that Clinton had had an affair with a White House intern and then urged her to lie about it under oath when she was deposed in Paula Jones's sexual harassment case against him. Erupting in January, the scandal cast a shadow over the entire election year, adding a large dose of uncertainty to the expectations that normally inform strategic election-year calculations.

Electoral expectations matter, because by shaping the choices presented to voters in House districts across the nation on election day, they become partially self-fulfilling. The economy, presidential popularity, and seats at risk affect midterm election results in part by influencing the strategic decisions of potential candidates and campaign contributors about running or contributing.

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FIGURE 5
Incidence of Violent Crime, 1973–1997



Source: Department of Justice

In an electoral system as candidate-centered as that of the United States, no party can expect to make substantial gains in Congress without recruiting strong challengers and supplying them with ample campaign resources. The best potential challengers are ambitious career politicians who hesitate to risk the attempt to move to a higher office without some reasonable prospect of success. In assessing their chances, they consider, among other things, the availability of issues that might induce voters to abandon the incumbent, for without exploitable issues, even attractive, well-financed challengers can expect to make little headway.

Recessions, unpopular wars, government failures, almost any source of popular discontent with an administration create exploitable issues for the party out of power, inspiring more of its promising political talent to take on incumbents. Part of the inspiration comes from knowing that the same conditions will also help to attract essential resources from campaign contributors. Absent exploitable national issues, or, worse, facing contrary national conditions, a party's best potential challengers are inclined to stay out, and the candidates who do decide to run find money scarce. Other things equal, vigorous challenges attract far more votes than feeble challenges. A party fielding an unusually large cohort of high-quality, well-funded challengers wielding potent issues can pick up seats; a party fielding poorly financed amateurs cannot. Strategic elite decisions that shape district-level match-ups across the country,

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FIGURE 6
The Federal Budget Deficit/Surplus as a Percentage of GDP, 1960–1998



Source: Office of Management and Budget

therefore, serve to reinforce the effects of the national conditions that initially informed them.[14]

National conditions and the issues they create often favor one party over the other, but not always. Sometimes they favor challengers of both parties (as in the wake of the House bank scandal in 1992, for example); and sometimes they favor incumbents of both parties. In this latter circumstance, strategic calculation will leave both parties with a shortage of strong challenges.

Decisions to run are of necessity normally finalized by the beginning of the election year, if not earlier. Fall prospects have to be gauged from information available when the decision is made. The customary forecasting cues available in early 1998—summarized in Figures 2, 3, 7, and 8—offered little hope for challengers of either party. Public satisfaction with the economy, the president, the Congress, and the United States in general were extraordinarily high. Unless these assessments deteriorated sharply before election day, it would be very difficult to persuade voters to opt for change of any kind. But the emergence of the Clinton-Lewinsky scandal in January, reinvigorating Starr's investigation of the president, obviously did contain the potential for a dramatic deterioration in the public's rating of the president, leaving the predictive value of his current standing in serious doubt.

[14] Gary C. Jacobson and Samuel Kernell, *Strategy and Choice in Congressional Elections*, 2nd ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), chaps. 3–6.

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FIGURE 7
Public Satisfaction with U.S. During the Clinton Administration



Source: Gallup Polls

The scandal flared up just in time to discourage potential Democratic challengers not already daunted by the dismal track record of challengers representing the president's party at midterm.[15] Mere mention of impeachment evoked memories of Watergate's devastating effect on the Republicans in 1974. High presidential job approval ratings have plummeted before; Richard Nixon's fell from 67 percent to 31 percent between January and August of 1973 as Watergate unfolded; at the time of his resignation a year later, only 24 percent still approved of Nixon's performance. Moreover, Clinton was far and away the Democrats' best fundraiser; if the scandal impaired his financial touch, Democratic candidates could face a serious shortage of campaign money.[16]

The same considerations that spooked Democrats should have heartened Republicans. Yet potential Republican challengers faced the same uncertainty about how Clinton's self-inflicted travails would play out. Perhaps the public would finally turn against the president, taking their disaffection out on congressional Democrats. Yet nothing in the initial public reaction to the story

[15] In the thirteen postwar midterms prior to 1998, the president's party's challengers have defeated only 33 incumbents, an average of 2.5 per election; the most victories (six) were won in a year in which voters were irate at incumbents of both parties. See Gary C. Jacobson, "Deficit Cutting Politics and Congressional Elections," *Political Science Quarterly* 108 (Fall 1993): 390–391.

[16] Jeffrey Katz and Dan Carney, "Clinton's Latest, Worst Troubles Put His Whole Agenda on Hold," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 24 January 1998, 165.

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FIGURE 8
Public Approval of Congress's Job Performance, 1993–1998



Sources: Gallup and CBS News/*New York Times* Polls

promised a swelling Republican tide. Indeed, rather the opposite; and Clinton's astonishing capacity to bounce back was a matter of public record. With relatively few Democratic targets vulnerable on their own, and with the public seemingly delighted with the status quo, potential Republican challengers had ample reason to question their own prospects.

As a consequence of these considerations, neither party recruited a cohort of challengers likely to take more than a handful of seats from the other side. Nearly a quarter of House incumbents enjoyed a completely free ride. As Figure 9 indicates, fifty-five Republicans and forty Democrats were unopposed in the general election, numbers dramatically higher than those of the most recent elections, with the total matching a record set back in 1950. Among those spared major party opposition were ten Republicans and eight Democrats who had won less than 55 percent of the vote in 1996 or who represented districts won by the other party's presidential candidate that year. That so many such likely targets failed to draw even token challenges is strong evidence of widespread strategic capitulation by both sides in 1998.

The challengers who did show up were not a very formidable group. Experience in elective public office serves as a simple but useful indicator of candidate quality.[17] In 1998, only 18.1 percent of Republican incumbents faced Democrats

[17] Gary C. Jacobson, "Strategic Politicians and the Dynamics of U.S. House Elections, 1946–86," *American Political Science Review* 83 (September 1989): 773–793.

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FIGURE 9
Unopposed House Incumbents, 1946–1998



Source: Compiled by author

with prior elective office experience, well below the 25 percent or so expected from either the postwar average or national conditions prevalent early in the election year.[18] Democrats were apparently more skittish about their chances than the economy or Clinton's standing early in the election year would lead us to expect, suggesting that the scandal's shadow did indeed take a toll. This is probably the only way in which the Lewinsky affair actually hurt congressional Democrats in 1998.

The proportion of Democratic incumbents facing experienced Republican challengers was similar, 18.3 percent, and stood slightly above the postwar average (16.4 percent) or the proportion projected from national conditions (14.5 percent). The scandal may have made Republicans a bit more optimistic than usual, but the data may also merely reflect the larger pool of experienced politicians created by Republican gains in state and local elections in the 1990s. On the whole, neither party fielded a large enough class of formidable challengers either to signal or to justify optimism about changing the status quo.[19]

[18] A regression model based on elections from 1946 through 1996, incorporating economic, presidential approval, and other relevant variables, and applied to 1998, projects that 24 percent of Republican incumbents would face experienced Democratic challengers. The model is an updated version of one found in Jacobson, *Congressional Elections*, 138. On average, 26 percent of Republican incumbents have faced experienced Democratic challengers in postwar elections.

[19] I expect final data on 1998 campaign finances to reinforce this conclusion.

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The Lewinsky scandal probably led Democrats to underestimate and Republicans to overestimate their electoral prospects, but neither can be faulted for an error that was nearly universal among sophisticated observers. How could it be that a scandal exposing Bill Clinton as a flagrant public liar at best, deserving of impeachment at worst, claimed as its chief victim Republican Speaker Newt Gingrich, not the president or any of his fellow Democrats. To answer this question, we need to review how the scandal and the public's response to it evolved over the election year.

The Evolution of A Scandal

News stories reporting Clinton's sexual relationship with Lewinsky, and charges that he had committed perjury and obstruction of justice to cover it up, surfaced just before the president's annual State of the Union address in January 1998. Clinton flatly and publicly denied all charges. The scandal's buzz helped boost the audience for the speech, which was watched by an estimated 53 million Americans. In it, Clinton resolutely ignored his personal problems, reminding people instead of the happy trends illustrated in Figures 1, 4, 5, and 6, along with other blessings flowing from peace and prosperity during his watch.

Figures 2 and 7 show that the public clearly got the message Clinton was trying to convey. Not only did Clinton's approval ratings jump to his highest levels ever, but so did ratings of Congress and Newt Gingrich. More remarkably, retrospective approval of Clinton's three immediate predecessors, Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, and George Bush rose 20, 17, and 16 percentage points, respectively, over their most recent ratings in 1993.[20] The policy successes highlighted in Clinton's speech were impressive enough to cast a warm glow over the governing class, past as well as present.

The public's reaction to the State of the Union address ended speculation that the Lewinsky affair would lead to Clinton's quick exit. It also established a pattern that persisted through the rest of election year. People's opinions on Clinton's performance as president diverged sharply from opinions on his culpability in the Lewinsky scandal. From the very first, more people than not believed Clinton had had an affair with Lewinsky and had lied about it under oath. As the year wore on, the proportion of skeptics grew, and views of Clinton's personal character and honesty became increasingly negative. Asked to choose, more people believed his various accusers (Starr, Paula Jones, Kathleen Willey) than believed the president. Majorities also believed that Clinton, not his persecutors, bore primary responsibility for his troubles.[21]

[20] David W. Moore, "Clinton Controversy Appears to Boost Ratings of Most Politicians," Gallup Poll Archives at http://www.gallup.com/POLL_ARCHIVES/980213.htm.

[21] Polling coverage of Clinton and his travails has been extraordinarily heavy; the summary conclusions about public opinion reported in this and several other paragraphs in this section are based on 1998 polls conducted by or on behalf of Gallup, CNN, CBS News, the *New York Times, Time,* the Pew Research Center, ABC News, the *Washington Post,* NBC News, the *Wall Street Journal,* and the *Los Angeles Times* and reported at http://www.pollingreport.com at http://www.gallup.com, and http://www.people-press.org.

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These beliefs did not, however, lessen approval of Clinton's policies or job performance or lead to widespread demands for his departure. Instead, the public soured on Kenneth Starr and his investigation. By March, moderate Republicans had begun to worry that Starr's unpopularity might rub off on them and that anything short of an open and shut case for impeachment would be politically disastrous.[22] In April, with public support for Clinton undiminished, Newt Gingrich joined other conservative Republican leaders in a full scale offensive, attacking Clinton for "the most systematic, deliberate obstruction of justice, coverup, and effort to avoid the truth we have ever seen in American history."[23] The attacks were designed to mollify the party's socially conservative core supporters and to persuade the broader public that the scandal was about perjury and obstruction of justice, not sex. While perhaps achieving the first goal, Gingrich failed conspicuously to achieve the second.

Republicans believed they had at last struck political gold when, on 17 August, Clinton testified on videotape for a grand jury and then publicly confessed to having had a relationship with Lewinsky that was "not appropriate" and lying about it to the American people. Republican candidates immediately began calling for Clinton to resign and linking their opponents to the White House. "Our intention is to brand every single Democrat in the state with the scarlet 'C,' said the executive director of the South Carolina Republican Party. "Bill Clinton . . . has re-energized our base. . . . We will gratuitously use Clinton's face on all our literature."[24]

Congressional Democrats, feeling betrayed, publicly vented their disappointment, disgust, and embarrassment, and several called on Clinton to resign. When Starr's report, recommending impeachment for perjury and obstruction of justice and containing excruciatingly detailed descriptions of Clinton's sexual dalliance with Lewinsky, was delivered with great fanfare to the House of Representatives, 138 Democrats joined the Republicans in voting to release its full text to the public. The report was posted on the Internet on 11 September; ten days later, Clinton's videotaped grand jury testimony was also made public.

To the frustration of Republicans and wary relief of Democrats, the Starr report and video testimony left public opinion on Clinton and impeachment almost unchanged. His job approval ratings remained high and in some polls even improved. The proportion of Americans wanting him out, either by impeachment or resignation, rose briefly before the contents of the report and videotape were fully exposed, then began to recede, falling below 30 percent

[22] Dan Carney with Carroll J. Doherty, "GOP Struggles To Find Strategy To Deal With Starr Fallout," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 14 March 1998, 643–644.

[23] "Thrust and Parry: Gingrich v. Clinton," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 2 May 1998, 1128.

[24] Karen Foerstel, "Clinton's Address Fails to Defuse Ticking Time Bomb of Starr Report, *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 22 August 1998, 2281.

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FIGURE 10
Public Opinion On Clinton's Impeachment



Source: See footnote in text.

as election day approached. Figure 10 displays the trends in public support for and opposition to impeachment from August through the election; the trends in opinion on resignation were nearly identical.[25] At no point did less than a solid majority want Clinton to remain in office.

Why did Clinton's admission of the affair with Lewinsky and charges serious enough to initiate impeachment hearings fail to undermine his public support? Commercial polling data suggest a number of complementary explanations, although we will no doubt learn more once the National Election Study for 1998 is released. First, Clinton's confession of an affair with Lewinsky and lying to cover it up could not disillusion people who had no illusions to begin with. By the time Clinton made his public confession, 74 percent of Gallup's respondents already thought it was definitely or probably true that he had had sexual relations with Lewinsky, 66 percent thought he had lied under oath about it, and 49 percent believed he had tried to obstruct justice.[26] After the

[25] Data are from ABC News/*Washington Post*, CBS News/*New York Times*, Gallup/CNN/USA Today, *Los Angeles Times*, Harris, and Pew Research Center polls at http://www.pollingreport.com/scandals.htm. Question wordings differ, making the stability of expressed opinions even more impressive.

[26] Gallup Poll taken 7–8 August 1998 at http://www.gallup.com/polltrends/opinion.htm.

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confession, another poll asked respondents if they were surprised by Clinton's admissions; 81 percent said "no."[27]

The August revelations merely confirmed what most people already believed and had thus already factored into their assessments of Clinton. Majorities had long since decided that his personal morals were not theirs, but they had also long decided that this was of little relevance in evaluating his job performance. In the Pew Research Center's September poll, 64 percent said they did not like Bill Clinton personally, but 70 percent said they liked his policies;[28] and it was on the basis of his policies that people judged his fitness to remain president.

Second, a majority of Americans believed from the beginning that the scandal was about sex and that the president's sex life was a private matter. The emphasis on salacious detail in Starr's report probably strengthened these sentiments. Most people said they saw no need to grill the president on explicit sexual acts, thought it unnecessary to release the full report and its ancillary material, and once the report was released, preferred that Congress either just censure the president for sleazy behavior—this was always the most popular alternative—or drop the matter.[29]

Why were Starr and Republican leaders unable to persuade more people that the issue was perjury and obstruction of justice, not private sexual behavior? The most likely explanation is that satisfaction with the Clinton administration's performance on things that directly affect people's lives, especially the economy, was so strong that most people resolved whatever cognitive dissonance the scandal provoked by maintaining a sharp public/private distinction or by downplaying the gravity of Clinton's transgressions. It is indicative that as the proportion of Americans who believed Clinton lied about and covered up the affair grew, the proportion who thought lying and covering up deserved impeachment diminished. In January, about half thought that Clinton should be impeached if he had lied under oath about his relationship with Lewinsky; in March, 40 percent thought so; by August, only 30 percent did.[30] Most people who were forced to choose between changing their minds about Clinton's fitness to remain president and changing their minds about the grounds for impeachment chose the latter. The simplest explanation for Clinton's continuing support is probably the most compelling: to borrow the watchword from his 1992 campaign, "the economy, stupid."

[27] ABC News/*Washington Post Poll*, 19–21 August 1998 at http://www.pollingreport.com/scandal2.htm.

[28] Of those who did not like Clinton personally, 60 percent still like his policies; see the Pew Research Center for the People and The Press, Early September 1998 Political Poll at http://www.people-press.org/sept98e.htm.

[29] See footnote 21.

[30] Gallup Poll taken 23–24 January 1998 at http://www.gallup.com/polltrends/opinion.htm; Pew Research Center Polls, taken in March 1998 and 21–28 August 1998 at http://www.pollingreport.com/scandal2.htm.

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Third, and more speculatively, Clinton may have been helped by a sort of populist reaction against both the Starr investigation and the news media's obsession with the scandal. People sympathetic to the president might easily have come to see Starr's sprawling $40 million four-year investigation as big government at its most bullying and intrusive. African Americans seemed especially disposed to this view. Perhaps this explains why a considerable part of the popular distaste for the scandal was, with a little help from the president's friends, deflected from Clinton to the special prosecutor. Opinions on Starr shifted from an evenly balanced 24:24 favorable-unfavorable ratio in January to a lopsidedly negative 31:60 ratio in October.[31] By the time Starr reported to Congress, 78 percent of the public believed that the time, effort, and money spent on his investigation had not been worth it; even 62 percent of Republican respondents took this view.[32]

News reporters and commentators also drew more disdain than deference as the scandal unfolded. John Zaller has shown how the initial media frenzy in January left the public largely unmoved.[33] Most people viewed the media's coverage as "irresponsible,"[34] and 80 percent thought that there had been too much media discussion of the issue.[35] The public was equally unimpressed by the editorials and commentary calling for Clinton's resignation that proliferated after his public confession of the affair in August. It is tempting to read a pointed message in ordinary people's refusal to be outraged in the way that self-appointed guardians of civic morality were telling them they ought to be outraged. It would certainly add to the year's ironies if the endemic American streak of anti-elitist populism exploited so effectively by Newt Gingrich's team in 1994 helped save Clinton in 1998.

Finally, public reactions to the scandal split sharply along partisan lines. In polls taken during September and October, self-identified Democrats divided on average about 85–15 against impeachment or resignation, while Republican identifiers favored both by about 60–40. Independents opposed either outcome by about two to one, matching the national average. About the same proportion in each category that opposed Clinton's exit also thought Starr's investigation was partisan rather than impartial and believed that the scandal was a private rather than a public matter.[36] People who regarded the move to impeach Clinton as a partisan vendetta had no need to rethink their views of the president in response to the Starr report's revelations.

[31] Gallup Poll of 11 September 1998 at http://www.gallup.com/POLL_ARCHIVES/98012.htm.

[32] CBS News/*New York Times* Poll, 22–23 September 1998 at http://www.pollingreport.com/scandal2.htm.

[33] John Zaller, "Monica Lewinsky's Contribution to Political Science," *PS: Political Science & Politics* 31 (June 1998): 182–189.

[34] Gallup Poll of 28 January 1998 at http://www.gallup.com/POLL_ARCHIVES/980131a.htm.

[35] Pew Research Center Poll, 30 January–2 February 1998 at http://www.people-press.org/feb98que.htm.

[36] See footnote 21.

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TABLE 2

The District Presidential Vote and House Democrats' Votes on Impeachment Hearings (8 October 1998)

	Clinton's Share of the Major Party Vote in 1996			
	<50%	50–55%	55–60%	>60%
For Impeachment Hearings	12	8	8	1
Against Impeachment Hearings	5	23	30	102
Percent for Impeachment Hearings	70.6	25.8	21.1	1.0
X^2=59.9, p<.001				

Source: Compiled by author.

With little evidence of bipartisan support for impeachment among the public, there was little bipartisan support for impeachment in the House. Opposition to impeachment among Democrats and independents in the electorate allowed most House Democrats to vote against holding impeachment hearings; only thirty-one sided with the unanimous Republicans in the 8 October vote to go forward. Most Democrats who did vote for hearings were, whatever their primary motives, acting prudently. Observe in Table 2 that support for the hearings was very high among Democrats seeking reelection in districts won by Bob Dole in 1996 but almost nonexistent in districts won by Clinton with a comfortable margin. Only a handful of Democratic votes for holding impeachment hearings, including those of two retirees, were unambiguously "conscience" votes.

The move to hold impeachment hearings was not popular, and Congress's approval ratings, while remaining high by historical comparison, began to slide. Instead of a winning issue, congressional Republicans found themselves in a serious political bind. Their core constituency of social conservatives demanded impeachment and would be unforgiving of anything less, while the broader public was overwhelmingly opposed to removing the president. To complicate matters, two-thirds of Americans also thought that members of Congress should follow the public opinion polls rather than exercising their own best judgment on impeachment.[37]

The Election Campaigns

The public's reaction to the events of August and September 1998 made it increasingly unlikely that the Clinton-Lewinsky scandal would by itself swing elections to Republican congressional candidates. With so much of the electorate sick of hearing about it, just bringing the matter up risked a backlash, and so candidates on both sides tended to ignore it. Mindful of the polls, most Re-

[37] Gallup/CNN/*USA Today* Poll, 11–12 September 1998 at http://www.pollingreport.com/scandal2.htm.

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TABLE 3

The Effects of the 8 October Impeachment Hearings Vote on the Elections of Incumbent Democrats

Independent variable	*Coefficient*	*Standard error*
Constant	11.82***	2.90
Democrat's vote in 1996 (%)	.51***	.07
Clinton's district vote in 1996 (two-party %)	.36***	.07
Experienced Republican challenger	−2.39*	1.07
Voted for impeachment hearings	1.74	1.46
Voted for impeachment hearings × Dole won district	4.89*	2.33
Adjusted R^2	.80	
Number of observations	141	

Note: The dependent variable is the Democrat's share of the two-party vote in 1998 (preliminary data); the interaction term takes the value of 1 if the Democrat voted for impeachment hearings and represented a district won by Bob Dole in 1996, 0 otherwise.

* $p < .05$, two-tailed test.

*** $P < .001$, two-tailed test.

publican candidates carefully avoided suggesting that the election should be a referendum on impeachment. Yet this left them with little else to say, for having staked victory on Clinton's troubles, they were unprepared to wage campaigns on issues that voters were saying they did care about. And those issues—notably education, HMO reform, and protecting Social Security—were the kind on which voters think Democrats do a better job anyway. The public's distinction between Clinton the president and Clinton the person freed Democrats to campaign on Clinton's policy agenda without defending his character or behavior.

Most Democrats representing districts where Clinton was not popular protected themselves by voting to go forward with the impeachment investigation. Statistical analysis of the election results, reported in Table 3, shows that this defensive strategy paid. The vote for Democrats representing districts won by Bob Dole in 1996 was about 5 percentage points higher, other things equal, if they voted in favor of holding impeachment hearings. In districts won by Clinton, the impeachment vote had no significant effect on the results. A few Democratic challengers even turned the impeachment issue to their advantage. In a notable instance in New Jersey, Democratic challenger Rush Holt upset incumbent Michael Pappas in a campaign that featured TV ads showing Pappas literally singing the praises of Kenneth Starr on the floor of the House.[38]

[38] Sung to the tune of "Twinkle, Twinkle Little Star," the lyrics were:
Twinkle, twinkle, Kenneth Starr,
Now we see how brave you are.
We could not see which way to go
If you did not lead us so,
Twinkle, twinkle Kenneth Starr
Now we see how brave you are
New York Times, 5 November 1998.

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Although most of the public seemed unmoved by the scandal, Republicans still hoped that it would help them by mobilizing their Clinton-hating core supporters while discouraging disaffected Democrats from voting. The party's $10 million media blitz during the last week of the campaign sought to exploit the scandal to these ends. However, Democrats effectively used the turnout threat and impeachment issue to fire up their own base, particularly among minorities and union members. As a result, turnout was in the 37–38 percent range, about average for midterms of recent vintage, with neither party enjoying a clear advantage.

Conclusion

In the end, the election was not a referendum on impeachment—to the great good fortune of the Republican party, because far more voters opposed than supported impeachment. For a large majority of voters, strongly positive national trends trumped all other considerations, leaving them disposed to continue the political status quo by reelecting incumbents of both parties. Prospective challengers who thought it would be a tough year to pry support away from incumbents turned out to be right, although their prophecy was, as always, in large part self-fulfilling. Republicans, trusting that Clinton's disgrace would be their ticket to victory, were left without a viable message to use against Democratic incumbents when the issue fizzled. Democrats were able to squeeze some small advantage from voters' opposition to impeachment and a favorable issue climate and so enjoyed modest but symbolically important gains. Yet the Clinton-Lewinsky scandal probably scared off high-quality challengers in potentially winnable districts, leaving Democrats poorly prepared to take full advantage of their unexpected good fortune. It is worth noting in this regard that four of the five winning Democratic challengers were from that small fraction who had prior experience in elective office, as was the lone successful Republican challenger. All were generously funded.[39]

The 1998 elections confirmed several other elements of the current political status quo. The strong trend in the 1990s toward electoral coherence continued in 1998,[40] diminishing the fraction of representatives who do not appear to match their district's partisan orientation. Of the seventeen House seats that changed party hands, thirteen went to the party that on the basis of presidential voting patterns should have held them in the first place.[41] The parties now com-

[39] According to Federal Election Commission data, the six successful challengers had already spent between $648,000 and $1.25 million each by 15 October.

[40] Gary C. Jacobson, "Reversal of Fortune: The Transformation of U.S. House Elections in the 1990s" in David Brady, John Cogan, and Morris P. Fiorina, *Continuity and Change in Congressional Elections* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999).

[41] For this analysis, I assume that the district's presidential preference is revealed by whether the average two-party vote for Bill Clinton in 1992 and 1996 was above or below 53.5 percent. This is the point at which a regression of the House vote on the presidential vote predicts a majority for the Democrat; it exceeds 50 percent because Clinton ran ahead of his party's expected vote in both elections.

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pete on nearly equal footing for popular allegiance among voters and for control of national institutions, and the distribution of institutional power after the 1998 results accurately reflects this balance. By narrowing the Republicans' House margin and keeping their Senate majority from growing, voters in 1998 set the stage for a decisive partisan showdown in 2000. With both Houses of Congress and the White House clearly winnable by either party, control of the whole federal government will be at stake. Republicans will certainly keep the House and Senate if they win the presidency, so victory would put them in full control of all three institutions for the first time in nearly half a century. And Democrats are almost certain to win the House, and might even take the Senate, if they can hold onto the White House. The huge stakes should inspire an appropriately millennial electoral effort on both sides.

The millennial showdown may be as thoroughly permeated by impeachment politics as was 1998. A few weeks after the election, the lame-duck House, ignoring both the election's message and the large public majority that continued to oppose Clinton's departure, voted on four articles of impeachment against the president; two articles passed. The vote was overwhelmingly partisan; all but four Republicans voted for at least one article, only five Democrats voted for any of them. In the first post-impeachment Gallup Poll, Clinton's job approval rating rose to 73 percent, the highest level of his presidency. As the action turned to the Senate, the public continued by a wide margin to oppose the president's conviction and removal. Despite the trial's unpopularity and certain outcome (nothing close to the sixty-seven votes necessary for conviction was ever in sight), Senate Republicans insisted that the process go through to its bitter end. Congressional Republicans gambled that a partisan attempt to impeach and remove a popular president in the teeth of public opinion will be forgiven, forgotten, or even applauded by the time of the year 2000 elections. Whether they win or lose that gamble may well determine which party leads the country into the new millennium.

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

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Public Support for Peacekeeping in Lebanon and Somalia: Assessing the Casualties Hypothesis

JAMES BURK

Among the many lessons that the U.S. military and political leaders drew from the Vietnam War, one was that the military could not deploy effectively or for very long without public support. Another was that public support for military deployments had declined quite predictably (one is tempted to say invariantly) in response to the accumulation of casualties.[1] In principle, it is nothing but wise counsel that rulers ignore the deadly consequences of military deployments only at their peril.

Recently, however, a new lesson has been taught that resembles but should be distinguished from these. Based on accumulating experience with peacekeeping operations, it holds that the public will not support peacekeeping deployments if they lead to the loss of American lives. This lesson is a source of worry and concern for those who believe armed forces are an essential instrument of national security policy, and it is taken very seriously. Since the barracks bombing that killed 241 Marines in Beirut in 1983, national security doctrine has required that there be "some reasonable assurance" of public support before combat forces are committed abroad.[2] The worry is that public support for missions, which seems sufficient, will quickly evaporate when faced with American casualties. It is often noted, for instance, that public support for

[1] On the issue of support for deployment, see Harry G. Summers, *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War* (New York: Dell, 1984); and Lewis Sorley, *Thunderbolt* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992). The key source on the relation between accumulation of casualties and trends in support for war is John E. Mueller, *War, Presidents and Public Opinion* (New York: Wiley & Sons, 1973).

[2] This is the fifth element of the so-called Weinberger doctrine. See Caspar W. Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace* (New York: Warner Books, 1990), 442.

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American participation in the peacekeeping mission to Somalia was strong. But immediately following the deaths of eighteen soldiers in the streets of Mogadishu, negative public reaction forced President Bill Clinton to withdraw U.S. forces.[3] As John Mueller observed, "when Americans asked themselves how many American lives it was worth to save hundreds of thousands of Somali lives, the answer came out rather close to zero."[4] The concern is that public intolerance of casualties radically constrains the government's ability to use armed force effectively to defend national interests and to maintain a more peaceful world order.[5] Quick reversals of public support ignore the long-range goals of foreign policy, jeopardize mission accomplishments, and underestimate the logistical difficulties or political costs of rapid withdrawal. Under these circumstances, military and political leaders are understandably wary of undertaking any military action.

The question is whether these worries and concerns are warranted. How reliable is the evidence that the public is so reluctant to accept even minimal casualties that it is fickle in its support of military missions and hamstrings political decisions about the use of force?[6] Is the public so intolerant of casualties that it will only approve peacekeeping operations that are virtually casualty free? And, in any case, does public opinion about casualties wield so much influence over political and military elites that it controls or constrains national security policy making?

In this article, I consider these questions in light of trends in public opinion about American peacekeeping in Lebanon from 1982 to 1984 and, ten years later, in Somalia from 1992 to 1994. The cases are not directly comparable. The intervention in Lebanon occurred during the cold war in an area of the world

[3] See, for example, Donald C. F. Daniel, "The United States" in Trevor Findlay, ed., *Challenges for the New Peacekeepers* (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1996), 94–95; and Ioan Lewis and James Mayall, "Somalia" in James Mayall, ed., *The New Interventionism 1991–1994* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 94–124, esp. 118.

[4] John E. Mueller, "Policy Principles for Unthreatened Wealth-Seekers," *Foreign Policy* 102 (Spring 1996): 31.

[5] General John Shalikashvili, when chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, voiced this concern in testimony before the Senate Armed Forces Committee, as reported by Williams Matthews, "Shali Warns Against Myth of Nonviolent War," *Navy Times* (2 October 1995), on-line edition. He is not the only one to have done so. See Benjamin C. Schwarz, *Casualties, Public Opinion, and US Military Intervention* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1994); Eric V. Larson, *Ends and Means in the Democratic Conversation* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1996); Charles J. Dunlap, "The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012," *Parameters* 22 (Winter 1992–93): 2–20; and A. J. Bacevich, "The Use of Force in Our Time," *Wilson Quarterly* 19 (Winter 1995): 50–63.

[6] In the current debate over civil-military relations, this question has also been raised the other way around by Deborah D. Avant, "Are Reluctant Warriors Out of Control?" *Security Studies* 6 (Winter 1996/97): 51–90. Wondering about the influence of military leaders over foreign policy, she asks: "Are civilian decisions [to employ force] hamstrung by a reluctant military?" Her answer is "not quite" (52). Her analysis and mine, while oriented differently, are not unrelated. We both argue that the decision to use force rests with civilian elites and is substantially affected by whether elites are unified or divided in their outlooks.

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in which the United States thought it had (and still thinks it has) vital security interests. The intervention in Somalia had no such justification. Somalia was important to the United States as part of its cold war rivalry with the Soviet Union, but afterward American interest in the country flagged. The decision to intervene in Somalia in late 1992 was fairly disinterested, in sharp contrast to the intervention in Lebanon. Nevertheless, these cases are alike in key respects, important for present purposes. They were both highly visible peacekeeping missions attracting public attention, unlike for instance the American peacekeeping mission in the Sinai. They were both peacekeeping missions in which combat casualties unexpectedly occurred. And they were both popularly regarded as missions that failed. For these reasons, these cases may help us to see whether casualties cause the public to withdraw its support of the missions and whether, in fact, the withdrawal of public support drives political leaders to abandon the missions earlier than they might otherwise have done. My argument is that public support for military deployments was neither as unsteady nor as uncritically contingent on the absence of casualties as many have claimed. Nor was it obvious (although it is difficult to prove conclusively) that public worry over casualties was a key factor affecting government decisions about normal security policy.

Before turning to these empirical claims, however, we need to examine more closely the logic of what may be called, the "casualties" hypothesis. It seems perfectly plausible to say that the public is concerned when foreign policy pursuits cause bloodshed and that in a democracy public concerns carry weight. But what reasons do we have to believe it? It matters what we say. To my knowledge, Edward Luttwak has offered the only comprehensive defense of the hypothesis.[7] His argument is provocative, especially its recommendations about how best to frame current military strategy. Yet it is not entirely persuasive. His contention that public intolerance of casualties is a new phenomenon, resulting from recent changes in family structure, is at best historically misleading. Moreover, he offers no reasons for believing that public opinion will exert a determining influence over national security policy. That is a surprising omission given the accumulation of evidence in recent years that relationships between public and elite opinion are extraordinarily complex and that the influence they have on one another defies summary by any single simple rule.[8]

[7] See Edward N. Luttwak, "Where Are the Great Powers?" *Foreign Affairs* 73 (July/August 1994): 23–28; "Toward Post-Heroic Warfare," *Foreign Affairs* 74 (May/June 1995): 109–122; "A Post-Heroic Military Policy," *Foreign Affairs* 75 (July/August 1996): 33–44.

[8] On this, see Michael X. Delli Carpini and Scott Ketter, *What Americans Know about Politics and Why It Matters* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996); Benjamin I. Page, *Who Deliberates?* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996); Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, *The Rational Public* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); John R. Zaller, *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1992); and Bruce Russett, *Controlling the Sword* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990).

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Intolerance of Casualties

Put simply, the casualties hypothesis states that American public opinion at present will not support the deployment of military forces abroad if that deployment results in the lives of American soldiers being lost. It is a strong claim and should be distinguished immediately from a related but substantively weaker claim that public support for military operations takes the risks of casualties into account.

We have strong evidence that Americans think the risk of casualties is a crucial, perhaps the most important, factor affecting their support of a decision to use armed force. In an Americans Talk Security survey done in 1988, well over 80 percent of the respondents said that the cost in American lives was an important factor to consider before deploying military force. No other factor ranked higher. The second most important consideration, at just under 80 percent, was the likely cost of civilian deaths in the area of combat. Other factors were mentioned, but were thought less important and some, like the possibility of failure or the cost in dollars, were thought much less important.[9] This is not the first or the only evidence we have on this score. John Mueller deserves credit for systematically documenting the strong negative relationship between the accumulation of casualties and public support for the Korean and Vietnam Wars. His analysis is well known and requires no detailed retelling here. It is enough to recall that in both cases a ten-fold increase in casualties led to a significant drop of 15 percentage points in support of these wars. More recently, Mueller studied public support for the Persian Gulf War. In this case, the ground war was mercifully short, American casualties were remarkably few, and support for the war while the war was going on "soared." It was lower before the fighting began. Nevertheless, Mueller concludes on evidence from polls querying the matter that this support was not unconditional. It was contingent on the level of casualties. "[A] drop off of support," he thought, "would have followed a logarithmic pattern as in Korea and Vietnam."[10] This judgment cannot be tested but is probably accurate given the divided state of public opinion on the eve of the war with Iraq, a division that was not evident when the country initially faced war in Korea and Vietnam.

This evidence, however, shows that public support for military deployments erodes as casualties accumulate and that erosion takes time. It does not speak directly to the hypothesis we are interested in. It does not say that the public will only support what are virtually casualty-free military deployments, a claim that lies at the center of the casualties hypothesis. And it does not hint that

[9] Eugene R. Wittkopf, *Faces of Internationalism: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1990), 228–229.

[10] For the original analysis, see Mueller, *War, Presidents and Public Opinion*, 60. Analysis of the Persian Gulf War is found in John E. Mueller, *Policy and Opinion in the Gulf War* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 77. See also Benjamin C. Schwarz, *Casualties, Public Opinion, and US Military Intervention*, 17.

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public opinion will quickly abandon support for an operation in midstream if casualties are taken. This stronger claim has been made by military and political leaders in private and public, and has affected their willingness to undertake peacekeeping operations short of war. Drawing on U.S. experience in Somalia, for instance, General John Shalikashvili, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, noted the public's unwillingness to support military operations as soon as casualties were incurred. He worried that insistence on casualty-free operations may have a deleterious effect on the judgment of young military leaders. Some might say that his was a defensive posture adopted to prevent the military from being sent on deployments where for a variety of reasons the risk of failure may be high. Obviously, no institutional leader wants to preside over failure.[11] But we should not rush to dismiss the hypothesis as a rhetorical exaggeration rather than an empirical claim to be taken literally and seriously.

Luttwak's Defense of the Casualties Hypothesis

Recently, Edward Luttwak, a noted scholar of national security affairs, incorporated the casualties hypothesis into a larger argument about what strategic posture the United States should adopt in the post-cold war environment.[12] His argument runs as follows. Historically, great powers, like the United States, have been willing to project force beyond their own borders to secure their own interests. And they have been willing to accept causalities as the price of success. "To lose a few hundred soldiers in some minor probing operation or a few thousand in a small war or expeditionary venture;" he says, "were routine events for the great powers of history."[13]

Not now. Whether we look at the United States or Britain or France or even the Soviet Union before its downfall, we find societies "so allergic to casualties that they are effectively debellicized, or nearly so."[14] In this situation, Luttwak fears, lesser powers will be quick to flex their muscle, unworried that the resulting violence will be checked by great power interventions. His primary concern, therefore, is to find some means of reorienting great power strategy that respects the public's disinclination to accept casualties and yet permits

[11] See Avant, "Are Reluctant Warriors Out of Control?"; Stevenson, "The Evolving Clinton Doctrine"; Matthews, "Shali Warns Against Myth of Nonviolent War"; and Colin L. Powell, "Why Generals Get Nervous," *New York Times*, 8 October 1992.

[12] I focus on the argument of Luttwak, because it is the most fully developed one I know. For references to his argument see above note 7. But the central hypothesis is repeated uncritically in other places. For instance, Bacevich, "The Use of Force," 60, writes: "An enterprise that yesterday seemed expedient is today not worth the blood of a single American soldier. In the case of Somalia, such thinking led the United States to abandon its commitment altogether." And Daniel Yankelovich, *Coming to Public Judgment* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1991), 62 writes: "Sooner or later public opinion makes itself felt, sometimes directly as in the public pressure that . . . persuaded President Reagan to withdraw the Marines from Lebanon after a number of Marines had been killed by a terrorist bomb."

[13] Luttwak, "Where Are the Great Powers?" 27.

[14] Ibid.

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great powers to use force to limit violent conflicts while they are still small and more easily contained. This can be done, he thinks, if force structures, presently organized (if necessary) to fight large-scale war are redesigned to wage something like siege warfare, following the model of ancient Rome and relying on advanced technology "to use force remotely, yet accurately and with discrimination."[15]

Luttwak may or may not be correct in his prescriptions for strategy and force structure. That is not our present concern. More important here are the reasons for believing that casualty-free warfare is required. His rationale is sociological. In preindustrial and early industrial societies, there was greater tolerance for casualties than in the advanced postindustrial societies of the present day.[16] That greater tolerance was founded on a family demography that was vastly different from the family demographics of today. In the past, families were larger, and it was "normal to lose one or more children to disease." So "the loss of one more youngster in war had a different meaning than it has for today's families." While always tragic, "a death in combat was not the extraordinary and fundamentally unacceptable event that it has now become." This changed attitude toward the death of young family members in combat reflects a widely shared expectation that children born into post-industrial families, fewer in number, will survive to old age and that each will consume "a larger share of the family's emotional economy." That is why parents and adults generally (to include decision-making elites) "react with astonishment and anger when their children are actually sent into combat situations. And they are apt to view their wound or death as an outrageous scandal, rather than as an occupational hazard."[17]

Luttwak does not say when this change in outlook occurred. Presumably it is relatively recent. And its influence was shown, he believes, in the decision to withdraw U.S. forces from Somalia after the lives of eighteen soldiers were lost, in the reluctance of the United States to send troops into Haiti to overturn its military dictatorship, and in the reticence of European powers to risk ground troops to counter aggression in the former Yugoslavia.[18]

Criticisms of Luttwak's Argument

There are at least three difficulties with the logic of this argument. First, we must suppose, if Luttwak is right, that earlier generations were more tolerant of casualties than ours. Is that really the case? It may be true that great powers incurred more casualties in earlier times. But that is not evidence for his argument. Perhaps the chief difference between then and now is that the public today is better able than it was to hold elites to account for the consequences of

[15] Luttwak, "A Post-Heroic Military Policy," 43.
[16] Luttwak, "Toward Post-Heroic Warfare," 115.
[17] Luttwak, "Where Are the Great Powers?" 25.
[18] Ibid., 23–24; Luttwak, "Toward Post-Heroic Warfare," 115.

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their security policy. If so, their ability might stem from an earlier intolerance of casualties. It is not improbable that public revulsion and unrest over the casualties incurred during World War I forced political and military elites since then to take greater care of the lives of soldiers in their command. We know with certainty that soldiers objected to being thrown into battle without regard for their survival; it was not only Russian soldiers who engaged in mutiny.[19] Jay Winter's recent study of that war documents the extensive grief that civilians felt for the death of loved ones and strangers. Attempts by government officials to assuage or channel those feelings in support of their policies were not always successful. Tellingly, while war memorial art recognized the sacrifice by citizens, the message was "expressed in terms of sacrifice that must never be allowed to happen again."[20] Birth rates in Britain, France, and Germany were on average much higher from 1910 to 1920 than they are today.

Second, Luttwak attributes a complex change in the pattern of public opinion to just one factor, the decline in birth rates with all that implies for family structure and the emotional economy of family life. But single factor theories, for all their luster, dim as we imagine how many other factors might explain the same result. Luttwak does briefly consider and dismiss the possibility that the changed attitude toward casualties is explained by the growth of democracy or the publicity of mass media.[21] Even if we accept these dismissals, other possibilities remain. A major conclusion of Winter's study, for example, is that our traditional language for justifying death and consoling the bereaved, revived during World War I, lost its persuasive power after that war and has not been replaced by any other. The modernist culture dominant since then, as shown in the work of Paul Fussell, can express anger and despair at war's casualties, but it does not console or heal. Military actions may still be justified, but there is no shared theodicy to explain away the losses.[22] Unwillingness to endure casualties may also rest on the perception that there are alternatives to putting armed forces at risk.[23] In his study of public opinion and the Persian Gulf War, John Mueller suggests that before the war began, support for it was divided, in part because many believed sanctions could force Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait. Public willingness to support resort to force weakens when a range of nonmilitary options are available.[24]

[19] See S. P. MacKenzie, *Politics and Military Morale* (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1992), 12–13.

[20] Ibid., 95.

[21] Luttwak, "Where Are the Great Powers?" To support this claim he draws attention to Soviet conduct of its war with Afghanistan. The Soviet Union was no democracy and yet, he asserts, authorities adopted "inordinately prudent tactics" in order "to avoid casualties at all costs" (24). Moreover, they "never allowed its population to see any television images of the war;" nevertheless, "the reaction of Soviet society to the casualties of the Afghan war was essentially identical to the American reaction to the Vietnam war" (25).

[22] Winter, *Sites of Memory*; see Paul Fussell, *The Great War and Modern Memory* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975); and Fussell, *Wartime* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).

[23] I am grateful to Ben M. Crouch for suggesting this possibility.

[24] Mueller, *Policy and Opinion*, 62; and Wittkopf, *Faces of Internationalism*, 181–186.

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Third, turning from causes to consequences, Luttwak argues that in consequence of the public's intolerance of casualties, great powers now avoid resort to force; they are effectively "debellicized." It may be true that public tolerance of casualties is low and that great powers are reluctant to use force in pursuit of foreign policy. It remains to be said how these states of the world are linked. Is there evidence that public intolerance has the causal power to affect (to debellicize) great power policy? Surely, it is a plausible hypothesis. But that is not enough. The causal process must be specified and evidence must be provided to show that it produces the predicted effect. Failing to do that, Luttwak's predicament is formally similar to the one Arnold Toynbee faced when he argued that war weariness causes peace. His "evidence" was the "long peace" that followed the Napoleonic Wars. But, as Geoffrey Blainey asks, what caused the "long peace" from 1870 to 1914, when there was no war weary generation? Or what caused the outbreak of World War II, which war weariness should have prevented?[25] The problem, however, is not only a formal omission to state the causal mechanism at work. It is substantive as well.

Recent studies of public opinion reject simple models of influence between the public and policy makers, no matter whether the direction of influence attributes dominant power to the public or to the policy-making elite.[26] The relationship between them is highly mediated by experts through systems of mass communication and so is more complex than either simple model would suggest. Public opinion, to include knowledge about foreign affairs, is shaped (literally mediated) by the views of elites (public officials, intellectuals, and journalists) whose judgments and opinions are broadcast electronically and reported in print.[27] That does not mean, however, that elites can manipulate and dominate public opinion. Much depends, as the work of John R. Zaller and Benjamin I. Page has shown, on whether elites agree or are divided among themselves about the appropriate policy and on the relative complexity of the policy issues under debate. In general, the more complex the issue and the more unified elites are about the appropriate policy response, the less likely public opinion will oppose and constrain the policy-making elite. But when the facts of the issue are relatively easy to grasp and elite opinion is divided, then public opinion may wield significant influence and operate as an important constraint on policy making. Most important is elite disagreement. As Zaller has argued, "resistance to [elite] persuasion depends very heavily on the availability of countervalent communications, either in the forms of opposing information or of cueing messages from oppositional elites."[28]

[25] Geoffrey Blainey, *The Causes of War*, 3rd ed. (New York: Free Press, 1988) 7–9.

[26] See Russett, *Controlling the Sword*, 87–118; also Page, *Who Deliberates?*; and Zaller, *The Nature and Origin of Mass Opinion*.

[27] As Benjamin I. Page observed in *Who Deliberates?* 107: "Research has indicated that experts' views, as presented in the media, have a significant impact on public opinion: when experts speak in favor of a policy proposal, public opinion tends to move toward supporting that proposal."

[28] Ibid., 267.

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Applying these findings to our problem suggests an alternative to the casualties hypothesis: namely, that public support of particular peacekeeping deployments depends on the degree of elite consensus that the deployment is justified or required. Expectations of consensus and dissensus must be framed in relative terms, of course. Since the Vietnam War, elites have been divided over whether U.S. involvement in world affairs should be, in Wittkopf's words, "cooperative" or "militant."[29] Indeed, on some accounts, elite opinion has divided over the wisdom of foreign "entanglements" ever since the country's founding. We may, nevertheless, attempt to weigh the preponderance of elite opinion. Recently, for example, Eric V. Larson examined the relative unity of public and elite opinion for American wars from World War II to the Gulf War and for the less intense deployments to Panama and Somalia. Based on that half-century of analysis, he concluded that public support for military deployments—to include toleration of casualties—"is influenced heavily by consensus (or its absence) among political leaders."[30] Given his findings, we have reason to expect that mass support for peacekeeping operations and tolerance of casualties are bolstered by evidence of a favorable elite consensus and eroded by evidence of elite disagreement. This elite consensus hypothesis offers a complex alternative to the casualties hypothesis for understanding public support for peacekeeping. It does not preclude considering the effects of casualties on any determination of support for a mission. But it rejects the view, supposed by the casualties hypothesis, that policy makers are virtual hostages to the public's recoiling from the loss of American life. It suggests that there is room for political leaders to shape public opinion and create a forum for public deliberation and debate.

In sum, the first two difficulties cast doubt on Luttwak's argument that public opinion is somehow less tolerant of casualties today than it has been. Those difficulties do not allow us to reject the claim. But they render it suspect. The third difficulty is more serious. It shows the inadequacy of Luttwak's argument that public opinion about casualties constrains decisions made by the policy-making elite. The difficulty is only formal and might be overcome by specifying the connection between mass and elite opinion. When this is done, however, we are led not only to doubt the casualties hypothesis but to consider an alternative, elite consensus hypothesis that is apparently better grounded in current public opinion research. In the following section, we examine public reaction to the Lebanon and Somali deployments to consider which hypothesis has greater support.

[29] Wittkopf, *Faces of Internationalism*; see also Ralph B. Levering, "Public Opinion, Foreign Policy, and American Politics since the 1960s," *Diplomatic History* 13 (Summer 1989): 383–393.

[30] Eric V. Larson, *Casualties and Consensus* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1996), xv.

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Support for Peacekeeping in Lebanon and Somalia

American peacekeeping missions in Lebanon and Somalia were preceded by a radical deterioration of social order caused by civil war. Neither country had an effective government able to exert its authority across the territory.[31]

In 1982, Lebanon was a country occupied by no fewer than six indigenous armed forces. In addition, Lebanon had been occupied since 1976 by a large Syrian force, dispatched formally by the Arab League to end the civil war. In the early 1980s, it was occupied also by Libyans, Palestinians, Israelis, and a small number of Iranian Revolutionary Guards. In addition, the United Nations (UN) had peacekeeping forces (UNIFIL) in southern Lebanon to monitor a cease-fire in that area. The complexities posed by this military situation reflected the difficult politics of the Middle East, heightened by the tensions of cold war. Following Israel's invasion of Lebanon in June 1982 to destroy Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) strongholds, the United States quickly intervened to arrange a cease-fire and help guard the withdrawal of PLO forces from Lebanon. In late September—following a massacre of Palestinians by the Phalangist Lebanese Forces, under the eye of the Israeli Defense Force—the United States intervened again as part of a multinational peacekeeping force that aimed to restore the authority of the legitimate government in Lebanon. U.S. Marines were deployed around the Beirut airport. French, Italian, and a small number of British troops were deployed elsewhere in the city. In the spring of 1983, U.S. and Italian troops began to patrol Beirut in support of the official, but contested, government and its army. At that point, they met armed attacks from opposing Muslim forces. In April, the U.S. embassy in Beirut was blown up by a car bomb. In August, U.S. Marines were under mortar attack from Druse militia forces (killing two). Then, on 23 October, 241 Marines were killed in a suicide terrorist attack in which a truck bomb was used to blow up the Marine barracks at the Beirut airport. President Ronald Reagan threatened to retaliate; but sporadic fighting continued without result. In January 1984, despite rising concern over escalating the conflict, President Reagan argued against sudden withdrawal of the multinational force. Nevertheless, the French announced that they would begin to withdraw some of their forces. In February, U.S. forces were also withdrawn to ships off shore and, on 30 March 1984, Reagan formally ended the U.S. role in the multinational peacekeeping force.

In 1991, Somalia too was wracked by a civil war. The military situation in Somalia was less complex than in Lebanon. There were no foreign forces to contend with, and the cold war was no longer available to intensify and in some ways to restrain the conflict. But in human terms, it was no less serious. The fighting disrupted economic life and led to a severe food shortage that threatened starvation for millions of Somalis. Concern for their straits led the UN

[31] Unless otherwise noted, facts about these two cases are drawn from *Facts on File Yearbook* (New York: Facts on File, 1983–1985, 1993–1995); *Keesing's Record of World Events* (London: Longman, 1982–1984, 1992–1994).

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Security Council in 1992 to monitor a cease-fire of the conflict and to facilitate delivery of humanitarian aid for the country's relief (UNOSOM I). Relief efforts, however, were seriously hampered when rival clans attacked the relief convoys and stole the food. In December 1992, President George Bush sent U.S. troops to Somalia for peacekeeping duty. They were to protect the relief efforts from armed attack by rival clans, a goal that required proactive peace enforcement from the beginning. In February 1993, the United States declared that security in Somalia was "substantially restored." It prepared to transfer control of the peacekeeping and humanitarian mission to the UN (UNOSOM II) in May. This was done despite ongoing demonstrations (sometimes violent) against U.S. and French forces by followers of the Somali warlord, Mohammed Farah Aidid, who complained that the peacekeepers favored his rival. Shortly after the UN took over, its forces too were attacked, but more seriously. On 5 June 1993, over twenty Pakistani soldiers serving as UN peacekeepers were ambushed and killed, allegedly by Aidid's supporters. The UN Security Council condemned the incident and called for the arrest and punishment of those responsible. This began military operations to capture Aidid. Unfortunately for the UN, these operations were not successful. They only increased the number of casualties taken on both sides. On 8 August, four Americans were killed while patrolling streets in Mogadishu. On 24 August, President Clinton sent 400 U.S. Army Rangers to Somalia to capture Aidid. Their efforts were mired in difficulty. On 27 August, U.S. troops conducted a raid in which they mistakenly "captured" UN aid workers. Worse, on 9 September, when crowds turned on UN troops fighting Somali militia, U.S. helicopter fire killed about 200 Somali civilians. The Rangers did apprehend four of Aidid's close aides; but Aidid remained at large. On 3 October, eighteen Rangers were killed, over seventy were wounded, and one was captured in a fifteen-hour firefight with Aidid's forces. Television pictures showed Aidid's men dragging dead American soldiers through the streets of Mogadishu. Four days later, Clinton announced that he would send reinforcements to Somalia immediately, but he also promised to withdraw most troops by 31 March 1994.

Public response to the Somali debacle, we have seen, is frequently cited as evidence for the casualties hypothesis. The perception is that the public supported the deployment so long as there were no casualties, but once the Rangers were killed, support collapsed; and political elites without public support were forced to withdraw the forces, whether or not it was sound policy to do so. Put generally, the argument breaks down into three claims. First, public opinion in support of peacekeeping missions is volatile; rather than a stable foundation on which to base national security policy, it is subject to quick reversal. Second, the most important cause of the erosion of public support for force deployments is the taking of casualties; the loss of eighteen U.S. soldiers precipitated the debacle in Somalia. Third, rapid erosion of public support for a peacekeeping mission causes political elites to suspend the deployment.

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Assessing the Casualties Hypothesis

Are these three claims borne out by what we know of the public's response to peacekeeping missions in Lebanon and Somalia? To answer this question, I identified the population of poll items dealing with these two missions and carefully examined all questions asking about public approval, decisions to remain or withdraw, and assessments of the missions' success.[32] Ideally, a number of questions with variant wording for each topic would be asked repeatedly over the entire course of both peacekeeping missions. Moreover, the questions asked during the Lebanon mission would be very much like the questions asked during the Somali mission. That ideal is rarely met in public opinion analysis, and it is not met here. Nevertheless, to answer questions about change, trend data are required. And to check the effect of casualties, the trend data must begin before the truck bombing in Beirut or the unsuccessful Ranger attack in Mogadishu and then continue somewhat beyond. While few questions met these criteria, fortunately some did, and they refer to the critical issue of public support for the two missions. Public support is measured here by questions that asked whether the respondents approved or agreed with the decision to send troops on the mission and by questions that asked whether troops should withdraw or stay in the area.

To assess whether public support for these missions was stable or changing, I followed the conventions outlined by Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro in their study, *The Rational Public*.[33] Public opinion is *stable* if it has not changed significantly over time. To determine whether public opinion has changed, they first recalculate poll responses to exclude don't know, not sure, and no opinion responses from the results.[34] After that, any movement in re-

[32] I collected all public opinion poll data on deposit with the Roper Center that mentioned either "Lebanon" in the years 1982 through 1984 or "Somalia" in the years 1992 through 1994. I conducted this search on line, accessing the Roper Center through CompuServe, and downloading the results. The Roper Center has public opinion poll data back through 1960 available for such on-line searches. I also searched for items before and after the years of focal interest. A few items were found, but there were virtually no items of any relevance to the present research. There were substantially more poll items reported for Lebanon (n=671) than for Somalia (n=267). Many of the items relating to Lebanon dealt with public reaction to Israel's invasion of Lebanon begun in June 1992, an important topic beyond the scope of this article. Otherwise, almost all of the items for both Lebanon and Somalia related directly or indirectly to the U.S. involvement in peacekeeping. Unfortunately, very few questions were asked repeatedly over the course of either operation, so trend data are not as numerous as we would like.

[33] Page and Shapiro, *The Rational Public*, 44–53.

[34] The rationale for excluding these data is that it clarifies tracking changes "in the balance of opinion among those people who express opinions," which is of course what we are interested in doing here. Page and Shapiro illustrate why with the following example. Take two data points. In the first, responses are 20 percent favor, 40 percent oppose, and 40 percent have no opinion. In the second, responses are 30 percent favor, 60 percent oppose, and 10 percent no opinion. The apparent increase in public favoring or opposing the policy issue, caused by including no opinion data masks that on balance at both points in time, 33 percent of those with opinions favored the policy. It is that kind of masking that their methodology aims to avoid. See *The Rational Public*, 423–424. The don't know, not

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TABLE 1

Public Approval of U.S. Peacekeeping Mission in Lebanon, 1982–1984 (in percentages)



Questions: (1) *NBC News/Associated Press:* Do you approve or disapprove of President Reagan's decision to send American troops to Lebanon? (2) *CBS/NY Times:* U.S. Marines went to Lebanon as part of an international peacekeeping force to try to prevent fighting there. Do you approve or disapprove of the government sending troops to Lebanon for that purpose? (3) *Gallup:* Do you think the U.S. made a mistake sending the Marines to Lebanon or not? (To ensure comparability across all questions, "not a mistake" responses were coded "approve" and "mistake" responses were coded "disapprove."

Note: Percentages were recalculated to eliminate "don't know," "not sure," and "no answer" responses.

sponses from one time to another of six percentage points or more constitutes *significant change*. If the change is twenty percentage points or more, it is *large*; and if the change occurs at a rate of ten or more percentage points a year, it is *abrupt*. Public opinion *fluctuates* when it reverses itself within a given time interval, operationally defined to mean two or more significant changes in opposite directions within two years or three or more over four years. Change is *gradual* if it is neither abrupt nor fluctuating.

Applying these conventions to the data reported in Tables 1 and 2, we can say that public support for U.S. peacekeeping missions in Lebanon and Somalia was definitely not stable. In Lebanon, before the truck bombing of 23 October 1983, opinion was divided over whether to approve or disapprove of the mission, with most disapproving (Table 1). It is impossible to say with certainty whether the level of approval declined from the fall of 1982 to early fall 1983. The 1982 question (1) is not repeated in 1983 and the closest parallel questions

sure, and no opinion responses for the trend data reported here never exceeded 10 percent and ranged most often between 4 percent and 7 percent.

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TABLE 2

Public Approvel of U.S. Peacekeeping Mission in Somalia, 1992–1993 (in percentages)



Questions: (1) *CBS/NY Times:* Do you think the United States is doing [did] the right thing to send U.S. troops to Somalia to try and make sure shipments of food get through to the people there, or should U.S. troops have stayed out? (2) *Times/CNN/Yankelovich:* In general do you approve or disapprove of the presence of U.S. troops in Somalia? (3) *CBS/NY Times:* Given the [possible] loss of American lives and the other costs involved, do you think sending U.S. troops to make sure food gets through to the people of Somalia is worth the cost or not? (To ensure comparable interpretation across all questions, "worth it" responses were coded "approve" and "not worth it" responses were coded "disapprove."

Note: Word in brackets in questions 1 and 3 represents variant wording. Percentages were recalculated to eliminate all "don't know," "not sure," and "no answer" responses.

(2 and 3) are worded too differently for us to attribute exact meaning to the different levels of approval and disapproval. We can say that from September through November 1983, approval of the mission rose abruptly from 40 percent to 61 percent in question 2 and that the change is evident immediately after the truck bombing in October. A similar but less abrupt rise in mission approval is shown in the data for question 3. Interestingly, that rise in approval reversed itself by January 1984. In early 1984, the level of support for the mission was not significantly different from what it was in early October 1983, before the truck bombing occurred. In brief, in this case, opinion change is significant, large, abrupt, and fluctuating.

Almost the same can be said about support for the peacekeeping mission in Somalia (see Table 2). From the winter of 1992–1993 to early fall 1993, there is a significant, large, and abrupt decrease in public approval of the peacekeeping mission. One cannot say how large or abrupt the change was. Taken together the three questions used to measure this movement give widely different estimates. Higher levels of approval generated by question 1 may well be caused by asking whether it was the "right thing" to send troops to provide food relief, which was always a popular rationale for the mission. Question 2 asked

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simply whether one approved "in general" of the presence of troops in Somalia. This question enabled the respondent to take more factors into account. It is quite conceivable that one could believe both that it was right to send troops for food relief and disapprove of U.S. presence in Somalia on other grounds. Question 3 linked mission approval of the humanitarian purpose with the costs, and that depressed levels of support attained when purpose alone is mentioned. Nevertheless, the pattern is the same in each instance. Opinion certainly changed over the period, and the change was, by the conventions adopted here, large and abrupt. There are, however, two differences worth noting between the patterns here and in Lebanon. First, the Somali data show no tendency toward fluctuation. Once the public changed its mind, no later than the fall of 1993, its mind stayed changed. This conclusion is supported by other poll data for 1994 collected at single points in time. Second, perhaps more important, in Lebanon opinion changed in the first place toward greater support for the mission and then by winter returned more or less to its original position. In Somalia the change withdrew support for the mission. Note too that, unlike the Somali mission, support for the Lebanon mission even in the beginning was not very high; opinion was closely divided.

Can we say that these changes in opinion resulted from the unexpected and unwelcome experience of casualties to American soldiers? Obviously, the public did not ignore and was not indifferent to the loss of life in these deployments. Nevertheless, I am hard-pressed to find support in either case for the supposed public unwillingness to support operations because casualties were incurred. At best the data are conflicting. In Lebanon, public reaction to the truck bombing increased support for what never was a very popular peacekeeping operation. Two months later, support began to decline. One might explain the decline as a cooling off of tempers raised by the initial terrorist attack or as recognition that the conflict was continuing without hope of resolution. In either case, support for the operation in February 1984, when Marines were pulled out of Beirut, was not significantly different from what it was in early October 1983, before the truck bombing occurred. One cannot conclude that the loss of 241 Marines, tragic as it was, eroded support for this peacekeeping mission.

In Somalia, support for the mission did erode, and there is evidence that support eroded further and substantially (dropping ten percentage points) after eighteen Rangers were killed in Mogadishu. But even here, one hesitates before concluding that these casualties are the reason why support for the mission declined, increasing support for an early withdrawal. The trend data for question 2 in Table 2 show that by September support for the mission had already declined precipitously (by thirty-four percentage points) from its January high. In short, 77 percent of the decline in public approval of the mission occurred before the Rangers lost their lives. Casualties may still have played a role in the erosion of support for the mission. Throughout the summer of 1993, the UN force faced Somali resistance and suffered casualties. On 9 September, a U.S. helicopter opened fire on a crowd of Somalis, killing about 200 people,

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including women and children. The UN claimed that those killed were combatants or were being used by combatants as human shields. This incident may also have played a role. Recall the data reported above, from the Americans Talk Security Survey, showing that the public opinion does consider the likelihood of civilian deaths in the area second only to the likely death of American soldiers when deciding to use force in foreign affairs.

Conceding this, one still cannot confidently conclude that casualties had the predicted strong effect. The reason why is that the U.S. Somali peacekeeping operation, which people approved in the winter (Operation Restore Hope), was not the same peacekeeping operation in which the United States was involved in the summer and fall (UNOSOM II). Although the questions remained the same, the mission they referred to in reality had changed. Quite possibly, public support for U.S. involvement in UNOSOM II was never very high. From its beginning, in late spring 1993, that operation aimed more at using force to end the civil war than at providing humanitarian relief. But peacekeeping to end the civil war in Somalia was not as popular as famine relief. A Gallup poll taken in December 1992 asked whether the U.S. role in Somalia should be "limited to delivering relief supplies" or widened "to bring a permanent end to the fighting." Only 31 percent thought the United States should attempt to end the fighting; 59 percent thought the role should be limited to delivering relief supplies.[35] Most thought that their preferences were being acted on. A *Times Mirror News* poll taken in January 1993 showed that 81 percent believed the principal objective of American forces in Somalia was "to restore enough order so that famine relief can take place." Only 10 percent believed it was "to disarm the gangs of Somali gunmen"; 9 percent were not sure.[36] In late March and early April, when asked to rank various possible missions in Somalia, 62 percent of the respondents thought the use of the military for humanitarian purposes was "very preferable."

In contrast, 45 percent thought it very preferable "to arrest leaders of warring factions." Just 19 percent thought it very preferable to use "overwhelming force to defeat the primary aggressors."[37] In June, about two-thirds of the public did approve of U.S. actions to retaliate against Aidid for attacking UN forces. Yet many (42 percent) worried that these actions would cause the United States to be "bogged down in Somalia."[38] By mid-September, only 36 percent believed

[35] Gallup Organization, Question ID: US GALLUP.121192 R2 (Storrs, CT: Roper Center, 1995).

[36] Times Mirror News Interest Index, Question ID: USPSRA.011393 R11 (Storrs, CT: Roper Center, 1995).

[37] Americans Talk Issues, Question ID: USMS.ATI121 R40-42 (Storrs, CT: Roper Center, 1995).

[38] These data come from two sources. Over 18–21 June, Gallup pollsters asked, "Last week, the United States participated in a military operation with the United Nations against one of the warlords in Somalia. Do you generally approve or disapprove of that decision?" 65 percent approved, 23 percent disapproved, and 12 percent had no opinion (Question ID: USGALLUP.062393 R6 [Storrs, CT: Roper Center, 1995]). Over 21–24 June, CBS News/*New York Times* pollsters posed a broader question. It read: "Mohammed Farah Aidid is the leader of a Somali clan whose troops killed United Nations peacekeepers. UN troops are trying to capture him. Do you think this is a good idea because it shows that violence against the UN will not be tolerated, or do you think this is a bad idea because this gets

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that the mission there was "under control." Most (52 percent) thought the United States was "too deeply involved in Somalia." The reason they thought so is tied plausibly to their still strong belief, held by 69 percent, that U.S. troops should "only be responsible for making sure that food is delivered." Few (22 percent) believed the troops should "be responsible for disarming the rival warlords there."[39] While we would prefer repeated questions to assess the trend, these various questions asked before (some long before) the Mogadishu firefight show that the public never supported the more aggressive mission of UNOSOM II, as they did the mission of famine relief. Admittedly, this argument is more complex and the evidence less telling than in the Lebanon case. Still, on balance it is difficult to find strong support for the casualties hypothesis in the data for Somalia. That is striking, as this case is often supposed to provide clear-cut evidence in favor of the hypothesis.

Given this analysis, it is difficult to conclude that changing public opinion had the predicted effect on political decisions to suspend the peacekeeping missions. Once the putative link between eroded support and casualties is broken, the entire logic of the analysis breaks down. Nevertheless, in both cases, public opinion favored withdrawing U.S. forces from the regions before the president announced a decision to withdraw. In Lebanon, public sentiment for withdrawal increased markedly from 39 percent to 61 percent between October 1983 and January 1984 (Table 3). Over the same period, support for sending more troops, never strong, fell below 10 percent. President Reagan did not announce his decision to remove Marines from Beirut until February 1984. Only a limited number of trend data are available for Somalia (Table 4). They all follow the 3 October firefight and show an unvarying and high proportion—nearly two-thirds—favoring withdrawal from Somalia. The first of these polls was taken the day before President Clinton announced his decision to withdraw from Somalia in six months. Examination of these and other poll data taken at single points in time suggest that the public accepted the president's proposal for a gradual withdrawal; support for immediate withdrawal was limited.

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the UN involved in Somalia's civil war?" 66 percent thought it a good idea, 23 percent thought it a bad idea, and 11 percent had no opinion (Question ID: USCBSNYT.62893A R69 [Storrs, CT: Roper Center, 1995]). But, in the same poll, when asked, "When United Nations peacekeepers are killed in Somalia, should United States troops retaliate, or is that likely to get the United States bogged down in Somalia?" 41 percent thought US should retaliate, 42 percent though retaliation would bog down the United States, and 17 percent did not know (Question ID USCBSNYT.62893A R68 [Storrs, CT: Roper Center, 1995]).

[39] The NBC News/*Wall Street Journal* pollsters asked "are you concerned that the United States is too deeply involved in Somalia, or do you think that our efforts in Somalia are under control?" (Question ID: USNBCWSJ.93SEPT R19B [Storrs, CT: Roper Center, 1995]). One week later, Time/CNN/Yankelovich pollsters asked "do you think the US troops in Somalia should be responsible for disarming rival warlords there, or should the U.S. troops only be responsible for making sure that food is delivered to the areas affected by the famine?" (Question ID: USYANK.092493 R41 [Storrs, CT: Roper Center, 1995]).

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TABLE 3

Public Pressure to Remove Troops from Lebanon, 1983–1984
(in percent)

	Deploying Troops			
Date	*Remove Troops*	*Same Number*	*Send More*	*n*
22–26 Sep 83	42	51	7	1430
23 Oct 83	53	23	23	454
25 Oct 83	41	27	32	588
26 Oct 83	48	35	17	686
26–28 Oct 83	44	38	18	1184
28 Oct 83	39	43	18	491
3–7 Nov 83	42	44	14	1400
8–13 Dec 83	51	40	9	1431
3 Jan 84	63	32	5	571
4 Jan 84	61	30	9	478
12–17 Jan 84	60	32	7	1463

Question: *ABC News/Washington Post:* Would you say the US should send more troops to Lebanon, leave the number of troops about the same, or remove the troops that are there now?

Notes: Percentages and sample sizes were recalculated to eliminate all don't know, not sure, no answer responses. Not all rows add to 100 due to rounding.

It is certainly likely that both Reagan and Clinton were aware of the poll numbers before they made their decisions. But other factors than these weighed in the balance. Reagan faced increasing opposition to the Lebanon deployment, especially to his announced policy to retaliate against terrorist attacks, from European allies including Margaret Thatcher and, at home, from congressional leaders. In late December 1983, even Robert Michel, the Republican House minority leader, urged Reagan to remove troops from Beirut, an opinion joined in January 1984 by Republican Senator Charles Percy, who chaired the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Clinton faced similar pressures in Somalia. In August 1993, the Italians withdrew from UNOSOM II, re-

TABLE 4

Public Pressure to Remove Troops from Somalia, 1993
(in percent)

	Deploying Troops		
Date	*Withdraw*	*Remain*	*n*
6 Oct 93	65	35	483
6–7 Oct 93	65	35	1027
18–19 Oct 93	65	35	831
5–7 Dec 93	64	36	1193

Question: *CBS News:* What should the United States do now? Do you think the United States should keep its troops in Somalia until the situation in Somalia is peaceful, or should the United States withdraw its troops as soon as possible?

Note: Percentages and sample sizes were recalculated to eliminate all don't know, not sure, no answer responses.

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deploying their forces in Somalia under their own command. They, along with other allies, objected to the "Rambo methods" of the UNOSOM commander. At home, congressional opposition to the Somali mission mounted as well. In September 1993, two days before the helicopter incident, the Senate passed a nonbinding resolution urging Clinton to outline the goals of the mission by 15 October and to seek congressional approval for further involvement. The House followed with a similar resolution on 28 September. In this context, it is difficult to conclude that public opinion—and especially that public reaction against the unexpected casualties—played a powerful determining part in shaping policy.

Overall, examination of the evidence for Lebanon and Somalia lends some, but not much, support to the hypothesis that public intolerance of casualties renders it a changeable and untrustworthy basis for deciding whether to launch or sustain peacekeeping deployments. Opinion was changeable. But it is not clear that casualties (or casualties alone) affected the change. Sudden, unexpected casualties did not cause the public to withdraw its support for either peacekeeping mission. In Lebanon, support for the mission rose, albeit briefly, after the truck bombing, which killed so many Marines. In Somalia, support for the U.S. deployment did fall in reaction to the firefight in Mogadishu that killed eighteen Rangers. But we must remember that public support for the mission had declined significantly even before the Rangers were killed. This evidence makes it difficult to believe that the public withdrew its support for either peacekeeping mission simply because of these tragic incidents or that its withdrawal was a decisive cause forcing political leaders to abandon the missions.

Assessing the Alternative Elite Consensus Hypothesis

If not by casualties, how can we explain the changing patterns of public support for peacekeeping missions? It is possible, of course, that we cannot. Studies of public opinion that point to the orderliness and interpretability of public beliefs have been based on examinations of long-term trends.[40] Opinion about peacekeeping missions form and change and turn into history in a matter of months. Perhaps that is not time enough to become aware of, work through, and reach a settled judgment about the complex issues that most peacekeeping initiatives raise. Or, perhaps, short-term changes over a period of months are due to the random shock of particular events beyond the reach of generalization. Such fluctuations may mask a more stable and orderly pattern that is only evident when we average observations over a period of years, as daily market fluctuations may mask the long-term trend in stock prices. They are interpreted at one's peril.

[40] See Ronald Ingelhart, *Cultural Shift in Advanced Industrial Society* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Wittkopf, *Faces of Internationalism*; Yankelovich, *Coming to Public Judgment*; and Page and Shapiro, *The Rational Public*.

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The issue, of course, is not so easily disposed. When criticizing the casualties hypothesis, we noted there was a significant alternative to it—the elite consensus hypothesis. Put simply, this hypothesis holds that when political elites (or, more generally, the "experts") agree on the course of policy, then public opinion, especially over the short term, is likely to go along; but when elites disagree, so will the public. Following this logic, we expect the public to withhold or withdraw its support from peacekeeping deployments when there is division among elites about the necessity for the deployment or the availability of alternatives to military action; and this will occur even if there are no casualties. At the same time, we expect the public to continue support for a deployment, despite casualties, if elite opinion is solidly behind it. How well does this hypothesis explain the observed patterns of public response to the deployment in Lebanon and Somalia?

Consider Lebanon. The first deployment, in August 1982, to protect the withdrawal of the PLO was not controversial. It was limited in scope, incurred no casualties, and was a quick success, ending early. Notice too that the president notified Congress of the deployment, acting consistently with the War Powers Resolution. That resolution requires the president to consult with Congress and gain its authorization for deployments of armed forces into hostile situations or situations where hostilities are imminent. Presidents have been reluctant to grant that they are subject to that resolution; they see it as an encroachment on their powers as commander-in-chief of the armed forces.[41] It remains a source of friction between the two branches of government. That any notice was sent suggests that the president expected no strong opposition to the deployment. The second deployment in late September 1982, following the Phalangist massacre of Palestinians, was quite different. It was always controversial, even within the administration that proposed it. It was strongly opposed by Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who thought the mission was vaguely defined. With no certain objective to achieve, it was difficult to define appropriate force size, equipment, rules of engagement, etc.[42] Yet Secretary of State George P. Shultz was equally strong in his support for the deployment and, most important, so was the president.[43] This time, however, President Reagan did not act consistently with the War Powers Resolution; no notification was sent to Congress, and Congress did not authorize the deployment.

In early 1983, elite divisions over this issue deepened and broadened. Marines were attacked while on patrol in Beirut and, on 18 April, the U.S. embassy was bombed, leaving dozens dead and many more wounded. The next day, congressional objections to the deployment were strongly stated. Senator Barry Goldwater (R-AZ) was blunt: it was time, he said, to withdraw the Marines

[41] See Louis Fischer, *Presidential War Power* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995); and John Hart Ely, *War and Responsibility* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).

[42] Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace*, 151–152.

[43] George P. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph* (New York: Charles Scribner's, 1993), 107–110.

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from Lebanon. The Foreign Affairs Committees of both houses approved sending additional aid to Lebanon, but only on condition that any expansion of U.S. forces in Lebanon had congressional approval. Agreement on this forestalled an effort by Senator Claiborne Pell (D-RI) directly to apply the War Powers Resolution to Lebanon. It did not silence congressional criticism of the deployment, which continued through the summer and never subsided entirely.

By late August 1983, when fighting in Beirut killed two Marines—the first American combat casualties—members of Congress renewed calls to review troop commitments as required under the War Powers Resolution. Reagan resisted, creating a dispute between Congress and the administration. Finally, a compromise was reached. Congress passed a resolution that placed the Marines' involvement in Lebanon under the War Powers Resolution, but also authorized the administration to keep Marines there for another eighteen months. Reagan signed the resolution, but asserted "that he felt no constitutional obligation to seek congressional authorization" to extend the deployment.[44]

In short, long before the barracks bombing, political leaders were divided over the wisdom and conduct of this mission, and their divisions grew deeper and more vocal over time. Nor were they silenced by the barracks bombing. Although the House defeated a proposal to end funding for the peacekeeping effort by March 1984, congressional criticism of the deployment intensified through the fall. Division over this issue was also found in newspaper editorials. Immediately after the barracks bombing, the *Wall Street Journal* argued that it was "time for retaliation" against military targets in Syrian-occupied Lebanon, even if those responsible for the bombing were not positively identified. Action was necessary to demonstrate U.S. resolve against terrorists.[45] The *New York Times*, in contrast, argued that America was once again being held hostage in the Middle East in pursuit of a "murky diplomatic cause"—removing Syrian backed forces from Lebanon—that is "not a vital American interest." It asked bluntly what purpose U.S. forces served in Lebanon and under what conditions would they finally depart.[46]

Given elite dissensus, it is hardly surprising that public support for the Lebanon operation was divided from the beginning and remained divided until early 1984, when opinion finally crystallized to favor removing the troops (Tables 1 and 3). What is surprising is that public support for the operation rallied briefly in the fall following the barracks bombing, despite casualties and in the face of elite dissensus. The explanation for that rise in support remains matter for speculation. Perhaps it reflected collective anger and frustration with the terrorist attack, so different from acts of war. Perhaps it represented a rally effect associated with the successful invasion of Grenada, which was launched

[44] Fischer, *Presidential War Power*, 141.

[45] "Time for Retaliation," *Wall Street Journal,* 25 October 1983, 28.

[46] "America Held Hostage," *New York Times*, 24 October 1983.

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two days after the Beirut bombing. Whatever the cause, the rally was short-lived. By early December, public pressure mounted in favor of withdrawal from Lebanon. Again surprisingly, at this point, public opinion was to some degree in front of (it certainly was not following) the opinion of the still-divided political elite. In this case, the domestic public pressure joined with the pressure of foreign elites to urge a change in U.S. policy. As the year ended, House Speaker Tip O'Neill (D-MA) called for a meeting of Democratic leaders to review their support for the mission, and House Minority Leader Bob Michel (R-IL) called for the Marines to be withdrawn. Administration leaders still defended policies they hoped would unify the country in support of the Lebanon mission. But they failed to do this before the barracks bombing. They were unlikely to succeed, as conditions in Lebanon grew worse, following the barracks bombing.[47] With violence continuing in the region and opposition mounting in Congress, the president's policy to stay and perhaps retaliate for losses was not sustainable. On 1 February 1984, the caucus of House Democrats called on the president to withdraw the Marines from Lebanon. One week later, he did.

In Somalia, initial support for the humanitarian relief effort was high not only among the public (Table 2) but among political leaders as well. And support was bipartisan. In fact, although it was Bush's decision to intervene, Congress took the initiative in the summer of 1992 to promote intervention.[48] Nevertheless, as shown by hearings held by the House Foreign Affairs Committee in December 1992, members of Congress were in no mood to write blank checks. Their support was for a humanitarian relief effort to relieve the famine and nothing more. Once that was done, U.S. forces were to withdraw. A similarly restrictive understanding of the mission to Somalia was embodied in the Senate Joint Resolution 45 (SR 45). Passed in February 1993, SR 45 authorized the use of American armed forces in Somalia, as required under the War Powers Resolution, but it prescribed a narrow humanitarian mission for them.

It was not long before continuing clan warfare showed that sticking to limited aims would be difficult. In March, the new administration under President Clinton declared a victory for Operation Restore Hope and turned the problem back to the UN for a new operation to begin in May. The new operation, however, had an expanded mission. Beyond humanitarian relief, it was to end civil war and begin democratic nation building. It was, moreover, to require continuing commitment of U.S. forces, although many fewer than before. As the terms of this transition were negotiated at the UN, the House of Representatives de-

[47] This argument is elaborated in Larson, *Casualties and Consensus,* 96–97.

[48] The facts in this and the next several paragraphs come from the account of Harry Johnson and Ted Dague, "Congress and Somalia" in Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, eds., *Learning from Somalia*, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), 191–204. Both were participants in the events. Johnston is a member of Congress (D-FL). He is the senior member of the House International Relations Committee and formerly chaired the Subcommittee on Africa. Dague is a foreign affairs analyst for the Congressional Research Service and served as a professional staff member for the subcommittee on Africa when Johnston was its chair.

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bated its version of SR 45 to authorize the troop deployment to Somalia. Here is the earliest evidence of elite dissensus over the peacekeeping mission. The House resolution adopted a broad definition of the mission, akin to that assigned to UNOSOM II. But expanding the mission beyond what Bush initially outlined and the Senate had approved was strongly opposed, largely along partisan lines, both in committee and on the House floor. Although it passed on 25 May, by a vote of 243–179, it was never "taken up by the Senate because Senate majority leader [George] Mitchell [D-ME] would not allow debate."[49]

What has most to be explained in this case and what the casualties hypothesis left in doubt was the sharp drop in support for the mission between January and September 1993. It is possible, but by no means certain, that public support eroded in the spring with erosion of elite consensus in Congress about what the mission in Somalia was supposed to be and disagreement over who was competent to authorize and define it—the president or Congress. Yet, as we learned from our analysis of the casualties hypothesis, the public never expressed much support for a peacekeeping mission that had other than humanitarian purposes. The public's mood was captured in SR 45 rather than in the broader resolution passed by the House. The strength of elite support for the broader resolution would be tested when the mission in Somalia changed radically in June 1993 to include a quest to bring Aidid to justice for the massacre of Pakistani peacekeepers. Surprisingly, one looks in vain for evidence in June that elites were divided over this shift to a more aggressive policy. *New York Times* editorials strongly supported action against Aidid, suggesting that "Mr. Clinton dare not flinch" and that "threatening General Aidid with arrest seems a minimal way of expressing international condemnation."[50] The *Wall Street Journal* was less effusive but also supportive. After the peacekeepers attacked Aidid, with more attacks sure to follow, it editorialized that the UN's mission must so far be regarded a success and that attacks against Aidid showed that UN troops cannot be murdered with impunity.[51] Indirect evidence is also revealing. Strikingly absent from reports about Somalia filed in June and broadcast on the network evening news are any interviews with public figures or leaders from the United States who opposed the actions taken. Protests by Somalis against the more aggressive UN actions were aired.[52] On the surface, public opinion accepted the new policy. We noted earlier that about two-thirds of the public approved of U.S. participation in UN military operations against Aidid, though they were worried that the action might cause the United States to be bogged down in Somalia's civil war. Here perhaps is evidence that the public may suspend its doubts when elites agree that a given policy should be pursued. By September many minds had changed.

[49] Ibid., 199.

[50] "Bloody Sunday in Somalia," *New York Times*, 15 June 1993; and "Drawing the Line in Somalia," *New York Times*, 20 June 1993.

[51] "Somali Awakening," *Wall Street Journal*, 14 June 1993.

[52] Based on my own analysis of abstracts held in the Vanderbilt Television News Archive.

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As the United States became more actively involved in efforts to capture the warlord Aidid, the mission was subject to heightened scrutiny and criticism in Congress. In July 1993, Senator Robert Byrd (D-WV) spoke against the mission on the Senate floor, objecting to the expense of the peacekeeping mission—he chaired the Appropriations Committee—and noting that the Senate never authorized use of American troops in Somalia for peace enforcement purposes. As peace enforcement was not contemplated by SR 45, the senator had raised an important constitutional question about which branch of government should authorize foreign deployments of American armed forces. Hostilities intensified through the summer and, though U.S. casualties were low (fewer than eight), Congress returned from its summer recess ready to pick up the cudgel that Senator Byrd had thrown down. Disillusioned with the peace enforcement effort, on 9 September the Senate voted 90–7 to require President Clinton to seek congressional authorization before 15 November to continue the mission in Somalia. The House passed an identical measure on 28 September by a vote of 406–26. Congress was controlled by the president's party. Still, it would not follow the president's lead in this matter. Moreover, we know from Eric Larson's work that the mass media widely reported congressional concerns with administration policy.[53] Elite disagreement was not kept from the public view. Yet, as public support for peace enforcement was never high, we cannot say that decreased public support for the mission resulted from the resurgence of elite opposition in September.

We can say that the October firefight in Mogadishu brought elite disagreement to a climax, making it inevitable that Clinton would not try to expand or to extend the expanded mission in Somalia. It sealed the doom of a policy already so unpopular among congressional leaders that it would probably have been sharply modified or discontinued in any event. In this context, it is perhaps surprising that public opinion favoring withdrawal from Somalia remained the same (at 65 percent throughout the fall). It did not rise as elite disagreement gave way to consensus over what the policy should be. This may be an artifact of the polling, as the first poll on this issue was not conducted until 6 October. By this time, there was already a clear elite consensus favoring gradual withdrawal from Somalia. Alternatively, public skepticism about the mission in Somalia may have exerted pressure on elite opinion to favor withdrawal. But, if so, public opinion was not behaving as predicted by the elite consensus hypothesis. The most we can say is that public support for the mission eroded as elite consensus eroded, that public disillusionment, already strong, grew stronger when casualties were taken, and that public support for gradual withdrawal was unwavering once political elites agreed to limit the mission and leave Somalia by March 1994.

In sum, we cannot conclude with certainty, on the basis of evidence here, exactly how elite and public opinion are interrelated. Our expectation, based

[53] Eric Victor Larson, *Ends and Means in the Democratic Conversation* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Graduate School Dissertation Series, 1995), 272–296.

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on current public opinion theory and research, was that patterns of elite opinion were the guiding force and that public support for peacekeeping missions would be high when elite opinion agreed on the missions and then drop as elite opinion about them became more divided. But neither case offers much support for that hypothesis. Some evidence in the Somali case suggests that when elites agreed on the policy to pursue, the public did suspend disbelief and go along. In both cases, however, it was most often the case that elite and public opinion were divided. Yet when opinion was divided, there was no certain relation between elite and public opinion. In the Lebanon case, at least, elite division did not invariably predict an erosion of public support. We would stand on shaky ground to conclude that public opinion is patterned after elite opinion. What we encountered rather was a highly mediated situation in which presidents and other leaders decided on policies that elites and the public evaluated and then accepted or rejected as their deliberation on the matter led them to believe. The causal order, if any, that explains the influence of one judgment on the other remains unclear.

Conclusion

We began by asking whether there was reliable evidence to support the central claims of the casualties hypothesis. These were, first, that the public will not support military deployments which result in casualties; second, that public support for a deployment would be abruptly withdrawn if casualties unexpectedly occurred; and, finally, that public opinion on this issue is so powerful that it constrains the use of force by—indeed, effectively debellicizes—great powers. Based on this article's analysis of public and elite opinion during U.S. peacekeeping deployments to Lebanon and Somalia, we may conclude with confidence that evidence for this hypothesis is lacking. While public opinion was not insensitive to the deaths of American soldiers, public approval or disapproval of both missions was, in fact, largely determined before casualties occurred. Opinions about the missions did change. The changes were sometimes large and abrupt. In the case of Lebanon, public opinion fluctuated back and forth in response to the terrorist bombing that killed so many Marines. But when opinion fluctuated about the bombing, it moved in a direction opposite to what the casualties hypothesis predicts. It moved to continue rather than end the deployment. In Somalia, support for the mission had withered already in response to the changing mission before the firefight in Mogadishu.

Stating the matter strongly, patterns of public support for peacekeeping missions reveal no irrational or knee-jerk reactions based on a putative unwillingness to tolerate casualties. They reveal no immature demand for a casualty-free security policy, both wrong to promise and impossible to deliver. They reveal a public prudently cautious about what to expect from the use of force. They are willing to risk it for humanitarian purposes, but they are risk averse

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with respect to the more complex and often partisan peace enforcement missions.

In light of these findings, why have so many found the casualties hypothesis persuasive, especially within the political elite? One reason may be, as Donald C. F. Daniels suggests, that members of Congress place more credence in what their constituents tell them than what national polls show, and that patterns of constituent contacts might actually support something like the casualties hypothesis.[54] This is a valuable suggestion. Taken seriously, it means that clear specification of the relation between elite and public opinion requires a different kind of study than undertaken here. Local studies are needed to compare public opinion within congressional districts with opinions expressed through constituency contact and to examine whether these influence or are influenced by the policy positions taken by members of Congress. Alternatively, rhetoric about public intolerance of casualties and its influence over policy may simply mask an intra-elite struggle, still unresolved, about the distribution of warmaking powers between the president and Congress. In both Lebanon and Somalia, elite opinion about the deployments divided most often over the application of the War Powers Resolution. The resolution asserts that the president's power over force deployments is not unilateral, but must be shared with Congress whenever forces are deployed in situations where hostilities are imminent. Presidents may say a situation is not hostile, of course. But hostilities are hard to deny once casualties are taken. On this account, casualties are a hot issue, because they trigger intra-elite conflict. Both of these ideas require further research.

Note, finally, a key assumption of democratic theory—namely, that the public is competent to decide what public policy should be, including national security policy. The casualties hypothesis may seem to share this assumption. It does not. It certainly holds that public opinion is powerful. But by supposing public support for peacekeeping deployments rests on the utopian condition that military operations be casualty free, the casualties hypothesis lays a groundwork for discrediting the quality of public judgment, for denying its competence. By supposing that elites are unwittingly constrained to desire whatever public opinion at the moment desires, the casualties hypothesis adopts the view that democracy is prone to corruption, as Aristotle and others long after have feared. In short, the casualties hypothesis undermines confidence in the public to govern itself wisely and well, at least in the area of foreign affairs. This study suggests that there is no reason to undermine confidence. The claims of the casualties hypothesis lack support and should be laid to rest.*

[54] Daniels, "The United States," 94–95.

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Origins of the Fourth Amendment

LEONARD W. LEVY

Before the American Revolution, the right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures had slight existence. British policies assaulted the privacy of dwellings and places of business, particularly when royal revenues were at stake. The right to be taxed only by the consent of representatives of one's choice was the great right whose violation helped caused the Revolution. British attempts to enforce tax measures by general searches also occasioned deeply felt resentments that damaged relations between England and the American colonies, and provoked anxious concerns that later sought expression in the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution. That amendment repudiates general warrants by recognizing a "right of the people to be secured in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." Any warrant that is vague about the persons, places, or things to be searched violates the specificity required by the command of the amendment that warrants shall issue only "upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."

The Fourth Amendment would not have been possible but for British legal theory which Britons of North America inherited and cherished as their own. The Fourth Amendment emerged not only from the American Revolution; it was a constitutional embodiment of the extraordinary coupling of Magna Carta to the appealing fiction that a man's home is his castle. The amendment resulted from embellishments on the insistence, which was rhetorically compelling, though historically without foundation, that government cannot encroach on the private premises of the individual subject. What mattered was not what Magna Carta actually said but what people thought it said, or rather, what it had come to mean. What also mattered was the inspiring imagery that swelled

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the sense of freedom in the ordinary subject. William Pitt expressed it best in a speech in Parliament in 1763, when he declaimed: "The poorest man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to all the forces of the Crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; the storm may enter, the rain may enter, but the King of England may not enter; all his force dares not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement."[1] The assertion that "a man's house is his castle" goes back at least to the early sixteenth century, and it was repeated with such frequency that it became a cliché.[2]

The first person to link the privacy of one's home to a right secured by Magna Carta seems to have been Robert Beale, clerk of the Privy Council, in 1589. Beale asked rhetorically what had happened to Chapter 39 of the great charter when agents of a prerogative court, acting under its warrant, could "enter into mens houses, break up their chests and chambers," and carry off as evidence whatever they pleased.[3] That Beale's statement was historically unsound is unimportant compared to the fact that he took a feudal document, which protected the barons, and converted it into a constitution for everyone. Creative glosses like Beale's would make Magna Carta a talismanic symbol of freedom, subjecting all authority, including the royal prerogative, to the rule of law. Construing Chapter 39 to be a ban on general warrants helped make a myth that would transform American thinking about privacy rights against government.

One of the most strategically significant places for the belief that a legal writ authorizing a legitimate search must be specific as to persons and places was Sir Edward Coke's *Institutes of the Laws of England*.[4] From the Puritans of Massachusetts Bay, who studied Coke, to Thomas Jefferson, who admiringly said of him that "a sounder Whig never wrote" nor one more learned "in the orthodox doctrines of British liberties," Americans regarded Coke as the foremost authority on English law.[5] Coke's authority legitimated the belief that Magna Carta outlaws general warrants based on mere surmise.

Sir Matthew Hale, another seventeenth-century legal luminary, more systematically analyzed the problem of search and seizure in his book *History of Pleas of the Crown*.[6] Hale criticized warrants that failed to name the persons

[1] Quoted in Nelson B. Lasson, *The History and Development of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1937), 49–50. Variations of the statement exist, and its date is not certain.

[2] 1505 opinion of Chief Justice John Fineux in a King's Bench case reported in the Year Books, the records of litigation from about 1300 to 1535.

[3] Leonard W. Levy, *Origins of the Fifth Amendment* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), 170–71, 466.

[4] Sir Edward Coke, *Institutes of the Laws of England* (London, 1628–1644, 4 vols.), iv, 176–77.

[5] Francis R. Aumann, *The Changing American Legal System* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1940), 46–47; and Charles Warren, *A History of the American Bar* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1911), 174.

[6] Sir Matthew Hale, *History of Pleas of the Crown*, Solom Emlyn, ed. (London, 2 vols., 1st ed., 1736), I, 577–83; ii, 107–11, 149–52.

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sought for crime or the places to be searched for evidence of theft. He even laid a basis for the concept of probable cause by maintaining that the person seeking a warrant should be examined judicially under oath so that the magistrate could determine whether he had grounds for his suspicions. Hale also asserted that an officer who made an illegal search and arrest was liable to a civil suit for false arrest.[7]

Beale, Coke, and Hale did not stand alone. They invented a rhetorical tradition against general searches, which Sergeant William Hawkins and Sir William Blackstone continued.[8] But the rhetoric was empty; the tradition had almost no practical effect. Beale's views leaked out through officially licensed publications that sought to refute him, but he did not dare publish his manuscript.[9] Coke's own report of *Semayne's Case* of 1604 refuted the accuracy of the propositions that he advanced in his *Institutes*, for in that case the court had held that although a man's house is his castle, his privacy did not extend to his guests or to "cases where the King is the party."[10] Coke's own experience shows best that the maxim represented only the frailest aspiration, not the law in cases involving the crown. In 1634, when Coke lay dying, the Privy Council's agents searched his home and law chambers for seditious papers and seized not only the manuscripts of his voluminous legal writings but also his personal valuables, including his money, keys, jewelry, will, and a poem addressed to his children.[11] Hale's book did not even get published until sixty years after his death. Pitt spoke in a losing cause; Parliament enacted the excise bill whose passage he so eloquently opposed as dangerous to the liberty of the subject. Blackstone made only a passing remark against general searches; his target, rather, was the general arrest warrant.

General Warrants and General Searches

In fact, English law was honeycombed with parliamentary enactments that relied on warrantless general searches and on general warrants for their enforcement, including hue and cry methods, sumptuary legislation, and measures aimed at punishing theft at governing crafts and guilds, bankruptcy, and military recruitment. Enactments also covered measures preventing illegal imports; manufactures; poaching; counterfeiting; unlicensed printing; seditious, heretical, or lewd publications; and nonpayment of taxes. Taxes extended to hearths and stoves, to estates, to intoxicating drinks, to a variety of consumer goods

[7] See Lasson, *History of the Fourth*, 35–36, for discussion of Hale.

[8] Sergeant William Hawkins, *A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown* (London, 1724, 2nd ed., 2 vols.), ii, 81–82; and William Blackstone, *Commentaries on the Laws of England* (Oxford, 1766–1796, 4 vols.), i, 288, 308.

[9] Levy, *Origins*, 171.

[10] 5 Coke Reports 91a, 91b, 93a, 78 English Reports 194–95, 198.

[11] Lasson, *History of the Fourth*, 31–32; and Catherine Drinker Bowen, *The Lion and the Throne: The Life and Times of Sir Edward Coke* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1956), 533–34.

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such as salt, candles, soap, glass and paper, and to foreign goods. The king's customs office and his exchequer depended on both the general warrant and warrantless searches as ordinary means of collecting royal revenues, and Parliament passed dozens of pieces of legislation to provide the taxes and authorize general searches. Promiscuously broad warrants allowed officers to search wherever they wanted and to seize whatever they wanted, with few exceptions. An eighteenth-century collection of warrants contains 108 authorized by secretaries of state or by the King's Bench for the period 1700–1763, all but two of which were general warrants.[12] The frequency in the use of general warrants substantially increased as time went by.

General searches completely pervaded colonial law as well as Great Britain's. Colonial legislation on search and seizure either copied Britain's or derived from it; until 1750, all handbooks for justices of the peace, who issued warrants, contained or described only general warrants. Until the 1760s a man's house was actually less of a legal castle in America than in England, because the Americans, when adapting English models, ignored exceptions. As a result, warrants in America tended to give their enforcers every discretion. The Fourth Amendment would not emerge from colonial precedents; rather, it would repudiate them.

Officers or their informants merely reported that an infraction of the law had occurred or that they had a suspicion, not that a particular person was suspected or that a particular place contained evidence of a crime; on the basis of such an assertion, a magistrate issued a warrant. Neither custom, judicial precedent, nor statutory law provided that the magistrate should interrogate the seeker of the warrant to determine the credibility of the suspicion or of his informant. The magistrate made no independent determination of his own whether a basis existed for the warrant other than the assertion that a crime had occurred or that a basis existed for some suspicion. Magistrates had an obligation to provide the warrant, rather than deny one or limit one to a particular person or place that was suspected. Probable cause in a modern sense did not exist; not even a reasonable basis for suspicion existed. Although an officer seeking a warrant more than likely would designate a particular person or place if known to him in advance, he need not do so to get a warrant.

Colonial documents contain no suggestion of a right against general warrants. Recommendations for them were common in the manuals that had been published in the colonies before 1763 for the use of justices of the peace. American legal writers even relied on the great authority of Coke and Hale as proof that an officer could forcibly enter a person's house.

In 1756, however, the province of Massachusetts enacted extraordinary legislation that reversed the tide of practice by abandoning general warrants in favor of warrants founded on some elements of particularity. The legislation of

[12] Philip Carteret Webb, ed., *Copies of Warrants Taken from the Records Office Books of the Kings Bench at Westminster; The Original Office Books of the Secretaries of State* (London, 1763), 10–72.

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1756 marked a watershed in Massachusetts law, indeed in Anglo-American law. Beginning in 1756, Massachusetts revised the statutory precursors of the Fourth Amendment. The new legislation resulted mainly from a vehement public clamor against provincial legislation of 1754. The excise act of that year authorized tax collectors to interrogate any subject, under oath, on the amount of rum, wine, and other spirits he had consumed in his private premises in the past year and taxed it by the gallon. Pamphleteers condemned the measure in hyperbolic language. John Lovell, a Boston schoolmaster whose pupils had included John Hancock and Samuel Adams, called it "the most pernicious attack upon *English Liberty* that was ever attempted," and the minister of the Brattle Church imagined that he saw a revival of the Inquisition, requiring people to incriminate themselves. One pamphlet, *The Monster of Monsters* (the excise act), so savagely attacked the legislature that it condemned the tract as a seditious libel and imprisoned its seller and the suspected author.[13] That author warned of the danger of the tax collector having power to break chains, doors, locks, and bolts, and invade bedchambers and winecellars.[14] In the torrent of tracts against the excise, it was described as a violation of Magna Carta, of the sanctity of one's home as his castle, and of natural rights.

The provincial impost laws, which employed general warrants for enforcement, provoked such animosity that mobs threatened impost officers who tried to collect duties on uncustomed imports—foreign goods on which the duties had not been paid. The hostility to general searches further intensified as the result of two other practices. In 1755 the royal governor of Massachusetts issued ex officio writs of assistance, a type of general warrant that became enormously controversial. Since 1745, British impressment gangs, operating under a general warrant provided by the governor, had been invading private premises as well as taverns and inns seeking to kidnap able-bodied men for service in the royal navy.[15]

Enforcement of the excise and impost acts by general searches, the introduction into the province of writs of assistance, and the general warrants for impressment gangs produced a hullabaloo that the enactments of 1756 sought to allay. The excise and impost acts of that year required an element of probable cause only in the sense that the informant had the obligation to swear on oath that he knew that an infraction of the law had occurred in the place specified. The justices of the peace, who issued the warrants, had no discretion to deny a petition for one; magistrates made no independent judgment whether adequate grounds for the issuance of the warrant existed. But the informant had to swear that he had "just cause" for his sworn statement. The officer con-

[13] Levy, *Origins,* 386–87. See Paul S. Boyer, "Borrowed Rhetoric: The Massachusetts Excise Controversy of 1754," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd ser., 21 (1964): 328–51.

[14] M. H. Smith, *The Writs of Assistance Case* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 113–14.

[15] William Cuddihy and B. Carmon Hardy, "A Man's House Was Not His Castle: Origins of the Fourth Amendment," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd ser., 38 (July 1980): 396–97.

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ducted his search during the daytime, only in the designated location, and could seize only things or objects regulated by the statute that he enforced by his search and seizure. The statues of 1756 also authorized warrants of arrest for named individuals.[16] "The British, in short," Cuddihy and Hardy stated, "introduced writs of assistance into Massachusetts just as the colony itself was rejecting the legal assumptions on which they were based."[17]

The writ of assistance was a type of general warrant deriving its name from the fact that a crown official possessed the legal authority to command the assistance of a peace officer and the assistance, if necessary, of all nearby subjects in his execution of the writ. Parliament authorized writs of assistance by an act of 1662 that empowered the Court of Exchequer to issue a writ to a custom official who, with the assistance of a constable, could enter "any House, shop, Cellar, Warehouse or Room or other Place, and in Case of Resistance to break open Doors, Chests, Trunks and other packages, there to seize" any uncustomed goods.[18] The writ, once issued, lasted for the life of the sovereign and therefore constituted a long-term hunting license for customs officers on the lookout for smugglers and articles imported in violation of the custom laws. In 1696, Parliament extended the act of 1662 to the colonies, but because the Court of Exchequer did not operate in America, no way existed to enforce it. Massachusetts, however, had extended the jurisdiction of its own high court to include the jurisdiction of the Court of Exchequer, thus opening the possibility of enforcement in that colony and in New Hampshire, which copied Massachusetts.[19]

Specific Warrants

When George II died, the high court of Massachusetts, presided over by Chief Justice Thomas Hutchinson, heard *Paxton's Case*, a petition by a customs officer for a new writ of assistance.[20] James Otis, Jr. appeared, he said, on behalf of the inhabitants of Boston to oppose issuance of the writ. Any fastidious legal historian must acknowledge that Otis's argument compounded mistakes and misinterpretations. In effect, he reconstructed the fragmentary evidence buttressing the rhetorical tradition against general searches, and he advocated that

[16] Act of Feb. 28, 1756, chap. 31, sect. 24, *Acts and Resolves . . . of the Province of Massachusetts Bay* (Boston, 1869–1922, 21 vols.), iii, 109. Ibid., iii, 936–37, for the impost act of 20 April 1756.

[17] Cuddihy and Hardy, "A Man's House," 397.

[18] 13 & 14 Car. 2, chap. 11, sect. 5, as quoted by the crown attorney Jeremiah Gridley in Paxton's Case, reported in L. Kinvin Wroth and Hiller B. Zobel, eds., *Legal Papers of John Adams* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965, 3 vols.), ii, 131; Smith, *Writs of Assistance Case*, 17–50, contains a detailed account of the originating legislation. On the writs, see also the documents and annotations by Justice Horace Gray, Jr. in Josiah Quincy, Jr., ed., *Reports of Cases Argued and Adjudged in the Superior Court of Judicature of the Massachusetts Bay Between 1761 and 1772* (Boston, 1865), appendix i, 395–540.

[19] Wroth and Zobel, *Legal Papers of Adams*, ii, 132.

[20] Smith, *Writs of Assistance Case*, is a massive study of Paxton's Case.

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any warrant other than a specific one violated the British constitution. That Otis distorted history is pedantic; he was making history. By an old British technique, which Coke himself had practiced, Otis sought the creation of new rights while asserting strenuously that they had existed nearly from time immemorial. His speech electrified young John Adams, who was present in the courtroom and took notes. As an old man, fifty-six years later, he declared, "Otis was a flame of Fire! . . . Then and there was the first scene of the first Act of Opposition to the arbitrary Claims of Great Britain. Then and there the child Independence [sic] was born." On the night before the Declaration of Independence, Adams asserted that he considered "the Argument concerning Writs of Assistance . . . as the Commencement of the Controversy, between Great Britain and America."[21] Adams's reaction to Otis's speech is so important because a straight line of progression runs from Otis's argument in 1761 to Adams's framing of Article XIV of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights of 1780 to James Madison's introduction of the proposal that became the Fourth Amendment.[22]

We have Adams's brief notes of Otis's speech made at the time of the speech and the fuller version made by Adams not long after. The fuller version takes about twenty minutes to read by comparison with the original, which took Otis four to five hours to deliver.[23] He denounced the writ of assistance as an instrument of "slavery," of "villainy," of "arbitrary power, the most destructive of English liberty and [of] the fundamental principles of the constitution . . . " The writ reminded him of the kind of power that had cost one English king his head and another his throne. The only legal writ, Otis asserted, was a "special warrant directed to specific officers, and to search certain houses &c. especially set forth in the writ may be granted . . . upon oath made . . . by the person, who asks [for the warrant], that he suspects such goods to be concealed in those very places he desires to search."[24] In the recent past, Otis alleged, only special war-

[21] Both statements by Adams quoted in Wroth and Zobel, *Legal Papers of Adams*, ii, 107.

[22] For the Massachusetts Declaration, see Bernard Schwartz, ed., *The Bill of Rights: A Documentary History* (New York: Chelsea House, 1971, 2 vols.), i, 342, sect. XIV. Madison's proposal in his speech of 8 June 1789, in the First Congress is in ibid, ii, 1027.

[23] Wroth and Zobel, *Legal Papers of Adams*, reprinted both versions of the speech, ii, 125–29, 139–44, with elaborate annotations. The longer version was first published by the *Massachusetts Spy* (Boston), 29 April 1773, 3. See John Kukla, ed., *The Bill of Rights: A Lively Heritage* (Richmond: Virginia State Library, 1978), 8597. William Cuddihy, "From General to Specific Search Warrants," 93, alleges that Otis "cited Sir Edward Coke's exaggeration of Magna Carta, incorrectly asserted that Coke required all search warrants to be specific, and appealed to 'higher law'." Cuddihy cites Wroth and Zobel as his source for Otis's remarks, but that source does not show any reference by Otis to Coke's use of Magna Carta to condemn general warrants or to any reliance by Otis on Coke as an authority for specific warrants. Quincy, ed., *Reports of Cases*, 51–57, includes a fourteen-line extract from Otis, in which Otis's claim that a writ of assistance is illegal is backed by these citations: "1 Inst. 464. 29M." Vol. I of Coke's *Institutes* is on feudal tenures, "29M," a reference to the famous judgment-of-peers or by-law-of-the-land clause, seems to support the point. However, Gray's discussion of Otis's quotations from Coke on Magna Carta, cap. XXIX, in Quincy's *Reports*, 483–85, has nothing to do with search and seizure.

[24] Wroth and Zobel, *Legal Papers of Adams*, ii, 141; I have not followed the capitalization of the original.

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rants existed, authorizing search of particularly named houses, and they were issued only after the complainant had taken an oath to support his suspicion; "special warrants only are legal," he concluded. He condemned writs of assistance because they were perpetual, universal (addressed to every officer and subject in the realm), and allowed anyone to conduct a search in violation of the essential principle of English liberty that a peaceable man's house is his castle. A writ that allowed a customs officer to enter private homes when he pleased, on bare suspicion, and even to break locks to enter, was void. An act of Parliament authorizing such writs was void, because it violated the British constitution, and courts should not issue an unconstitutional writ.[25]

Otis lost his case. The writs were issued, but Americans found a cause and a constitutional argument. In 1762, the Massachusetts legislature passed a bill that would have required all writs to be as specific as the warrants used by provincial officers to enforce the excise and impost acts, but the royal governor vetoed the bill. Thereafter, crowds frequently prevented enforcement or "rescued" goods seized by customs agents. In a 1766 case, a Boston merchant, believing that in "whig Boston Whig furies made Whig law," used force to barricade his home, as a crowd gathered. Officers prudently decided that calling on bystanders to assist as *posse comitatus* might result in a loss of life—their own—and abandoned efforts to enforce the writ. After a rescue in Falmouth (Portland) Maine, the governor conceded that public opposition had effectively paralyzed the use of writs to conduct searches and seizures. Britain's Attorney General William DeGrey decided that the act of Parliament that authorized the writ allowed them to issue only from the Court of Exchequer, whose writ did not run in America.[26] In London, far more than DeGrey's technical opinion damaged the principle of general warrants.

John Wilkes's studied insult of the king's speech in 1763, in the forty-fifth number of his journal *North Britain,* provoked massive retaliation by the government. One of the secretaries of state issued general search warrants for the arrest of everyone connected with *North Britain #45*. Crown agents enforcing the warrants had unfettered discretion to search, seize, and arrest anyone as they pleased. They ransacked printer's shops and houses, and arrested forty-nine persons including Wilkes, a member of Parliament, his printer, publisher, and booksellers. The officers seized his private papers for incriminating evidence after a thorough search; thousands of pages and scores of books belonging to persons associated with him were also seized. The House of Commons voted that *North Britain #45* was a seditious libel and expelled Wilkes, and he was eventually convicted and jailed. The government found, however, that it

[25] Ibid., 144. Curiously, in the briefer version of the speech, Otis relied more fully on Coke's decision in Dr. Bonham's Case, 8 Coke's Reports 113b, 118a, (C.P. 1610) and more clearly asked the court to hold the act unconstitutional. See Wroth and Zobel, *Legal Papers of Adams*, ii, 127–28.

[26] Smith, *Writs of Assistance Case*, 442–47, 542–43; Quincy, ed., *Reports of Cases*, 437–38, 446, 495–99; John Phillip Reid, *In Rebellious Spirit* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1979), 1–35.

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had mounted a tiger; no one since the time of John Lilburne, more than a century earlier, had proved to be such a resourceful and pugnacious antagonist. Wilkes had quickly filed suits for trespass against everyone, from flunky to minister, connected with the warrant that had resulted in his undoing; others who had suffered searches and arrest filed similar suits. A legal donnybrook ensued. On the one hand, the government, based on about two hundred informations, had engaged in mass arrests and searches, and on the other, the victims filed a couple of dozen suits for trespass and false imprisonment. The Wilkes case became the subject of sensational controversies, angry tracts, and confusing trials. Wilkes would emerge from his prosecution a popular idol, the personification of constitutional liberty to Englishmen on both sides of the Atlantic. Although he focused mainly on the dangers of general warrants and the seizures of private papers, some of his supporters also championed freedom of the press and the right against self-incrimination.[27]

In the colonies, "Wilkes and Liberty" became a slogan that patriot leaders exploited in the service of American causes. In New York, for example, Alexander McDougall, a leader of the Sons of Liberty who had censured a bill to provision the king's troops, posed as an American Wilkes and turned his imprisonment into a theatrical triumph, as had Wilkes, while his supporters used the number 45, the seditious issue of *North Britain*, as a symbol of their cause. On the forty-fifth day of the year, for example, forty-five Liberty Boys dined on forty-five pounds of beef from a forty-five-month-old bull, drank forty-five toasts to liberty—liberty of the press, liberty from general warrants, liberty from compulsory self-accusation, liberty from seizure of private papers—and after dinner marched to the jail to salute McDougall with forty-five cheers. On another festive liberty day, forty-five songs were sung to him by forty-five virgins, every one of whom, according to some damned Tory, was forty-five years old.[28] The Fourth Amendment, as well as the First and the Fifth, owes something to the Wilkes cases. Unlike *Paxton's Case*, the Wilkes cases filled the columns of American newspapers from Boston to Charleston.

The first of these cases, *Huckle v. Money*, established the doctrine, traceable at least to Hale, that crown officers are liable to damage suits for trespass and false imprisonment resulting from unlawful search. Chief Justice Charles Pratt said, when charging the jury: "To enter a man's house by virtue of a name-

[27] See Robert R. Rea, *The English Press in Politics, 1760–1774* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1963), 40–85; Raymond Postgate, *That Devil Wilkes* (New York: Vanguard Press, 1929); George Nobbe, *The North Briton: A Study in Political Propaganda* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1939), chap. 16; and George Rude, *Wilkes and Liberty* (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1962).

[28] Leonard W. Levy, *Emergence of a Free Press* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 79. For the fallout of the Wilkes cases in America, see Patricia Bonomi, *A Factious People: Politics and Society in Colonial New York* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), 267–76; Pauline Maier, *From Resistance to Revolution* (New York: Knopf, 1972), 162–77; Jack P. Green, "Bridge to Revolution: The Wilkes Fund Controversy in South Carolina 1769–1775," *Journal of Southern History* 27 (Summer 1963): 19–52.

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less warrant, in order to procure evidence, is worse than the Spanish Inquisition, a law under which no Englishman would wish to live an hour." The jury awarded 300 pounds in damages, an excessive sum for the deprivation of a journeyman printer's liberty for six hours; but on appeal Pratt ruled that the small injury done to one of low rank meant nothing compared to the "great point of the law touching the liberty of the subject" invaded by a magistrate of the king in an exercise of arbitrary power "violating Magna Carta, and attempting to destroy the liberty of the kingdom, by insisting on the legality of this general warrant. . . ." [29] In *Wilkes v. Wood* (1763), Pratt presided over a similar trial and engaged in similar rhetoric ("totally subversive of the liberty of the subject"). The jury awarded damages of 1,000 pounds to Wilkes, who later got an award of 4,000 pounds against the secretary of state who had issued the warrant.[30] In fact, the government paid a total of about 100,000 pounds in costs and judgments.[31]

In one of the Wilkes cases, the government appealed to England's highest criminal court, the King's Bench, and Lord Mansfield, the chief justice, agreed that the warrants in the Wilkes cases were illegal. Although the common law, he observed, authorized arrests without warrant and Parliament had often authorized searches and arrests on the basis of general warrants, in this case no circumstance existed justifying warrantless searches or arrests, and no act of Parliament was involved. Accordingly, a secretarial warrant, based on executive authority, leaving discretion to the endorsing officer, "is not fit." Mansfield thought that the "magistrate ought to judge; and should give certain directions to the officer"—a foundation for what later emerged as probable cause.[32]

The victories of the Wilkesites encouraged other victims of secretarial warrants in seditious libel cases to bring suits for damages. The most important of those cases, *Entick v. Carrington* (1765), resulted in an opinion by Chief Justice Pratt, now Lord Camden, which the Supreme Court of the United States would describe as "one of the landmarks of English liberty."[33] Victory for the government, Camden declared, would open the secret cabinets of every subject whenever the secretary of state suspected someone of seditious libel. The law required no one to incriminate himself, for that would be "cruel and unjust" to the innocent and guilty alike, "and it should seem, that search for evidence is disallowed upon the same principle." Camden held that neither arrests nor gen-

[29] *Huckle v. Money*, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (C.P. 1763) in Philip B. Kurland and Ralph Lerner, eds., *The Founders' Constitution* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987, 5 vols.), v, 230.

[30] 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (C.P. 1763), in ibid., 230–31.

[31] Thomas Erskine May, *Constitutional History of England Since the Accession of George III* (New York, 1880, 2 vols.), 249. May is the source of the earlier statement that the government filed 200 informations in these cases; ibid., ii, 112.

[32] *Money v. Leach*, 97 Eng. Rep 1075 (K.B. 1765), in Kurland and Lerner, eds. *Founders' Constitution*, v, 235.

[33] *Boyd v. United States*, 116 U.S. 616, 626 (1886), citing *Entick v. Carrington*, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B.), most easily available in Kurland and Lerner, eds., *Founders' Constitution*, v, 233–35.

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eral warrants could issue on executive discretion, and he implied that evidence seized on the authority of such a warrant could not be used without violating the right against self-incrimination. Similarly, the Supreme Court in 1886 ruled that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments have an "intimate relation" and "throw great light on each other."[34]

In 1764 and 1765, the House of Commons irresolutely debated whether general warrants should be regarded as illegal, and in 1766 it repeated the debate. The upshot was the passage of three resolutions, not statutes, that revealed a victory for the narrow position of Mansfield rather than the broader one of Camden. The Commons condemned general warrants in all cases involving arrests but condemned general warrants for searches only in cases where the warrants issued from the executive branch in connection with the crime of seditious libel. Secretarial search warrants in treason cases remained legal. The resolutions of 1766 left in place the elaborate system of warrantless searches when authorized by Parliament and of general searches when undergirded by statutory authority. The House of Lords rejected a proposal from the Commons that would have restricted general search warrants to cases of treason and felony. Thus, the reforms resulting from the judicial decisions and parliamentary resolves of 1763 to 1766 conformed to the prime directive of England's law of search and seizure: even promiscuously general searches did not violate the liberty of the subject or infringe the maxim about a man's home so long as Parliament had laid down the law.[35]

On the other hand, the Wilkes case and the parliamentary debates unleashed a lot of rhetoric that went far beyond the reality of actual judicial holdings and legislative resolves. Americans were practiced in making a highly selective use of authorities and other sources that suited their needs. They could even turn Blackstone, that spokesman for parliamentary supremacy, into an advocate of constitutional restraints. In Britain, Englishmen often spoke thunderously but thrashed about with a frail stick; in America they threw the stick away, contenting themselves with the thunder. They found a lot of it in Pitt, Camden, Wilkes, and in "Father of Candor," all of whom they knew well. Father of Candor was the author of a little book of 1764 "on libels, warrants, and the seizure of papers," which had gone through seven editions by 1771. He condemned general warrants as "excruciating torture,"[36] and he urged that search warrants should be specific as to persons, places, and things, and should be sworn on oath.[37] That was the sort of thing Americans could exploit when confronted by Parliament's determination to impose writs of assistance on the colonies.

[34] Howell's *State Trials* 1038, 1041, 1063, 1073; *Boyd v. United States*, 116 U.S. 616, 633 (1886).

[35] Robert Bisset, *History of the Reign of George III* (London, 1782–1783, 2 vols.) i, 182–88; and John Adolphus, *History of England* (London, 1802, 3 vols.), i, 152–54, 191–92, and 235–36.

[36] Father of Candor, *An Enquiry Into the Doctrine Lately Propagated Concerning Libels, Warrants, and the Seizure of Papers* (London, 1765, reprinted in New York: Da Capo Press, 1970), 55.

[37] Ibid., 55–56.

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Twenty years after the Townshend Acts of 1767, James Madison, speaking in the First Congress on the occasion of recommending the amendments to the Constitution that became the Bill of Rights, recalled that the legislative power constituted a great danger to liberty; the British, he noted, "have gone no farther than to raise a barrier against the power of the Crown; the power of the Legislature is left altogether indefinite."[38] Notwithstanding grandiose rhetoric against general warrants, Parliament in 1767 superseded its act of 1696, which had extended writs of assistance to America without providing a mechanism for granting them under the seal of the Court of Exchequer. The Townshend Acts of 1767 provided that the highest court in each colony possessed authority to issue writs of assistance to customs officers to search where they pleased for prohibited or uncustomed goods and to seize them.

Repudiating General Warrants

The Townshend Acts, therefore, expanded the controversy over writs of assistance to all of the thirteen colonies. What had been a local controversy, centering mainly in Boston, spread continent-wide. Only the two colonies, Massachusetts and New Hampshire, which had previously experienced the writs, continued to issue them, although the mobs "liberated" seized goods as often as not. Elsewhere the provincial high courts stalled, compromised, or declined the writ. The New York court issued the writ but deviated from the exact language authorized by Parliament, with the result that the customs officers refused to execute the deviant writ and sought one in the correct form. It was not forthcoming; indeed, applications kept getting lost or mislaid. In 1773, five years after the first application, the New York court held that "it did not appear to them that such Writs according to the form now produced are warranted by law and therefore they could not grant the motion."[39]

Something like that happened in several colonies. In Connecticut, Chief Justice Jonathan Trumbull and Judge Roger Sherman refused to be rushed into making a decision on the application for a writ. Trumbull remarked privately that he and his associates were not clear "the thing was in itself constitutional."[40] Chief Justice William Allen of Pennsylvania was more forthcoming. In 1768 he declared that he had no legal authority to issue the writ. Customs officials sent Allen's statement to Attorney General William DeGrey in London for his opinion. He thought that Allen would see the error of his ways if confronted by a copy of the writ, a copy of the act of Parliament, and a copy of the opinion of England's attorney general.[41] On a new application for the writ backed by English legal artillery, Allen replied that he would grant "partic-

[38] Speech by James Madison, 8 June 1789, in Schwartz, ed., *Bill of Rights*, ii, 1028.

[39] Oliver Dickerson, "Writs of Assistance as a Cause of the American Revolution" in Richard B. Morris, ed., *Era of the American Revolution* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1939), 54–58.

[40] Ibid., 52–54.

[41] Quincy, ed., *Reports*, 453–54, for DeGrey's opinion, dated 20 August 1768.

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ular [not general] writs whenever they are applied for on oath." The customs agent must swear he knew or had reason to believe that prohibited or uncustomed goods were located in a particular place. Allen's groping toward a concept of probable cause as well as specific warrants became clearer as customs officials vainly persisted to engage his cooperation.[42]

In South Carolina a judge, explaining his court's refusal to issue the writ, stated that it "trenched too severely and unnecessarily upon the safety of the subject secured by Magna Charta." After five years of persistence, however, the customs officials got a writ of assistance in South Carolina.[43] In Georgia, where the judges declined to issue the writ, they said they would authorize a search warrant for a specific occasion if supported by an affidavit.[44]

Virginia issued writs of assistance in 1769, but undermined the process by annexing a degree of specificity obnoxious to the customs office. Its agent had to swear an oath in support of his suspicion and could obtain a writ only for a special occasion and for a limited duration of time. The Virginia judges alleged that the writ sought by the customs office under the Townshend Act was "unconstitutional" because it allowed the officer "to act under it according to his own arbitrary discretion." The customs office appealed to England for support against the Virginia court. Attorney General DeGrey had to acknowledge that he knew of "no direct and effective means" to compel a provincial court to award a writ of assistance. He asserted that judges might be impeached for contumacious refusal to execute an act of Parliament, but he did not know how to proceed in such a case. He preferred to believe that Virginia's judges had acted out of a mistaken understanding of the law. Virginia's court, however, remained contumacious.[45]

Between 1761 and 1776, a glacial drift in American legal opinion can be discerned toward increased reliance on specific warrants. Law books, including manuals of the justices of the peace, began to recommend specific warrants in some cases; most, however, relied on general warrants, as did American judges in actual practice. American rhetoric and reality diverged. John Dickinson's *Letters of a Pennsylvania Farmer*, which circulated in every colony, censured general warrants and repeated the cliché about a man's home being his castle; but Dickinson did not recommend specific warrants in their place or condemn any warrantless searches. Americans never spoke of a right to privacy as such, although they understood the concept and like their British counterparts expressed outrage over the possibility that customs agents might ransack houses, and "enter private cabinets" or "secret repositories." The best known of such remarks, which received considerable publicity in the colonies, was that of the Boston Town Meeting of 1772, which complained:

[42] Dickerson, "Writs of Assistance," 59–60.

[43] William Henry Drayton, *A Letter from Freeman of South-Carolina* (Charles Town, 1774), 19–20; Dickerson, "Writs of Assistance," 67.

[44] Dickerson, "Writs of Assistance," 66.

[45] Ibid., 68–71.

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> Thus our houses and even our bed chambers, are exposed to be ransacked, our boxes chests & trunks broke open ravaged and plundered by wretches, whom no prudent man would venture to employ even as menial servants; whenever they are pleased to say they suspect there are in the house wares &c for which the dutys have not been paid. Flagrant instances of the wanton exercise of this power, have frequently happened in this and other sea port Towns. By this we are cut off from that domestic security which renders the lives of the most unhappy in some measure agreeable. Those Officers may under colour of law and the cloak of a general warrant break thro' the sacred rights of the domicil, ransack mens houses, destroy their securities, carry off their property, and with little danger to themselves commit the most horred murders.[46]

In all the American rhetoric, only one writer seems to have urged special warrants in place of warrantless searches and general warrants. Some writers revealed that their objection lay against a parliamentary empowerment, rather than one of their own assemblies.[47] General searches continued in the colonies as the prevailing standard, not the specific warrants used in Massachusetts. Nevertheless, some colonies became more familiar with specific warrants and even used them in various kinds of cases. One need only add that Otis's extraordinary forensic effort of 1761 on behalf of specific warrants, which a Boston newspaper printed in 1773, bore scarce fruit elsewhere, at least not until well after the Revolution.

The Declaration of Independence, however, spurred the definition of American ideals. Although that document, which itemized the king's perfidies, failed to say anything about search and seizure or even about general warrants, it inspired the making of the first state constitutions. In the midst of war, Americans engaged in the most important, creative, and dynamic constitutional achievements in history, among them the first written constitutions and the first bills of rights against all branches of government. Their provisions on search and seizure are significant because they distilled the best American thinking on the subject, constituted benchmarks to show the standard by which practice should be measured, and provided models for the Fourth Amendment.

Virginia, the oldest, largest, and most influential of the new states, anticipated the Declaration of Independence by adopting a Declaration of Rights on 12 June 1776, and completed its constitution before the month ended. Article 10 of the Declaration of Rights provided: "That general warrants, whereby any officer or messenger may be commanded to search suspected places without evidence of a fact committed, or to seize any person or persons not named, or whose offence is not particularly described and supported by evidence, are grievous and oppressive, and ought not to be granted."[48] Obviously this provision is a substantial step in the direction of specific warrants. Its force is weakened by the wishy-washy climax: certain warrants are grievous, not illegal, and

[46] "The Rights of the Colonies," 1772, in Schwartz, ed., *Bill of Rights*, i, 206.

[47] William Henry Drayton, cited above, n. 43, seems to have been the exception.

[48] Schwartz, ed., *Bill of Rights*, i, 235.

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"ought" not be granted, but the language imposes no prohibition against them. The concept of probable cause is stunted with respect to searches but considerably broader with respect to arrests. The search may be conducted, presumably under warrant, if the fact of a crime has been established, though no need exists to show a connection between the crime and the place to be searched, and there is no reference to a need for specificity with respect to the things to be seized. Moreover, the warrant need not be based on a sworn statement. Probable cause must be shown for the criminal involvement of the persons to be arrested; far more than mere suspicion is required for an arrest.

As the first search and seizure provision in any American constitution, Virginia's had egregious deficiencies as well as pioneering attainments. That the attainments might have been better still is evident from the fact that in a committee draft of 27 May, the property to be seized had to be "particularly described." We do not known why that clause was omitted in the final draft.[49] We do know that the provision could have been far worse or altogether nonexistent. George Mason, who provided the original draft of the Declaration of Rights, had omitted a search and seizure provision; and Thomas Jefferson's draft of a state constitution omitted one, too.[50] Edmund Randolph may have been right in recalling that his state's search and seizure provision "was dictated by the remembrance of the seizure of Wilkes's paper under a warrant from a Secretary of State,"[51] but Virginia went well beyond a condemnation of general warrants issued under executive authority.

In August 1776, Pennsylvania adopted its extraordinary constitution preceded by a Declaration of Rights influenced by Virginia yet original in major respects. Its tenth article provided:

> That the people have a right to hold themselves, their houses, papers, and possessions free from search and seizure, and therefore warrants without oaths or affirmations first made, affording a sufficient foundation for them, and whereby any officer or messenger may be commanded or required to search suspected places, or to seize any person or persons, his or their property, not particularly described are contrary to that right, and ought not to be granted.[52]

That provision is memorable because it recognizes a right of the people in affirmative terms rather than merely declaring against general warrants or grievous searches. And, the right of the people is broad, promiscuously so; there is no such thing as an absolute right to be free from search and seizure. The provision meant, rather, that searches and seizures made without specific warrants "ought"—that weak word again—not to be granted. Even that proposition had to be subject to exceptions, because no evidence suggests that Pennsylvania intended to depart from common law exceptions to the need for a war-

[49] Ibid., 238, Article 12.
[50] Ibid., 232, 243–46.
[51] Ibid., 248.
[52] Ibid., 265.

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rant if a peace officer was in hot pursuit of a felon or had reason to believe that the felon might escape if the officer called time out to obtain a warrant. Exigent circumstances of various kinds always allowed warrantless arrests and even warrantless searches and seizures of evidence of crime, of weapons, or of contraband. The Pennsylvania provision had the virtue of including a requirement for specificity with respect to the things seized when a warrant was attainable. It was also the first to require that the warrant be available only if the informant swore or affirmed that he had "sufficient foundation" for specific information about the person, place, or things described. Probable cause, attested to on oath, derives partly from Pennsylvania's contribution to the constitutional law of search and seizure.

Delaware's Declaration of Rights of 1776 derived its search and seizure provision partly from Maryland and partly from Pennsylvania, though the Delaware variant was truncated; it omitted the clause recognizing the right of the people. It also omitted a requirement for specificity respecting the property to be seized under a warrant, yet deplored as grievous any warrant for the seizure of property not based on a sworn statement. Delaware's contribution consisted, rather, in the fact that its provision was the first to declare "illegal" any warrants not meeting the constitutional requirement of specificity.[53] In this respect, the Delaware provision was based on a draft of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, not yet adopted.[54] The texts of the search and seizure provisions of these two states were nearly the same. As Delaware copied Maryland, North Carolina copied Virginia, and Vermont copied Pennsylvania.[55]

Similarly, New Hampshire in 1784 would copy Massachusetts, which did not adopt its Declaration of Rights and Constitution until 1780. As a source of the Fourth Amendment, the Massachusetts provision on search and seizure was the most important of all the state models, because it was the one that the Fourth Amendment most resembles. The Massachusetts provision was the work of John Adams, the witness to and recorder of Otis's monumental speech in Paxton's Case about twenty years earlier. Through Adams and Article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, Otis's influence at last bore triumphant fruits. Article 14 declared:

> Every subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches, and seizures of his person, his houses, his papers, and all his possessions. All warrants, therefore, are contrary to this right, if the cause or foundation of them be not previously supported by oath or affirmation; and if the order in the warrant to the civil officer, to make search in suspected places, to arrest one or more suspected persons, or to seize their property, be not accompanied with a special designation of the persons or objects of search, arrest, or seizure and no warrant ought to be issued but in cases and with the formalities, prescribed by the laws.[56]

[53] Ibid., 278, Article 17.
[54] Ibid., 279, 283, Article 23.
[55] Ibid., 287, 323.
[56] Ibid., 342.

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The detail of the provision is striking. No other right received such particularity in the Massachusetts constitution, and, like the provision of Pennsylvania, which Adams borrowed, it is a "right" that is protected. The right is to be secure against "unreasonable search, and seizures," the first use of the phrase that would become the prime principle of the Fourth Amendment. The warrant must be based on sworn statement providing "case or foundation" for the warrant, but the provision amazingly omits a requirement that the search, arrest, or seizure occur within specifically designated premises.[57]

The war years were the worst possible for testing whether American practices matched American ideals or constitutional provisions. Search and seizure was a method of fighting the enemy and those suspected of adhering to his cause. Perhaps the grossest violation of a constitutional provision occurred in Pennsylvania in 1777. Three years earlier Congress had complained about customs officials breaking and entering without authority. In 1777, though, Congress urged Pennsylvania's executive council to search the homes of Philadelphians, mostly Quakers, whose loyalty to the American cause was suspect. Congress wanted to disarm such persons and to seize their political papers. Pennsylvania's executive council authorized a search of the homes of anyone who had not taken an oath of allegiance to the United States. The searches of at least six Quaker homes were conducted cruelly and violently; and all sorts of books, papers, and records were confiscated. Over forty people were arrested and deported without trial, let alone conviction, to Virginia, where they were detained until the next year.[58] Nothing that the British had done equaled the violation of privacy rights inflicted by Pennsylvania on its "Virginia Exiles," in defiance of the state constitution and a writ of habeas corpus by the state chief justice, but with the support of Congress.

American adherence to professed principles stands up far better and is more fairly tested after the shooting stopped. Between 1782 and the ratification of the Constitution, five states—Maryland, New York, North and South Carolina, and Georgia—employed general searches. The southern states conventionally employed warrantless searches without restriction against slaves, especially to detect vagrants and fugitives. But all five states used general warrants to enforce their impost laws. Although Maryland's constitution banned general warrants, Maryland used them to enforce excise laws and laws regulating bakers. Such laws, however, derived from past experience. More significant, perhaps, is the fact that the laws of Massachusetts kept faith with its commitment to specific warrants. Moreover, Rhode Island, which had no constitution, and New Jersey, which had one but did not include a search and seizure clause, enacted legislation that required the use of specific warrants. In the remaining states, general warrants continued to be used, but specific warrants were be-

[57] For New Hampshire, see ibid., 377, Article 19.

[58] Isaac Sharpless, *A History of Quaker Government in Pennsylvania* (Philadelphia, 1900, 2 vols.), ii, 151–68.

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coming more common, especially in cases of theft. In Virginia, the trend toward specificity was pronounced, if belated.

In Connecticut, which like Rhode Island had no constitution, the state supreme court delivered an opinion of major consequence that voided a general warrant directed against every person and place suspected by the victim of a theft. The state chief justice ruled that a justice of the peace, in granting a warrant, had an obligation "to limit the search to such particular place or places, as he, from the circumstances, shall judge there is reason to suspect," and he must limit the arrests under the warrant to those persons found with the stolen goods. The warrant before the court, the chief justice concluded, "is clearly illegal," because not specific. The case, *Frisbie v. Butler* (1787), shows that probable cause as determined independently by a magistrate was not an unknown concept.[59]

The Fourth Amendment

The failure of the Framers to include in the Constitution a bill of rights exposed it to the withering criticism of those who opposed ratification for any reason. Ten days after the Convention adjourned, Richard Henry Lee of Virginia, a member of Congress, sought to wreck the ratification process by moving that Congress adopt a bill of rights. Acting out of genuine fear of the proposed national government, Lee had troubled to frame his own bill of rights rather than simply urging the famous one of his own state. He omitted numerous liberties of importance, but included a search and seizure clause of significance: ". . . the Citizens shall not be exposed to unreasonable searches, seizures of their papers, houses, persons, or property." Lee had constructed the clause from the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780. It was the broadest on the subject.

Lee's colleague from Virginia, James Madison, led the fight against Lee's motion. Madison observed that the Articles of Confederation required that all thirteen state legislatures would have to approve the Lee proposals if endorsed by Congress. That would cause confusion because of the Convention's rule that ratification by nine states conventions would put the Constitution into operation.[60] Lee's motion lost, but he did not quit. He wrote his *Federal Farmer* letters, the best of the Anti-Federalist tracts.[61]

[59] 1 Kirby (Conn.) 231–35 (1787), excerpted in Kurland and Lerner, eds., *Founders' Constitution*, v, 237.

[60] Lee's Proposed Amendments, 27 September 1787, in Merrill Jensen, ed., *The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution. Constitutional Documents and Records, 1776–1787* (Madison: State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1976), i, 325–40; the quotation from Lee is at 338.

[61] *Observations . . . in a Number of Letters from the Federal Farmer* (New York, 1787), a tract that sold several thousand copies in a few months. Reprinted in Herbert J. Storing, ed., *The Complete Anti-Federalist* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981, 7 vols.), ii, 214–357. Lee's authorship is not certain, but the author's remarks on search and seizure accord with Lee's motion in Congress and with his letter of 22 December 1787, in ibid., v, 117.

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In an early letter, Lee discoursed on the rights omitted from the proposed Constitution. The second one he mentioned was the right against unreasonable warrants, those not founded on oath or on cause for searching and seizing papers, property, and persons.[62] In another letter he included the term "effects," which would become part of the Fourth Amendment.[63] In his final word on the subject, he urged a constitutional provision "that all persons shall have a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches and seizures of their persons, houses, papers, or possessions; and that all warrants shall be deemed contrary to this right, if the foundation of them be not previously supported by oath, and there be not in them a special designation of persons or objects of search, arrest, or seizure."[64]

Other Anti-Federalists also popularized the demand for a provision on searches and seizures, and some used significant language. "Centinel" employed an extract from the Pennsylvania constitution. The "Dissent" of the Pennsylvania convention's Anti-Federalists, which also circulated throughout the country in newspapers and pamphlet form, used a truncated form of the same provision. "Brutus," another whose writings were reprinted almost everywhere, used his own formulation against warrants that were not specific.[65] Anti-Federalists who addressed the issue usually opposed general warrants in purple language, either reflecting fear or calculated to inspire it. Newspapers in the four largest states reprinted the rant of "A Son of Liberty," who depicted federal officers dragging people off to prison after brutal searches and confiscations that shocked "the most delicate part of our families."[66] No one could compete with the florid fears expressed by that first-rate demagogue, Patrick Henry.[67]

Virginia's convention ratified the Constitution with recommendations for amendments to be considered by the First Congress. Among them was a detailed provision on the right of every free person "to be secure from all unreasonable searches and seizures"; the provision also required sworn warrants to be based on "legal and sufficient cause." The Virginia recommendation of 1788 of unknown authorship, was moved by George Wythe on behalf of a powerful bipartisan committee that included James Madison.[68] The committee blended

[62] Storing, ii, 249, Letter iv, 12 October 1787.

[63] Ibid., ii, 262, Letter vi, 25 December 1787.

[64] Ibid., ii, Letter xvi, 20 January 1788.

[65] Ibid., ii, 136 and 153 for Centinel (Samuel Bryan of Pennsylvania); ibid., iii, 151, for the Pennsylvania minority; and ibid., ii, 375, for Brutus (Robert Yates of New York).

[66] Ibid., vi, 35. See also John DeWitt, in ibid., iv, 33; and Mercy Otis Warren, in ibid., 279.

[67] Jonathan Elliot, ed., *The Debates in the Several State Conventions* (Philadelphia, 1836–1845, 5 vols.), iii, 58, 412, 448–49, and 588, for Henry's oratory on the despoliations of hearth and home by tyrannical federal agents unrestricted by a requirement of specific warrants.

[68] Lee was not a member of the Virginia convention. Mason, a member of the Wythe committee, had omitted from his draft of the Virginia Declaration of Rights a search and seizure provision. The Wythe committee ignored the weak provision in their own state's constitution. See Robert A. Rutland, ed., *The Papers of Georges Mason* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979, 3 vols.), iii, note on 1071.

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the precedents of the Pennsylvania and Massachusetts state constitutions and the recommendations of Richard Henry Lee. Virginia was the first state to ratify with a search and seizure recommendation. North Carolina copied it in her recommended amendments; New York and Rhode Island did so also, with slight changes.[69]

Without a single supporter when he began his fight in the House for amendments safeguarding personal liberties, Madison struggled to overcome apathy and opposition from members of his own party as well as the Anti-Federalists. He meant to win over the great body of people who withheld their support of the new government in the sincere belief that the Constitution should secure them against the abuse of powers by the United States. And he meant to isolate the leaders of the opposition by depriving them of their supporters. But Madison could have achieved his goals and redeemed his campaign pledge by taking the least troublesome route. On the issue of search and seizure, for example, he might have shown up the Anti-Federalists by proposing that the United States would not enforce its laws by searches and seizures that violated the laws of the states, most of which still allowed general warrants. That would have put the burden on the states to bring about reforms securing the rights of citizens against unreasonable searches and seizures. Or, Madison might have simply proposed that the United States would not employ general warrants.[70] Or, he might have recommended the weak formulation of his own state's constitution, with its omission of specificity for the things to be seized, its failure to require a sworn statement, and its flabby assertion that "grievous" warrants "ought" not to be granted . Even Virginia's excellent 1788 recommendation for a search and seizure provision to be added to the federal Constitution employed the same "ought."

If Madison had chosen a formulation narrower than the one he offered, only the citizens of Massachusetts could consistently have criticized him. Facing a variety of minimal options, any of which would have been politically adequate, Madison chose the maximum protection conceivable at the time. He recommended:

> The rights of the people to be secured in their persons, their houses, and their other property, from all unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated by warrants issued without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, or not particularly describing the places to be searched, or the persons or things to be seized.[71]

[69] Charles Tansill, ed., *Documents Illustrative of the Formation of the Union of the American States* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1927), 1030, 1036, 1046, and 1054. The recommendations of North Carolina and Rhode Island were made too late to be of influence; Congress had already recommended the Bill of Rights.

[70] In his speech of 8 June 1789, urging amendments, Madison took note of the fact that one argument against the Constitution was that the government, under the necessary and proper clause, might enforce the collection of its revenue laws by issuing general warrants. Schwartz, ed., *Bill of Rights*, ii, 1030–31.

[71] Ibid., 1027.

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No one previously had proposed the imperative voice, "shall not be violated," rather than the wishful "ought not," which allowed for exceptions. "Probable cause" was also a significant contribution, or became so; it required more than mere suspicion or even reasonable suspicion, as had its antecedents such as "just cause" and "sufficient foundation." Above all, Madison used the positive assertion drawn from Pennsylvania and Massachusetts that the people have rights against "unreasonable searches and seizures"—John Adams's formulation for the Massachusetts constitution.

A House Committee of Eleven, composed of one member from each state, deleted the crucial phrase that establishes the general principle of the Fourth: no "unreasonable searches and seizures." Specificity in warrants is the lesser half of the amendment, because it provides the standard of reasonableness only when a search or seizure is conducted with a warrant. But the standard of reasonableness must also apply to warrantless searches according to the Fourth Amendment. The committee version initially declared that the "rights of the people to be secured in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, shall not be violated by warrants issuing without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and not particularly describing the places to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."[72] During the debate by the House acting as the Committee of the Whole, Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts moved the restoration of "unreasonable seizures and searches." Oddly, he said he did so on the presumption that a "mistake" had been made in the wording of the clause, which he corrected by changing "rights" to "right" and "secured" to "secure." The effect was to provide security or, as we might say, privacy to the people; Gerry's motion changed the meaning from a protection of the right to a protection of individuals in their persons, homes, papers, and effects. The Committee of the Whole adopted his motion but defeated others that were also important.[73] According to the House Journal, the defeated motions of 17 August were reported as agreed upon by the Committee of the Whole. Thus, the provision recommended to the House, in the articles arranged by a special committee of three, read:

> The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.[74]

The changes that seem to have been sneaked in did more than eliminate a double negative. The entire provision was split into two parts separated by a semicolon. The first part fixed the right of the people and laid down the standard against unreasonable searches and seizures. The second part required probable cause for the issue of a specific warrant. No other changes were made

[72] Ibid., 1061 and 1112, 17 August 1789.
[73] Ibid., 1112, 17 August 1789.
[74] Ibid., 1123.

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except in the number of the article. Its test remained the same as adopted by the House and accepted by the Senate. Thus, Otis and Adams finally had a belated but cardinal impact on the making of the Fourth Amendment, even though Madison was immediately influenced by Lee and Virginia's recommendation. Lee, whom Virginia's legislature had elected to the United States Senate instead of Madison, bitterly complained to Patrick Henry that the idea of recommending amendments to the Constitution turned out to be political suicide; the Bill of Rights made impossible the amendments most desired by the Anti-Federalists limiting national powers concerning taxes, treaties, and commerce.[75]

When Madison had first recommended to the House that it consider amendments to the Constitution, some Anti-Federalists thought the House should not neglect the more important business of passing a law for the collection of duties. That law, which passed seven weeks before the amendments were adopted for state consideration, contained a clause on search and seizure. It allowed collectors and naval officers to enter and search any ships suspected of having uncustomed goods and to seize such goods. That is, Congress authorized general searches for the search and seizure of ships—warrantless, general searches. By contrast, if an officer suspected the concealment of uncustomed goods in a building on land, he must apply for a specific warrant before a magistrate and under oath state the cause of his suspicion, and he "shall . . . be entitled to a warrant to enter such house, store, or any place (in the day time only)" and to conduct the search for and seizure of uncustomed goods.[76] Thus, the statute enacted before the framing of the Fourth Amendment required magistrates to issue the warrant on the basis of the officer's suspicion, not on the magistrate's independent judgment of the question of whether probable cause existed.

Allowing the officer who executed a warrant to determine its specificity put the fox in charge of the chicken coop. The magistrate in effect accepted the officer's sworn statement that he was acting in good faith. That is difficult to reconcile with the fact that the good faith execution of a general warrant by a customs officers in the years before the Revolution did not, to American whigs, validate the warrant or the seizures under it.

The adoption of the Fourth Amendment changed the situation drastically. In March 1791, before the amendment had been formally ratified but after approval by nine state legislatures, Congress enacted a tax on liquor, whether imported or distilled in the United States. The statute reflected the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Unlike the collections act of 1789, the act of 1791 explicitly empowered magistrates to decide for themselves whether an officer had probable cause. Any judge with jurisdiction might issue a "special warrant" for the detection of fraudulently concealed spirits, but the warrant was lawful only

[75] Lee to Henry, 14 September 1789, in William Wirt Henry, *Patrick Henry* (New York, 1891, 3 vols.), iii, 399.

[76] Statutes at Large, 1st Cong., sess. I, chap. 5, sec. 24, 31 July 1789, An Act to Regulate the Collection of Duties, vol. i, 43.

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"upon reasonable cause of suspicion, to be made out to the satisfaction of such judge or justice of the peace" and sworn under oath. That became the basis in federal law for the determination of probable cause.[77]

The amendment constituted a swift liberalization of the law of search and seizure. Its language was the broadest known at the time. It provided no remedy, however, for an illegal search or seizure, or for the introduction in evidence of illegally seized items. It contained principles that were as vague as they might be comprehensive; "probable" and "unreasonable," even if judicially determined, remained uncertain in meaning, and Congress made no provision for the liability, civil or criminal, of federal officers who violated the amendment. Moreover, no exclusionary rule existed. Consequently, the right of privacy created by the amendment, while better secured by the fundamental law in comparison to previous practices and standards, depended then, as now, upon the interpretation of the "probable cause" that justified a specific warrant and, above all, on the reasonableness of searches and seizures.

[77] Statutes at Large, 1st Cong., sess. III, chap. XV, sec. 32, 3 March 1791, vol i, 207.

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Lessons from Russia's Protracted Transition from Communist Rule

MICHAEL McFAUL

Despite the recent explosion of regime transitions throughout the world, social scientists have yet to develop a comprehensive theory of transition. Some transitions from authoritarian rule lead to the creation of liberal democracies. Others descend into civil war or end with the recreation of an authoritarian regime. Even within the set of successful transitions to democracy, some succeed in consolidating liberal democracies while others settle into patterns of democracy that are not fully liberal. How can we explain this variation? Russia's protracted transition from communist rule to democracy is especially puzzling, for this case over time is both an instance of a failed transition and a successful transition. The first two attempts at creating new democratic institutions failed. The third attempt appears to be succeeding. Why?

A failed transition occurs when a change in the political rules of the game precipitates abnormal politics or what Charles Tilly has called "revolutionary" politics.[1] Such moments occur when one or more significant actors opt to pursue political objectives outside of the normal rules of the game. These situations become revolutionary when two opposing groups claim sovereignty over the same territory and only end "when a single sovereign polity regains control over the government."[2] Russia's protracted transition from communist rule produced two such revolutionary situations. Mikhail Gorbachev initiated the first attempt to democratize the institutions of national government in the Soviet Union in 1987. This attempt ended in failure in August 1991, because the design resulted in violent confrontation between multiple sovereigns. The sec-

[1] Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978).
[2] Ibid, 191.

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ond attempt at institutional innovation began in the fall of 1991, when Boris Yeltsin and his government tried to establish a new set of institutions for governing Russia. This design also failed, culminating in another violent and tragic military clash in October 1993 between two groups of significant actors, each claiming to be the sole sovereign authority in Russia.

A successful transition occurs when all major political actors adhere to a shared set of rules of the game that organizes political behavior. A successful democratic transition is when, "Sufficient agreement has been reached about political procedures to produce an elected government, when a government comes to power that is the direct result of a free and popular vote, when this government de facto has the authority to generate new policies, and when the executive, legislative, and judicial power generated by the new democracy does not have to share power with the others bodies *de jure*."[3] Russia's third attempt at institutional design meets this definition of success. In December 1993 and again in 1995, Russian voters elected representatives to the State Duma, the lower house of parliament. Six months later, Russian citizens elected a president in Russia's first direct election for a head of state. The 1995 parliamentary election and the 1996 presidential election were guided by law, held on time as scheduled, took place with only minor fraud, and did not contradict the constitution ratified in 1993. Two-thirds of the electorate participated, and all major political actors recognized the legitimacy of the results. By most definitions, these milestones mark the end of a democratic transition when "abnormality is no longer the central feature of political life; that is, when actors have settled on and obey a set of more or less explicit rules."[4]

Russia's political system is not a liberal democracy. Pluralist institutions of interest intermediation are weak, mass-based interest groups are marginal, and institutions that could help to redress this imbalance—such as a strong parliament, an effective party system, or an independent judiciary—do not exist. Russia is at best an electoral democracy but most certainly not a "liberal democracy."[5] Still, the existence of an electoral democracy in Russia after 1993 is a qualitatively new kind of institutional arrangement for governing politics, never before in place in Russia.

Why did the first two attempts at transition to democracy fail and end in polarized, military conflict between political opponents? In comparative perspective, why does the third attempt appear to be succeeding? This article builds an answer to this question by placing institutions and the actors that make them at the center of analysis. Institutions "are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape hu-

[3] Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1996), 3.

[4] Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 56.

[5] On this distinction, see Larry Diamond, "Is the Third Wave Over?" *Journal of Democracy* 7 (July 1996): 20–37.

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man interaction."[6] Democratic transitions involve the replacement of one set of authoritarian institutions with another set of democratic institutions. If a transition from authoritarian rule is to succeed, all major political actors must agree to reject old political institutions and accept the new rules of the game. The probability of reaching general agreement on the new rules of the game can be enhanced by interim negotiated settlements or pacts.[7] If a pact can be negotiated between all significant actors during the transition period, then democratic institutions are more likely to stick than if the transition takes place without a pact or series of pacts.

Two key variables influence the probability of agreement on a pact or acceptance of a new institutional order more generally. First is the breadth of the agenda regarding institutional change. The more limited the agenda of change, the more likely all significant actors can reach agreement or acquiesce to the new rules.[8] The wider the agenda, the less likely agreement will be reached. An important corollary to this hypothesis is that the degree of homogeneity within a state—ethnic, religious, or ideological—influences the scope of the agenda. The greater the degree of homogeneity, the narrower the range of contested issues.

The second critical variable that influences institutional change is the perception of the balance of power between significant actors or groups. If everyone shares the same perception of the distribution of power between significant actors, then an agreement on a new institutional order is more likely than if assessments of the balance of power are conflicting. An equal or balanced distribution of power is more likely to produce a more optimal new institutional arrangement for democracy, but stalemate is neither a sufficient nor necessary condition for success.[9] On the contrary, stalemate or gridlock can produce the exact opposite—confrontation, dual sovereignty, civil war, and revolution.[10] More important than the actual distribution is shared knowledge about the distribution. Asymmetric balances of power recognized by all are more likely to

[6] Douglass North, *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 6.

[7] Terry Karl, "Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America," *Comparative Politics* 23 (October 1990): 1–22; O'Donnell and Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule;* and Giusseppe Di Palma, *To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990).

[8] On why acquiescence is more important for constitutions, while agreement is more important for contracts, see Russell Hardin, "Why a Constitution?" in Bernard Grofman and Donald Wittman, eds., *The Federalist Papers and the New Institutionalism* (New York: Agathon Press, 1989), 100–120.

[9] An alternative claim is made in Dankwart Rustow, "Transition to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model," *Comparative Politics* 2 (April 1970): 337–363. Much of the literature on transitions takes this assumption about stalemate as the midwife of democratic transition as a given.

[10] Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution,* chap. 9; Samuel Huntington, *Political Order and Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 266–267; Douglass North, "Five Propositions about Institutional Change" in Jack Knight and Itai Sened, eds., *Explaining Social Institutions,* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995), 18.

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produce sustainable transitions than symmetric balances of power that are not recognized or understood by all. Incongruent perceptions of the true balance of power leads to conflict.[11]

Taken together, these hypotheses about regime change offer a framework to analyze and compare Russia's three attempts at transition. In the first two attempts at forging a new political order—under Gorbachev from 1987–1991, and the first Russian republic from 1991–1993—all significant actors did not agree either to an interim pact or more generally to a new set of rules for governing political competition. They failed to agree because the agenda for negotiation was large and complex, and the balance of power between actors was ambiguous. The third attempt at transition after 1993 has been more successful. Political actors have acquiesced to a common set of rules for ordering political competition because the agenda of transition had narrowed and all actors shared common information about the balance of power between actors. They did not succeed in negotiating a pacted transition. Yet, under these new conditions of a narrower agenda and a clearer definition of the balance of power, all major actors saw it in their interest to acquiesce to the new rules of the game dictated by the most powerful. The one actor powerful enough to defect from this new order was Boris Yeltsin, the very author of the new rules of the game to which other weaker actors had acquiesced. Bounded by his own authorship and the democratic ratification of these rules, Yeltsin resisted the temptation to trump the democratic process. In turn, his commitment to these new rules, including most importantly his willingness to participate in the 1996 presidential elections, has raised the stakes of future transgressions of the current institutional order. The probability of persistence of the new rules has been enhanced as Yeltsin's own power has declined.

To explicate this approach for understanding Russia's protracted transition from communist rule, this article proceeds as follows. First, I locate this explanation within the theoretical literature on democratic transitions and rational choice approaches to the study of institutions. Then I discuss three case studies: the Gorbachev period from 1987–1991, which ended in democratic breakdown; the "first" Russian Republic from 1991–1993, which also ended in failure; and the "second" Russian Republic from 1993 to the present, which has been more successful at making democratic institutions stick. Space limitations dictate that these three illustrations be presented as stylized facts rather than full-blown case studies.[12]

[11] A similar argument regarding interstate conflict is made in Stephen Walt, *Revolution and War*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), 347.

[12] As these cases are not independent of each other, some analysts might be comfortable calling the examination of these three periods "process tracing" within one case. Methodologically, the process of discovery is still the same—Mill's method of difference—whether three cases with variance or one case with change internally. See John Stuart Mill, *Philosophy of Scientific Method* (New York: Hasner, 1950). On the method of comparing several cases within one country, see Alexander George, "Case Studies and Theory Development" (unpublished manuscript, 1982); and Donald Campbell, "Reforms as Experiments," *American Psychologist* 24 (April 1964): 409–429.

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Rational Choice Institutionalism and "Transitology"

How do political actors change the rules of the game that structures their competitive interaction? Why do some attempts at changing the rules succeed and others fail? How do we know when a set of rules induces a stable situation for interaction between political actors?

This set of questions haunts all theories of institutions and of equilibrium more generally. While social science has made tremendous theoretical strides in uncovering the logic of institutional stability, progress has been less pronounced regarding theories of institutional instability, breakdown, or change. As William Riker and David Weimar have commented, ". . . though neoinstitutional economics and social choice theory offer some insight into the efficiency and stability of alternative institutions, they are largely silent about how institutions evolve, or can be induced to evolve, from one equilibrium to another."[13]

One consequence of this asymmetry in theory development is that the theoretical projects to explain equilibria and disequilibria have been divorced in many literatures in the social sciences.[14] In comparative politics, research agendas dedicated to the study of change in the rules of the game, such as models of revolution, democratic transitions, or economic transformation, rarely incorporate insights and often explicitly reject the assumptions of research programs concerned with equilibria phenomena. The converse is equally true, especially when the rules change in question is unexpected, radical, and by definition exogenous to these models concerned with institutions as equilibria.[15] Kenneth Waltz has gone so far as to assert that theories should not even aspire to explain change, because "a theory explains continuities. It tells one what to expect and why to expect it. Within a system, a theory explains recurrences and repetitions, not change."[16]

Consequently, our most robust theories often seek to explain nonevents—why the rules of the U.S. Congress "make public policy stable and predictable when it might be expected to be arbitrary"; why countries do not go to war even when the anarchy of the international system permits, if not encourages, them to do so; or why totalitarian and authoritarian political systems do (did) not collapse even when they are (were) inefficient.[17] Explaining change to these sys-

[13] William Riker and David Weimer, "The Political Economy of Transformation: Liberalization and Property Rights" in Jeffrey Banks and Eric Manusek, eds., *Modern Political Economy: Old Topics, New Directions* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press), 81.

[14] Randall Calvert makes a similar point in "The Rational Choice Theory of Social Institutions" in Banks and Hanushek, eds., *Modern Political Economy,* 219.

[15] This institutions-as-equilibria approach adopted here follows Randall Calvert, "Rational Actors, Equilibrium, and Social Institutions" in Knight and Sened, eds., *Explaining Social Institutions,* 57–94.

[16] Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 69.

[17] The summary quote about American institutional approaches to the study of Congress comes from Robert Bates, "Macropolitical Economy in the Field of Development" in James Alt and Kenneth Shepsle, eds., *Perspectives on Positive Political Economy,* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 46.

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tems in equilibrium—be it the Gingrich Revolution in 1994, the collapse of the bipolar international system in 1989, or the collapse of the Soviet regime in 1991—is beyond the domain of these static theories. Successful institutions are overstudied; failed institutions are understudied. As Elinor Ostrom has concluded, "While much research has been conducted on long-term successful self-organized institutions, less has been documented about institutions that never quite got going or failed after years of success."[18]

While recognizing the multitude of problems of theorizing about change, this article nonetheless aims to join these two different kinds of literatures to explain one aspect of a dynamic phenomenon, namely the reequilibrium process. Specifically, this article attempts to reformulate basic assumptions from static rational choice approaches to the study of institutions and dynamic "transitology" approaches to the study of regime change as a way to build a general framework for understanding how and when new institutions stick. Contrary to prejudices found in both traditions, these two approaches are more complementary than is usually acknowledged.

Central to both rational choice and transitology is a focus on the individual as the unit of analysis. By focusing on individuals, their preferences, and their power the argument about democratic transition advanced in this article places human agency at the center of analysis. "Structure" shapes the preferences and constrains the menu of choices of individuals, but human agency ultimately has a direct causal relationship with successful and unsuccessful institutional change.[19]

Regarding the behavior of individuals, the method of rational choice analysis assumes that individuals act rationally, pursuing their own interests and maximizing their own expected utility.[20] This assumption does not contradict the set of probabilistic statements found in the transitions literature. Actors from the *ancien regime* seek to limit the powers of the democratic challengers and preserve for themselves as many powers as possible from the old order, while democratic challengers seek the converse. The unit of analysis and the basic assumption about the behavior of the individual are shared properties of both approaches.

Sometimes these two sets of actors—the incumbents and the challengers—succeed in agreeing to a set of rules to govern their political behavior, and sometimes they fail. A theory of regime change and institutional change must seek to specify the varying conditions that lead to these different outcomes. Both rational choice and transitology, whether implicitly or explicitly, offer prob-

[18] Elinor Ostrom, "A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action: Presidential Address, American Political Science Association, 1997," *American Political Science Review* 92 (March 1998): 17.

[19] Peter Ordeshook, "The Emerging Discipline of Political Economy" in Alt and Shepsle, eds., *Perspectives on Positive Political Economy,* 13.

[20] William Riker, "Political Science and Rational Choice" in ibid., 163–181.

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abilistic statements for when we should expect cooperation and when we should expect confrontation during the creation of new institutional arrangements.

First, from the transitions approach comes the importance of the pacts, which are interim arrangements between a "select set of actors" that seek to "limit the agenda of policy choice, share proportionately in the distribution of benefits, and restrict the participation of outsiders in decision-making."[21] If a transition is pacted or negotiated, then democracy is more likely to succeed.[22] Logically, if the transition is not pacted, then the transition is more likely to fail. A pact is not a necessary condition for a successful transition, but it does enhance the probability of success.[23]

A second important statement from transitology concerns the scope of the agenda being negotiated. If challenges to the economic system are in play, the political transition is more likely to fail. As Guillermo O'Donnell and Phillipe Schmitter concluded ". . . all previously known transitions to political democracy have observed one fundamental restriction: it is forbidden to take, or even to checkmate, the king of one of the players. In other words, during the transition, the property rights of the bourgeoisie are inviolable."[24] Since the completion of O'Donnell and Schmitter's study, several transitions from communist rule have altered the property rights regime while simultaneously negotiating new democratic institutions into place, suggesting that their definitive statement needs to be reformulated as a probabilistic hypothesis—the narrower the scope of the agenda, the more likely the negotiations will succeed. Moreover, economic issues are not the only items that can widen the scope of the agenda during transitions. Questions concerning the delineation of state borders, federal divisions, and minority rights also can increase the scope of the agenda during transition moments.[25]

Third, writers on transitions from authoritarian rule have warned about the deleterious consequences of sustained mass mobilization during transition. If political liberalization ignites sustained mass mobilization within society, it will be more difficult to negotiate a pact between soft-liner leaders in the *ancien regime* and moderates from society. Revolution, rather than a pacted transition,

[21] O'Donnell and Schmitter, *Tentative Conclusions*, 41.

[22] Karl, "Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America"; and O'Donnell and Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule.*

[23] Terry Lynn Karl and Philippe Schmitter, "Democratization around the Globe: Opportunities and Risks" in Michael Klare and Daniel Thomas, *World Security* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1994), 43–62.

[24] O'Donnell and Schmitter, *Tentative Conclusions,* 69.

[25] Rustow made the observation about the importance of defining borders in his seminal article, "Transition to Democracy." Federal issues have received much less attention in the democratization literature. Recent work includes Peter Ordeshook and Olga Shvetsova, "Federalism and Constitutional Design," *Journal of Democracy* 8 (January 1997): 27–42; Steven Solnick, "Asymmetries and Federal Stability in Russia (unpublished manuscript, Columbia University, May 1997); and Dan Triesman, "Democratization and Economic Reform in Federal States" (unpublished manuscript, Harvard University, March 1996).

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is more likely to ensue, and revolutions rarely produce democratic outcomes.[26] More generally, overthrows of power are less likely to produce democratic outcomes than transfers or abrogations of power.[27]

These probabilistic statements from the transitions approach can be reformulated into more general hypotheses about the role of uncertainty in producing cooperation and conflict during the making and unmaking of new institutions. All institutions by definition provide some information to actors about the expected behavior of other actors. Once institutions are disrupted, however, information about expected behavior in any strategic interaction becomes more costly, uncertainty increases, and rational calculations about ends and means become more difficult. Under conditions of incomplete information, decisions today can produce unintended consequences tomorrow. In rare or new situations in which the causal relationships between many variables are complex and difficult to understand, actors may make suboptimal decisions or even choose strategies that do not serve their interests.[28] Such moments of uncertainty occur especially when institutions themselves no longer provide clear information, but instead become yet another variable. As George Tsebelis has stated, "as the rules of interaction become more fluid and imprecise, rational-choice explanations will become less applicable."[29]

It follows that in moving from one equilibrium to the next—or, in the language of transitology, from one regime type to another—factors that reduce uncertainty and provide information between actors facilitate the successful emergence of a new institutional arrangement. Pacts reduce uncertainty and provide interim information to actors as they migrate from the old order to the new. Similarly, the narrower the scope of the agenda, the more certainty there is surrounding the move from one institutional setting to another. For instance, transitions from authoritarian rule that involve the resurrection of an elected parliament are easier to negotiate than transitions that involve the creation of an elected parliament, as well as the creation of new economic institutions. The presence or absence of mass mobilization also can be reformulated as a factor that can reduce or exacerbate uncertainty. In transitions that involve only elites, it is easier to know everyone's preferences and assess everyone's power to defect from a negotiated solution. The preferences and strength of mass movements are harder to assess.

In this reformulation, uncertainty varies inversely with the probability of success regarding a transition to democracy or, in more general terms, with the emergence of a new institutional order. The higher the level of uncertainty, the less likely will a transition succeed. Three factors raise or lower the level of uncertainty—the presence or absence of pacts, the scope of the agenda of

[26] Juan Linz, *Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibrium* in Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, eds., *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1978).

[27] O'Donnell and Schmitter, *Tentative Conclusions,* 11.

[28] Riker, "The Experience of Creating Institutions," 173.

[29] George Tsebelis, *Nested Games* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 33.

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change, and shared knowledge about the balance of power between competing actors. Although consistent with most of the inductive discoveries of the transitions project, this hypothesis about uncertainty is at odds with much of the spirit of transitology, which celebrates contingency and uncertainty as positive attributes, if not necessary conditions, for successful transitions. For instance, Adam Przeworski has written, "Institutions adopted when the relation of forces is unknown or unclear are most likely to last across a variety of conditions."[30] Przeworski's observation may be true, but the logic outlined above suggests paradoxically that it is precisely during conditions of high uncertainty that actors are least likely to adopt new institutions. A synthetic formulation of these two observations may be that institutions formed under conditions of high uncertainty may be more democratic, more sustainable, and more efficient than institutions formed under less uncertainty; but institutions constructed under conditions of greater certainty are more likely.[31]

This reformulation of some of the tentative conclusions of the transitions approach into more general arguments about institutional emergence offers a framework for analyzing Russia's successes and failures along the transition road. The remainder of this article compares three attempts at forging new institutions in the Soviet Union and Russia over the last decade: the first failed attempt at democratic reform between 1987–1991, the second failed attempt at creating a new democratic polity from 1991–1993, and the third more successful try at designing stable and democratic institutions from 1993–1996. Before turning to the specifics of these three cases, however, the alternative approaches that are implicitly rejected in the analysis below should now be made explicit.

Alternative Approaches

In adopting a strategic, actor-centric approach to understanding regime change or institutional change more generally, this article challenges purely structural, historical, or cultural explanations of Russia's attempts at democratic transition. Cultural theorists have argued that Russians are predisposed to paternalistic, authoritarian rule; they lack a civic culture that could support a democratic regime. From this perspective, Russia's inability to institutionalize democracy in the past decade demonstrates continuity not only with Russia's communist legacy, but also with authoritarian political culture in pre-revolutionary Russia.[32]

This article rejects these approaches for two reasons. First, comparatively, the emergence of democracies over the last century has time and time again refuted cultural determinism. Democracies have taken hold in many so-called

[30] Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market,* 88.

[31] Larry Diamond, "Rethinking Civil Society," *Journal of Democracy* 5 (July 1994): 4.

[32] Tim McDaniel, *The Agony of the Russian Idea* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).

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authoritarian cultures such as Germany and Japan and later South Korea, South Africa, and Taiwan. Cultural and historical factors have shaped the kind of democracies to emerge in these countries, but culture has not determined the path of political development in any of these countries with so-called anti-democratic cultures. Second, variation within the same cultural and historical context has occurred. Long-term historical or cultural factors cannot cause the failures of new institutional design in 1991 and again in 1993 as well as the success of new institutional design in Russia after 1993.

Structural, developmental, or modernization arguments about Russia's slow and volatile transition to democracy also are of limited explanatory value for the question addressed in this article.[33] Building on and adapting Seymour Martin Lipset's seminal work on requisites for democracy, two kinds of arguments about Russia have emerged.[34] Those interested in explaining the origins of the Soviet Union's democratization point to modernization as the principal causal variable. Once delayed by totalitarian rule, Russia's process of democratization is now back on its natural course.[35] Paradoxically, those interested in explaining Russia's failure to democratize also point to modernization, arguing instead that Russia has not developed far enough to create or sustain a democratic society. This theory, especially popular among Russian analysts, posits that the dual transition to the market and democracy must be sequenced (the market coming first) for either to succeed.[36] In the interim, these theorists argue that political rule in Russia will and should gravitate toward authoritarianism.[37]

Hypotheses derived from modernization theories cannot explain the variation in Russia's transition attempts. Modernization may create the initial conditions for transition from authoritarian rule, but it cannot uncover the causal mechanisms that lead to the initiation of regime change, the process of regime change, and most centrally, the success or failure of new political institutions. Even if Fukuyama ultimately is right and the final endpoint for all countries is the same—liberal, capitalist democracy—the path to this end will have varied considerably.

Similarly, the pessimistic prerequisite approach cannot explain variation. Within the former communist world, some countries have made a smooth transition to democracy without waiting for the market to take hold and society to

[33] This said, these kinds of forgotten variables may play a more central role in explaining regime transition variation in the new fourth wave. See Jeffrey Herbst, "Prospects for Elite-Driven Democracy in South Africa," *Political Science Quarterly* 112 (Winter 1997–98): 595–615.

[34] Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Basis of Politics* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1960).

[35] Francis Fukuyama, "The Modernizing Imperative: The USSR as an Ordinary Country," *The National Interest* 31 (Spring 1993): 16–17.

[36] Vladimir Mau, *Ekonomiki i Vlast'* (Moscow: Delo, 1995).

[37] See especially the contributions by Adranik Migranyan and Igor Klyamkin, *Sotsializm i Demokratiya: Diskussionaya Tribuna* (Moscow: Institut Ekonomiki Mirovoi Sotsialisticheskoi Sistemi, 1990).

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transform, while other countries have not.[38] Even within the same case of Russia, the first two attempts at creating a new political order failed, while the third appears to be working. These kinds of variation only can be explained from a strategic approach and a focus on individuals as the unit of analysis.

Institutional Design Failure: The Gorbachev Era

In his capacity as general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), Mikhail Gorbachev sought to revitalize the Soviet regime through liberalization of economic and political institutions.[39] The success of the Soviet totalitarian party/state provided only one real place in the system from which reform could originate—the top.[40] Gorbachev's initial focus was economic, not political reform.[41] Only after three years of attempting to introduce economic reform through the existing set of political institutions did Gorbachev conclude that he could not rely on the existing nexus of party and state institutions to implement his reform agenda.[42] He reasoned that he could only proceed with *perestroika* (reorganization) by changing the institutions of governance as a way both to undermine his opponents empowered within the existing institutional arrangement and to strengthen new proponents of reform in society.[43]

To stimulate new allies for *perestroika*, Gorbachev initiated sweeping reform measures aimed at liberalizing political society. His policy of *glasnost* (openness) allowed for the publication and discussion of previously taboo subjects while changes in the Soviet criminal code no longer punished political assembly and demonstration. At the Nineteenth Party Conference in 1988, Gorbachev outlined a plan for fundamental institutional change by announcing that partially competitive elections for the USSR Congress of People's Deputies would be held in the spring of 1989. These elections were followed by elections for soviets at the republic, *oblast* (region), and city level during the spring of

[38] For a comprehensive review of this variation, see Joel Hellman, "Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reform in Postcommunist Transitions," *World Politics* 50 (January 1998): 203–234; and Anders Aslund, Peter Boone, and Simon Johnson, "How To Stabilize: Lessons from Post-Communist Countries," *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity* 1 (1996): 217–313.

[39] Some have argued that Gorbachev never attempted to implement liberalization at all. This article adopts the argument presented by Bova that Gorbachev's reforms can be understood as a case of liberalization. See Russell Bova, "Political Dynamics of the Post-Communist Transition: A Comparative Perspective" in Nancy Bermeo, ed., *Liberalization and Democratization* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), 113–138.

[40] Gorbachev himself makes this argument. See Mikhail Gorbachev, *Memoirs* (New York: Doubleday, 1996), 175. On the importance of understanding these reforms as state-centric revitalization rather than as a response to societal pressures, see Steven Fish, *Democracy from Scratch* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).

[41] Mikhail Gorbachev, *Perestroika* (New York: Harper & Row, 1987), 27.

[42] Author's interviews with Nikolai Ryzhkov, former CPSU Politburo member and Soviet prime minister, July 1992 and Anatolii Chernayev, former aide to Gorbachev, June 1995.

[43] This a theme of Gorbachev, *Memoirs*; and A. S. Chernayev, *Shest Let s Gorbachym* (Moscow: Progess, 1993).

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1990. Having decided that beheading the CPSU apparatus was too dangerous, Gorbachev hoped to resurrect the soviets as a set of state institutions that could take governing power away from the Communist party.

During the first stages of liberalization, Gorbachev's plan seemed to work. The 1989 elections produced an unprecedented whirl of new political mobilization in Soviet society.[44] Media criticism exploded, electoral clubs sprouted, and noncommunist pro-perestroika organizations convened. Reformers elected to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies still represented a very small minority, but the event of elections and the subsequent live broadcast of the Congress's proceedings stimulated significant nonparty mobilization in society for the first time in several decades.[45] Mobilization from below grew even stronger during and immediately after the 1990 elections, when a newly organized opposition movement, Democratic Russia, won hundreds of seats in the Russian Congress of People's Deputies and controlled majorities in the Moscow and Leningrad city soviets.[46] Boris Yeltsin, the leader of the democratic opposition, won election as the chairman of the Russian Congress in the spring of 1990.

Initially, these forces from below were Gorbachev's allies against the conservative midlevel bureaucracy of the Communist party.[47] Quickly, however, the kind, extent, and pace of change demanded from below overtook Gorbachev's own reform agenda.[48] Beginning first with the Interregional Group of Deputies in the USSR Congress, political actors bent on truly revolutionary change began to organize against the traditional ruling institutions of the Soviet regime. Led by Boris Yeltsin, this new political force rapidly gravitated toward the "organization of counterhegemony: collective projects for an alternative future."[49] While initially vague, several antisystemic themes eventually crystallized to help situate these challengers in diametric opposition to Gorbachev's *ancien regime*.

Their demand for national sovereignty was most salient. After elections for soviets on the republican level in the spring of 1990, opposition to the Soviet communist system was expressed most vividly as a demand for national sovereignty, first in the Baltic Republics and then in Russia.[50] By 1990, a "war of laws" erupted between the Soviet and Russian congresses, with each using their

[44] V. A. Kolosov, N.V. Petrov, and L.V. Smirnyagin, eds., *Vesna 89: Geographiya, Parliamentskikh Vyborov* (Moscow: Progess, 1990).

[45] Fish, *Democracy from Scratch.*

[46] Yitzhak Brudny, "The Dynamics of 'Democratic Russia,' 1990–1993," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 9 (April–June 1993): 141–170.

[47] Author's interviews with Yurii Boldyrev, Ilya Zaslavskii, and Aleksandr Minzhurenko, members of the Interregional Group of Deputies, June–July 1995.

[48] Stephen Hanson, "Gorbachev: The Last True Leninist Believer?" in Daniel Chirot, *The Crisis of Leninism and the Decline of the Left: The Revolutions of 1989* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1991).

[49] Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market,* 54–55.

[50] John Dunlop, *The Rise of Russia and the Fall of the Soviet Empire* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).

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legislative mandate to assert sovereignty over the other.[51] A second, but significantly less developed concept of the opposition was the call for market reforms. If Gorbachev's *perestroika* sought to reform and revitalize socialism, Yeltsin, Democratic Russia, and their allies eventually called for the abandonment of socialism altogether.[52] Democracy was a third component of the ideology of opposition. To clearly delineate this democratic/antidemocratic cleavage, the opposition promoted and carried out the election of their leader Boris Yeltsin to the newly created post of president of Russia in June 1991. Yeltsin's election in June 1991 was his third landslide victory in as many years, whereas the leader of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, had never submitted his authority for ratification by the electorate.

In 1990 and again in 1991, Gorbachev engaged with Russia's opposition in order to negotiate a transition to some new institutional order. In fall 1990, representatives from the Soviet and Russian governments drafted the so-called 500 Day Plan, an economic reform pact.[53] It failed, however, when Gorbachev's prime minister, Nikolai Ryzhkov, refused to commit to the negotiated program.[54] In spring 1991, bargaining over a new federal treaty created the appearance that a negotiated transition was still in the offing. It too was subverted when conservatives within Gorbachev's government attempted a coup in August 1991 as a way to avoid the implementation of this federal accord.[55] Stalemate in Russia ultimately did not induce compromise or momentum for pacting a transition. Rather, stalemate devolved into a breakdown of dialogue between challengers and challenged, and eventually precipitated a revolutionary situation of "multiple sovereignty," a condition that was resolved by the forceful victory of one side over the other. That happened in August 1991, when Boris Yeltsin and his allies defeated the coup attempt and soon thereafter assumed power by overthrowing those previously in power.

Agreement on a new set of political institutions ultimately failed for two central reasons. First, the agenda of change became too unwieldy. Russia's revolutionary mode of transition challenged not only the political system, but the organization of the economy and the very borders of the state. Attempts to parcel this agenda into different pacts failed. Instead, the multitude of differences regarding all three of these issues polarized political actors into irreconcilable camps. Especially regarding issues of sovereignty and the nature of the economic system, middle positions grew increasingly difficult to construct conceptually, let alone negotiate between competing actors.

[51] M. Korshkova and V. Zhuravleva, eds., *Gorbachev, Yeltsin: 1500 Dnei Politicheskogo Protivovostoyaniya* (Moscow: Terra, 1992).

[52] *Materiali: II S'ezda Dvizheniya Demokraticheskoi Rossii* (Moscow: DR-Press, November 1991).

[53] Author's interview with Sergei Stankevich, one of the leaders of the Russian democratic opposition and a prominent advocate at the time of a pacted transition, July 1995.

[54] Author's interview with Nikolai Ryzhkov, June 1992. See also Jack Matlock, *Autopsy on an Empire* (New York: Random House, 1995), chap. 15.

[55] Author's interview with Anatolii Lukyanov, former USSR Supreme Soviet chairman, CPSU Politburo member, and one of the coup plotters, November 1993.

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The probability of reaching an agreement on these issues was diminished still further by competing evaluations of the balance of power between important actors. Especially when compared to other successful transitions in the former communist world, uncertainty about the balance of power between incumbents and challengers served to derail this first attempt at democratic transition in the Soviet Union.[56] By 1991, the number of significant actors had increased substantially, as national liberation movements gained strength throughout the USSR, especially in the Baltics, the Caucasus, Russia, and Ukraine. Increasing the number of players commensurately increased uncertainty about preferences and passions concerning new institutions. Most vague was the balance of power between the Soviet regime and the Russian opposition. From the vantage point of the Kremlin, Democratic Russia and its allies looked unwieldy, undisciplined, and unsophisticated—neither a worthy ally nor a serious foe.[57] Making calculations about the preferences and power of mass-based organizations is much more difficult than sizing up elites. While able to organize rallies and demonstrations, these democratic forces from below did not control armies, enjoyed no international recognition, and were supported by only a minority of the Russian population. Guided by this assessment, Gorbachev underestimated Yeltsin and the democratic movement.

The conservatives that surrounded Gorbachev in the Kremlin in his final months in office also underestimated the power of the democrats. Throughout 1991, this entourage pursued a zero-sum strategy in dealing with the opposition. When Gorbachev suddenly began negotiations with the opposition about the reorganization of the Soviet federation, these conservatives decided to test their assumptions about the balance of power and moved to restore the old institutional order by force. They greatly overestimated their own strength and underestimated the opposition.[58] After three days, their coup attempt failed.

In retrospect, we now know that the Russian opposition forces were stronger than the Soviet conservatives that attempted the coup. At the time, however, real doubts also existed within the opposition about their own strength and conviction. Their own ambiguous assessment of the balance of power made the democratic opposition an unpredictable interlocutor concern-

[56] While it is beyond the scope of this article to discuss other cases, the balance of power between incumbents and challengers in East Central Europe in 1989 appears to have been better defined and understood by all strategic actors than in the Soviet case in 1991. The withdrawal of Soviet support for communist leaders throughout the region weakened all incumbents quickly and dramatically and provided a clear signal of the shifting balance of power internally in favor of the challengers. In contrast, the balance of power in most Central Asian states also was better defined and understood by all as the former Soviet rulers kept a firm grip on political power. In Tadjikistan, the one case where the balance of power between incumbents and challengers was more ambiguous, civil war rather than democracy resulted.

[57] This perception of the "democrats" permeates Gorbachev's retelling of this historical period in Gorbachev, *Memoirs*.

[58] Author's interviews with coup leaders Gennadii Yanayev, former Soviet vice president, and Anatolii Lukyanov, former USSR Supreme Soviet chairman, November 1993.

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ing negotiations about transition. After Gorbachev's turn to the right in January 1991, many within Russia's democratic opposition believed it was time to negotiate, not fight.[59] At the time, Yeltsin was struggling to maintain his position as chair of the Congress of People's Deputies. Within Democratic Russia, recurrent ideological battles threatened to splinter the amorphous movement.[60] These factors made assessments of the true strength of the opposition difficult to make, an ambiguity that tempted Soviet conservatives to try to restore the old regime through force. They dramatically miscalculated.

Institutional Design Failure: The "First" Russian Republic

During most successful transitions to democracy, the rules of the game that were negotiated during the transition often guide the consolidation process. The timing of elections, the organization (especially the division) of power within the state, and even the menu of issues open for political competition are decided beforehand. Often the franchise of existing exclusionary democratic institutions are extended, or dormant democratic institutions (including even whole constitutions) are reactivated.[61] Most importantly, the basic principles of economic organization are not revised during the consolidation, while political institutions governing and supporting this economy are not challenged. All states in southern Europe, Latin America, Africa, and Asia had market-based, capitalist economies before and after transiting to democracy.

Before August 1991, no rules were negotiated to delineate the path from old to new in the Soviet Russian transition. This mode of transition left many of the rules of the game of Russia's new polity ambiguous, uncodified, and subject to manipulation. Was the Soviet president the head of state or was the Russian president the true holder of executive power? Should the Communist party be considered a political party or was it better understood as a criminal organization? What mix of plan and market institutions governed (or should govern) the organization of the economy? Where were the borders of the new state?

The trajectory of consolidation or the lack thereof after August 1991 was influenced by this unpacted mode of transition, but not determined by it. Yeltsin and his compatriots made or declined to make several critical decisions concerning Russia's new political institutions. The euphoric moment immediately after the triumph over the putschists in August 1991 opened a window of opportunity to design new democratic institutions and thereby consolidate Russia's new democracy. The opportunity was not taken.

Yeltsin did take some important first steps towards transforming the Soviet political system when he banned the CPSU, subordinated Soviet ministries to

[59] Author's interviews with Democratic Russia co-chairs, Lev Ponomarev, June 1995, Gleb Yakunin, July 1995, and Viktor Dmitriev, June 1991. See also Sergei Stankevich, "The USSR's Protracted Crisis," *Journal of Democracy* 2 (Summer 1991): 55–57.

[60] Brudny, "The Dynamics of 'Democratic Russia.'"

[61] O'Donnell and Schmitter, *Tentative Conclusions,* 8.

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the Russian state, and most dramatically in December 1991 dissolved the USSR. At the same time, Yeltsin failed to take several other key steps. He did not push for ratification of a new constitution, though a draft was in hand; he refrained from convoking a postcommunist founding election; he refused to create his own political party as a way to institutionalize support for his reforms in society; and he did not dismantle many Soviet-era governmental institutions, including most importantly, the Russian Supreme Soviet and the Congress of People's Deputies.[62] Each of these nondecisions critically impeded the emergence of new democratic practices.

Rather than focus on political reform, Yeltsin and his new government used their political mandate to initiate economic transformation. Eager to avoid what they perceived as Gorbachev's mistake of putting politics before economics, Yeltsin's team concentrated their energies on dismantling the Soviet command economy and creating a new Russian market system. In fact, many in Yeltsin's new government believed that economic transformation was a precondition for democracy. Without private property, Russian voters had no private political rights to defend. The most vocal proponents of this logic advocated a Pinochet-type dictatorship as an interim regime between command communism and capitalist democracy.

This series of nondecisions about Russian political institutions fueled ambiguity, stalemate, and conflict both between the federal and subnational units of the state, and then more consequentially between the president and the Congress of People's Deputies. Federal problems arose first.[63] Immediately after the August coup attempt, Chechnya declared its independence. In March 1992, Tatarstan held a successful referendum for full independence. The first of several federal treaties were signed in March 1992, but negotiations over a new federal arrangement embedded within a constitution dragged on without resolution into the summer of 1993, prompting several other republics as well as oblasts to make their own declarations of independence, complete with their own flags, customs agents, and threats of minting new currencies.

This constitutional crisis between center and periphery might have erupted into armed conflict had not the stalemate between executive and legislative branches of the central government proved to be even more dire. Immediately after the putsch attempt, the institutional ambiguity between the president and Congress did not have a direct impact on politics, as most deputies in the Con-

[62] Democratic Russia polling indicated that their organization, with Yeltsin's backing, would win a majority within the Congress of People's Deputies if new elections were held in 1991. Author's interviews with Democratic Russia leaders Vladimir Bokser, Viktor Dmitriev, Yurii Afanasiev, Ilya Zaslavskii, Mikhail Schneider, and Lev Ponomarev, October 1991. Information about Yeltsin's decision not to create a political party comes from the author's interview with Gennadii Burbulis, former state secretary and first deputy prime minister in Yeltsin's government, Moscow, July 1995. On the constitution, see Oleg Rumyanstev, *Osnovy Konstitutsionnogo Stroya Rossii* (Moscow: Yurist, 1994).

[63] For a review, see Steven Solnick, "The Political Economy of Russian Federalism," *Problems of Post-Communism* 43 (November-December 1996): 13–25.

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gress at that time supported Yeltsin. Ruslan Khasbulatov, Yeltsin's successor as chairman of the Congress, was considered a close Yeltsin ally. After price liberalization and the beginning of radical economic reform in January 1992, however, the Congress began a campaign to reassert its superiority over the president. The disagreement over economic reform in turn spawned a constitutional crisis between the parliament and president.[64] With no formal institutions to structure relations between the president and the Congress, polarization crystallized yet again.[65] During summer 1993, in preparing for the tenth Congress of People's Deputies, deputies drafted a series of constitutional amendments that would have liquidated Russia's presidential office altogether.[66] Yeltsin preempted their plans by dissolving the Congress in September 1993. The Congress, in turn, declared Yeltsin's decree illegal and recognized Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoi as the new interim president. In a replay of the 1991 drama, Russia suddenly had two heads of states and two governments claiming sovereign authority over the other. This revolutionary situation ended only after the military conquest of one side by the other. In this second iteration of the dual sovereignty game, Yeltsin won again.

Polarization occurred again between 1991 and 1993, in part because of the complex and contested agenda of change. Throughout this two year period, no consensus emerged on the kind of economy, the kind of governmental system, or even the boundaries of the state. Regarding economic issues, not all major Russian political actors agreed on the necessity of the market reform program as articulated by Yeltsin's government headed by Deputy Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar. Ardent Communists within the Congress of People's Deputies and society more generally resisted government efforts to liberalize prices, privatize property, and achieve macroeconomic stabilization. Only weeks after the first liberalization of prices in January 1992, people's deputies mobilized to secure price controls on energy and basic food supplies. Regarding property issues, opposition leaders in the Congress amended Yeltsin's privatization to allow insiders the opportunity to seize majority control of their enterprises.[67] They also succeeded in blocking land privatization altogether. As for stabilization measures, Congress deputies pushed for continued government subsidies to enterprises, which ballooned the 1993 budget deficit to 25 percent of GDP.[68]

Likewise, no modicum of agreement existed between significant actors concerning the division of power within the central government. As debates over a new constitution dragged on for two years through the summer of 1993, the majority in the Congress of People's Deputies believed that their legislative

[64] Author's interview with Ruslan Khasbulatov, April 1995.

[65] *Yeltsin-Khazbulatov: Edinstvo, Kopromiss, Bor'ba* (Moscow: Terra, 1994).

[66] Author's interview with Oleg Rumyantsev, at the time secretary of the constitutional committee that prepared these amendments, May 1995.

[67] Maxim Boycko, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny, *Privatizing Russia* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996).

[68] Aleksei Ulyukaev, *Rossiya na Puti Reform* (Moscow: Evraziya, 1996).

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body was and should be the highest sovereign in the land. In contrast, Boris Yeltsin believed that his presidential office was and should remain above and beyond the control of the Congress. Creative scenarios were devised to resolve this fundamental conflict, including a referendum on the performance of both institutions (held in April 1993) and the convocation of a Constituent Assembly that would be granted the mandate to draft a new constitution (which did not occur). Ultimately, both sides opted to resolve this dilemma unilaterally rather than cooperatively.

Divisions regarding the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation did not crystalize into a nationwide direct confrontation between central and regional authorities. However, these differences regarding Russia's federal structure did cloud calculations about the balance of power and also served to exacerbate conflicts over economic and constitutional issues. In demanding more local autonomy, regional leaders and especially republican presidents prolonged constitutional deliberations. As polarization between the Congress and the president grew, both sides courted support from regional leaders by pledging to acquiesce to demands for greater autonomy.

Stalemate over these issues produced conflict rather than compromise, in part because of uncertainty concerning the balance of power between significant actors. In 1991, ambiguity about the power distribution between opponents and proponents of radical institutional change contributed to Yeltsin's decision not to convoke new elections and liquidate the Congress of People's Deputies.[69] By 1993, continued uncertainty and disagreement about relative power capabilities of the president and the Congress convinced both sides that they could defeat the other. In April 1993, the referendum on Yeltsin's performance and his economic reforms demonstrated that a majority of Russian citizens supported the president. Immediately thereafter, several of Yeltsin's closest supporters urged the president to move against the parliament and impose a new institutional order. Yeltsin, however, opted for continued negotiations over a new constitution. By the fall, Yeltsin's electoral mandate had faded, and calculations about which side society would support became more ambiguous. Critically, the preferences of the armed forces remained ambiguous throughout this period leading up to the October events. When called to act, would the military support Yeltsin or would they support General Alexander Rutskoi?[70] With whom the regional elite would ally—the Congress or the president—also remained ambiguous until the final days of this stalemate in fall 1993. Finally, mass politics also confused the power picture as tens of thousands took to the

[69] According to Yegor Gaidar, deputy prime minister at the time, Yeltsin was unsure if the "democrats" could win new elections in 1991. He also did not believe that he and his allies were capable of destroying all Soviet institutions or even of purging these institutions of conservative elements. Author's interview with Gaidar, October 1997. Yeltsin makes a similar argument in Yeltsin, *The Struggle for Russia* (New York: Times Books, 1994), 126.

[70] See Yeltsin, *Struggle for Russia,* chap. 8; and Yegor Gaidar, *Dni Porazhenii i Pobed* (Moscow: Vagrius, 1996).

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streets in September 1993 in support of the Congress, while Yeltsin's supporters stayed home.

Incongruent and equivocal calculations about the power balance prompted both sides to forego negotiation, gamble, and instead pursue maximalist, zero-sum strategies. Both sides thought they had a chance of winning through military force. Both sides could believe this because the balance of power between sides was relatively equal and information about the exact balance of power was poor. Yeltsin and his allies prevailed again, but the scale of military force needed to restore a single sovereign in October 1993 was much greater than that needed to overthrow the incumbent sovereign in August 1991.

Institutionalization: The "Second" Russian Republic

Ironically, the tragic October events in 1993 created a new window of opportunity for institutional innovation. In his decree dissolving the Congress of People's Deputies, Yeltsin also called for immediate elections for a new parliament and a referendum to adopt a new constitution. In December 1993, Russian citizens ratified this new basic law in a national referendum. After years of ambiguity, Russia had a new set of formal rules for organizing politics accepted both by the majority of the population and by all strategic political actors.

On paper, the constitution spelled out solutions to the two institutional ambiguities that had plagued the Russian state during its first two years of existence. Regarding Russia's federal structure, the new constitution specified that all constituent elements were to enjoy equal rights vis-à-vis the center. Ideas circulated earlier about the need to construct an asymmetric federal system were conspicuously missing in the new document. Also absent from the document was any mention of a mechanism for secession. Obviously, the formal institution of a new constitution cannot resolve over night the real and ongoing conflicts between the center and the regions. Negotiation over the distribution of power between the central and subnational governments has continued and will continue to remain as long as Russia maintains a federal structure. Nonetheless, all subnational governments except one—Chechnya—have acquiesced to a minimalist maintenance of a federal order. The danger of federal dissolution is remote.

The new Russian constitution also provided a set of rules to order executive-legislative relations. As in other transitions by imposition, the new rules of the game reflected the preferences of the dominant actor, Boris Yeltsin, as the new constitution provided the legal basis for a very strong presidential system.[71] Despite this imbalance, the adoption of a new constitution has helped to decrease uncertainty between actors regarding political competition between these two branches of government.[72] Though the new Duma (the lower house

[71] Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market,* 82.

[72] Robert Sharlet, "Transitional Constitutionalism: Politics and the Law in the Second Russian Republic," *Wisconsin International Law Journal* 14 (Fall 1996): 495–521.

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of parliament) has been dominated by opposition forces, the relationship between the new parliament and president has survived new elections for parliament in 1993 and 1995, votes of no confidence in the government during the summer of 1995, a presidential election in 1996, and two changes of government in the spring and fall of 1998. Even under the duress of a financial meltdown in the summer of 1998, cooperation between these two branches has been much higher than anyone anticipated.[73] All significant actors have calculated that they are better off playing under these new rules, however imbalanced and unfair, than by continuing to engage in political competition without any rules.[74]

In addition to outlining a procedure for a referendum on a new constitution, Yeltsin's September 1993 decree called for new parliamentary elections—the first national elections in Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Although Yeltsin artificially inflated turnout numbers to validate the constitutional referendum, few contested the general fairness of the 1993 parliamentary vote.[75] The strong showing of anti-Yeltsin parties helped to counter claims of falsification.[76] Two years later, this interim parliament was replaced by a new group of parliamentarians, elected according to schedule, under law, and in a free and fair process in which 65 percent of the electorate participated. Most dramatically, Russia then held elections for the presidency in the summer of 1996. Despite calls for postponement by Russian businessmen and some of Yeltsin's own aides, this election also happened on time and under law.[77] Voter participation in these elections reached almost 70 percent.

Elections do not a democracy make. Russia's new institutional order still lacks many features of a liberal democracy—few checks and balances between federal branches of government, no independent judiciary, a fragmented party system, and a weak and depoliticized civil society.[78] Nonetheless, this sequence

[73] See Thomas Remington, Steven Smith, and Moshe Haspel, "Decrees, Laws, and Inter-Branch Relations in the Russian Federation" (unpublished manuscript, Emory University, November 1997).

[74] Aman Tuleev, "Pochemu ya idu s KPRF?" *Dialog* 11–12 (1995): 8–9.

[75] Even the falsification issue demonstrated the degree to which all political actors wanted a new set of rules, however flawed. Though several prominent Russian political leaders and organizations, including both liberals and communists, recognized that falsification probably occurred, no one tried to initiate a recount or review because all believed that they were better off with a constitution—any constitution—even if adopted by undemocratic means, than with no constitution at all. For evidence of falsification, see A.A. Sobyanin and V.G. Sykhovskii, *Demokratiya, Organicheniya Falsifikatsiyami* (Moscow: Proektnaya Gruppa no Pravam Cheloveka, 1995).

[76] From the perspective of the presidential administration, the outcome of this election did not go as planned. See Thomas Remington and Steven Smith, "Political Goals, Institutional Context, and the Choice of an Electoral System: The Russian Parliamentary Election Law," *American Journal of Political Science* 40 (November 1996): 1253–1279; and Robert Moser, "The Impact of the Electoral System on Post-Communist Party Development: The Case of the 1993 Parliamentary Elections," *Electoral Studies* 14 (1995): 377–398.

[77] For details of these proposals for postponement, see Michael McFaul, *Russia's 1996 Presidential Elections: The End of Polarized Politics* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1997).

[78] See Michael McFaul, "Russia's Rough Ride" in Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner, eds., *Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 64–94.

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of three major national elections under a single, popularly-approved constitution marked an important turning point in Russia's troubled transition to democracy. First and foremost, all major actors participated. They acquiesced to a set of rules about political competition before they knew the results that these rules would produce.[79] In 1993, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) had a long debate about whether to accept Yeltsin's dictated rules or whether to continue to oppose the regime through "revolutionary" means. The CPRF eventually decided to urge its supporters to vote against the new constitution, but the party did field a list of candidates in the 1993 elections and in every subsequent election. After the vote, even this opposition party recognized the new constitution and has operated within its bounds ever since. A few other extreme actors and organizations refused to recognize the legitimacy of the new basic law, but they became increasingly marginalized after the 1993 vote. In 1996, Yeltsin's participation in the presidential election was as unexpected as communist participation in 1993, for many believed that he would maintain power by other means rather than subjecting his political career to the unknown whims of the people.[80]

Second, all main players accepted the results of these elections. In 1993 and 1995, winners assumed power and losers vacated offices without incident. In 1996, some predicted communist-inspired riots after their electoral loss, but Gennadii Zyuganov and his party comrades accepted defeat, attended Yeltsin's inauguration, and then approved Yeltsin's candidate for prime minister, Viktor Chernomyrdin, by an overwhelming majority. Zyuganov then began planning for the next election, creating the impression that democracy had become "the only game in town."

Obviously, a Yeltsin electoral defeat would have been a greater test of the institutionalization of elections. The election of his successor now stands as the next major hurdle to Russia's electoral democracy. During gubernatorial elections in the fall of 1996, however, dozens of sitting executives established the precedent of handing over power peacefully as roughly half of all incumbents running in over fifty elections lost.[81]

Since 1993, the participation of all important actors in this series of elections and their acceptance of the results have increased the price of extraconstitutional politics in the future. Elections now constitute normal politics, while acquisition or retention of power by other means now would constitute abnormal behavior. Some actors, such as Vladimir Zhirinovskii's Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), may still be using elections in the short run to advance nondemocratic agendas in the long run, but their actual behavior (as opposed

[79] Adam Przeworski, "Democracy as a Contingent Outcome of Conflicts" in Jon Elster and Rune Slagstad, eds., *Constitutionalism and Democracy* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 59–80.

[80] Liliya Shevtsova, "Yeltsin ostanetsya, dazhe esli proigraet," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta,* 26 April 1996.

[81] Michael McFaul and Nikolai Petrov, "Russian Electoral Politics after Transition: Regional and National Assessments," *Post-Soviet Geography and Economics* 38 (November 1997): 507–549.

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to their future behavior) has remained consistent with the existing institutional order.

Moreover, the actual process of elections has produced a moderating influence on Russian politics. Extreme nationalists and extreme communists failed to win representation in the 1995 parliamentary elections, while groups like the LDPR have lost support over time. Since its electoral defeat in the 1996 presidential elections, the largest opposition group, the CPRF, has begun to creep toward the center and marginalize extremists within its ranks. In gubernatorial elections after the 1996 presidential vote, few communist candidates ran on militant platforms; none challenged the legitimacy of the political order.[82] The recurrence of elections also has started to hurt the career of nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovskii. He lost half of his electoral support between 1993 and 1995, and then lost half of this diminished support in the June 1996 elections.

In nonelectoral situations, former challengers to democracy in both the Yeltsin administration and the opposition have played by the existing constitutional rules and have not even attempted to mobilize resources to pursue antisystemic strategies. Communist party leaders within the parliament have cooperated with the president and his government on most major issues, including the approval of all annual budgets proposed by the president since 1994.[83] Perhaps most dramatically, Yeltsin and Communist party leaders managed to negotiate the creation of a new coalition government after the 1998 financial crash. When tested under the strains of economic crisis, Russia's nascent democratic institutions have not collapsed yet. This new institutional order has existed longer and appears to be more stable than the first two attempts at designing new political institutions. How can we explain this variation?

Clarity in the Balance of Power

First, the balance of power, as well as perceptions of the balance of power, changed dramatically after the defeat of the opposition in 1993. After two rounds of zero-sum competition, the opponents of the post-1991 institutional order were much weaker, while Boris Yeltsin and his new regime emerged as stronger—a shift in the balance of power recognized by all. Unlike in the first two situations, mass mobilization did not cloud calculations about the balance of power after October 1993.

Additional information enhancing rational choice calculations was provided by the two previous rounds of confrontation. After two rounds of conflict, both sides possessed hard information about the opponent's capabilities and preferences.[84] They also had obtained hard information about the real costs of

[82] Ibid.

[83] See Jonas Bernstein, "New Pals: Kremlin, Zyuganov," *St. Petersburg Times,* 30 December–5 January 1997.

[84] On learning in regime transition, see Nancy Bermeo, "Democracy and the Lessons of Dictatorship," *Comparative Politics* 25 (1992): 273–291.

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confrontation, which had risen with time. In August 1991, three people died; in October 1993 hundreds died.

After October 1993, the CPRF stopped pursuing antisystemic or revolutionary strategies and instead acquiesced to the new rules of the game dictated by Yeltsin.[85] In their rhetoric, opposition leaders continued to decry the new order; but in their actions, they demonstrated acceptance by participating in the electoral process in 1993, again in 1995 and 1996. They did so out of weakness, out of recognition of the new balance of power, and because they calculated that the new rules—the game of elections—would serve their interests better than no rules at all. Critical to their acceptance of the new institutional order, they believed that they could win free and fair elections. Their relative success in the 1995 parliamentary elections fueled this optimism. Even after losing the presidential election in 1996, opponents of the incumbent government still had the opportunity to participate in politics under the existing rules through their dominance in the Duma and their hold on many governor's offices. Importantly, Russia's economic woes after the financial crash in 1998 have encouraged opposition leaders about their ability to come to power in the next presidential election. Given this optimism about future elections, opposition leaders have made investments in the electoral game and refrained from making investments in nonelectoral methods for coming to power. Opposition leaders are busy making coalitions and learning campaign techniques rather than training militias or stockpiling weapons.

By defeating his opponents for the second time in as many years, Yeltsin became the one actor most capable of transgressing the new rules of the game after 1993. Why did he agree to these rules? First, Yeltsin accepted the rules because he and his colleagues wrote them. The constitution did not result from compromise, but reflected Yeltsin's preferences for extraordinary executive powers, a weak parliament, and a symmetric federal order. Second, the popular ratification of these rules further fortified the legitimacy of the new institutional order. By asking for the support of the electorate for his constitution, Yeltsin effectively raised the stakes for himself for transgressing these rules. In the shadow of the October 1993 events, a decision he deeply regretted, Yeltsin was extremely unlikely to violate the constitution again, especially as the new basic law reflected his preferences.[86] Finally and paradoxically, Yeltsin was less capable of transgressing the rules of the game soon after the October 1993 showdown. Even if he and his allies wanted to use extraconstitutional means to impose their preferences regarding a political issue, the probability that the

[85] The Communist party of the Russian federation actually ended its confrontation strategy with Yeltsin on 1 October 1993, two days before the armed conflict began. More extremist communist and nationalist groups did not follow its lead but stayed on at the parliament building to fight the Yeltsin government.

[86] Yeltsin, *The Struggle for Russia,* chap. 8.

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military would intervene again on his behalf or that the population more generally would support him were much lower after October 1993.[87]

And yet, the rules drafted by Yeltsin also outlined a process—elections—by which he could lose control of this superpresidential system. Six months before the 1996 presidential vote, such a loss of power appeared likely as the Communists had just scored a major electoral victory in parliamentary elections while Yeltsin's approval rating hovered below 10 percent.[88] Facing the prospect of electoral defeat, aides to Yeltsin drafted defection strategies that included postponement of the vote, electoral fraud, and emergency rule.[89] We may never know how seriously Yeltsin considered these alternative strategies, but he ultimately chose to participate in the regime of his own making and not to pursue these nondemocratic options. Ironically, this decision appears to have been guided by both assessments of weakness and strength. On the one hand, the president reasoned that he was too weak, both domestically and internationally, to pull off a coup.[90] On the other hand, despite his poor ratings, Yeltsin still had confidence that he could win the election.[91] Moreover, Yeltsin wanted to go down in history as the father of Russian democracy. Postponing this historic election would have done permanent damage to this goal.

He was right about his chances of winning. His victory meant that the transgression strategy was never pursued. His submission to the electoral process and demonstration of responsible behavior has served in turn to raise the stakes for future defectors.[92] The more ritualistic and regular elections become, the harder they will be to cancel.[93] With time and iteration under the existing rules, change becomes more costly. As Russell Hardin has noted: Once we have settled on a constitutional arrangement, it is not likely to be in the interest of some of us to then try to renege on the arrangement. Our interests will be better

[87] Deborah Yarsike Ball, "How Reliable Are Russia's Officers?" *Jane's Intelligence Review,* May 1996, 206.

[88] Jerry Hough, Evelyn Davidheiser, and Susan Goodrich Lehman, *The 1996 Russian Presidential Election,* Brookings Occasional Papers (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1996).

[89] Author's interview with a deputy to General Aleksandr Korzhakov, chief of Yeltsin's security staff, March 1996. Korzhakov drafted these contingency plans. For further details, see McFaul, *Russia's 1996 Presidential Election.*

[90] Author's interview with presidential adviser, Giorgii Satarov, March 1996.

[91] Author's interviews with Aleksandr Olson, Igor Kharichev, Valerii Khomyakov, Vyacheslav Nikonov, Giorgii Satarov, Mikhail Schneider, and Vladimir Zharikin—all Yeltsin campaign officials, March–April and June 1996.

[92] On "responsible behavior" as a method for credibly committing to a set of rules, see Douglass North and Barry Weingast, "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England," *The Journal of Economic History* 49 (December 1989): 803–832.

[93] This assumption does not mean that political actors will stop criticizing these rules of the game, but rather that they will begin to take them for granted. On this distinction, see Ronald Jepperson, "Institutions, Institutional Effects, and Institutionalism" in Walter Powell and Paul DiMaggio, eds., *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), esp. 146–147.

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served by living within the arrangement. And this is generally true not because we will be coerced to abide if we choose not to but because we generally cannot do better than to abide. To do better, we would have to carry enough others with us to set up an alternative, and that will typically be too costly to be worth the effort."[94]

The probability of institutional persistence is further enhanced by the weakening of the one actor previously capable of transgressing the new order, Boris Yeltsin. Given his age and health, Yeltsin is unlikely to be a major actor during the next presidential vote, scheduled for 2000. Furthermore, the probability that Yeltsin himself will disrupt or annul Russia's new political rules has decreased considerably after the 1998 financial crisis. Yeltsin's approval rating has fallen into single digits, major political allies have abandoned him, and power de facto has shifted to the parliament and to Russia's regional leaders.[95] In this new context, Yeltsin is not in a position to abrogate Russia's democratic rules. All other actors, including those in Yeltsin's entourage, have less confidence, uncertain capacity, and little experience in pursuing nondemocratic solutions, making them more likely to remain committed to the new democratic rules of the game. Although created in a more certain context, the new rules of the game have served to institutionalize future uncertainty.[96] For all actors involved, it is now rational to accept the existing rules of the game, and costly to defect from them.[97]

The Shrinking Agenda of Change

Clarity regarding the balance of power proved most critical to the adoption of a new set of institutions for regulating political competition in Russia. However, acceptance of these new political institutions by both Yeltsin and his opponents was made easier by the narrowing of the agenda of change. If before 1993 and most certainly before 1991, political actors debated the kind of economic system that Russia should have, this cleavage issue no longer polarized politics thereafter.[98] A Yeltsin defeat in the 1996 presidential elections might have altered or impeded market reform, but not rolled back capitalism. Some marginal organizations still advocate a return to the command economy, but all significant actors now accept the basic tenets of a market economy. The debate now has turned to what kind of capitalism, a debate that exists in all capitalist countries. Even after Russia's financial meltdown in the summer of 1998 and the

[94] Hardin, "Why a Constitution?" 113.

[95] "Five Percent of Russians Approve of Yeltsin's Work, *Interfax,* 28 October 1998.

[96] See Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market.*

[97] This is the common property of all institutions as specified by Randall Calvert, "Rational Actors, Equilibrium, and Social Institutions," 60.

[98] See Gennadii Zyuganov, speech before the Fifth Plenum of the CPRF Central Committee, reprinted in *Informatsionnyi byulleten'* (CPRF) 1 15 January 1996).

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consequent return of some Communists to the government, no one is advocating a return to the command economy.

Similarly, the boundaries of the state have not been an issue of polarized conflict after 1993. Although many still clamor for reintegration of the USSR and some republics within the Russian federation still trumpet sovereignty, no important actor has advocated revolutionary means to achieve these changes. The borders with Chechnya remain ambiguous, but even here, both sides have agreed to disagree and postponed demarcation of borders for five years.[99] Reintegration initiatives have gained increasing salience, particularly the plan to unite Russia and Belarus. However, strategies for reunification proposed by the Yeltsin government, nationalists, and communists vary only slightly from each other. Polarized conflict in Russia over this issue is highly unlikely.

The range of positions regarding the processes for both selecting leaders and regulating political competition has narrowed considerably. All major actors now accept elections as the only legitimate method of achieving or maintaining political power. Alternative ideas have little currency. In sum, when compared to the first and second attempts at institutional design, major political actors share a greater consensus about all major issues in this third period.[100]

The extent to which the shrinking agenda of change is independent of or a consequence of the balance of power variable is difficult to gauge. They do not change at the same time. The balance of power became more clarified in 1993, but polarized rhetoric about the agenda of change continued until the 1996 presidential election. Nonetheless, the coincidence of change of these two independent variables suggests a causal relationship between them. Unfortunately, the real world does not offer a test in which we could isolate the independent effects of the two variables.

Conclusion

This article has sketched a simple and general framework for explaining failed and successful attempts at institutional design during Russia's protracted transition from communist rule. The earlier literature on transitions has suggested that pacts can facilitate successful democratic transitions. Yet, what causes pacts to emerge in the first place is more fundamental to developing a theory of transition. In a revision of previous thinking, the analysis in this article suggests that pacts may be more appropriately understood as epiphenomena or as at best intervening variables—that is, they reflect successful deals or outcomes,

[99] Alessandra Stanley, "Yeltsin Signs Peace Treaty with Chechnya," *New York Times,* 13 May 1997.

[100] The importance of values consensus for sustaining democratic institutions is a common theme in all approaches to democratic theory. See, for instance, Barry Weingast, "The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law," *American Political Science Review* 91 (June 1997): 245–263; John Higley and Michael Burton, "The Elite Variable in Democratic Transitions and Breakdowns," *American Sociological Review* 54 (February 1989): 17–32; and Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1963).

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rather than cause them. The factors that cause pacts may well be the same factors that cause transitions to succeed.

This article has identified two sets of factors that influence the probabilities of the emergence of a pact or the success of new democratic institutions more generally. First, the narrower the contested agenda of change, the more likely that agreement will emerge. Transitions involving only the altering of political institutions are more likely to succeed than situations in which political, economic, and social institutions are all in flux at the same time. Second, the greater the consensus concerning the perception of the balance of power between major actors, the more likely a new set of rules can be accepted by all.

This article has presented a probability probe of these hypotheses about institutional change by comparing three attempts at institutional design in the Soviet Union and then Russia. In the first two cases, agreement over new rules was not reached, pacts were not negotiated, and actors went outside of the existing rules of the game to pursue their interests. Opposing, polarized camps pursued zero-sum strategies until one side won, because the contested agenda of change was wide and the balance of power between opposing actors ambiguous. In the third case, all major actors acceded to an explicit set of new rules imposed by the strongest actor and codified in the new Russian constitution of 1993. Acquiescence by all principal actors occurred because the distribution of power between actors had changed and the new balance was recognized by all significant actors; the number of issues on the agenda for change had narrowed; and to a limited extent, the author of the new rules, Boris Yeltsin, submitted to self-binding mechanisms built into the new institutional order.

Though only three cases of institutional design within one protracted transition, the Soviet/Russian experience suggests several possible revisions for thinking about transitions. First, if different modes of transition can lead to the same outcome, then the mode may not have the same causal importance for the success or failure of democratic transitions as we once thought. If countries such as Russia can establish new democratic institutions, however flawed, without negotiating a pact, then pacts may not be the right focus of analysis. Instead, this article has suggested two prior variables that can help predict the probability of both pacts and new institutional designs more generally—the scope of the contested agenda of change and the degree of shared knowledge about the balance of power. Preferences and power as well as information about preferences and power are central to the analysis.

The mode of transition is still important, for it may determine the kind of new institutions that emerge. Russia's difficult and protracted transition has helped to delay the emergence of liberal democratic institutions. Polarized politics impeded the negotiation of new rules of the game accepted by all. After this polarization produced two military confrontations in as many years, Yeltsin then dictated a new set of political rules to which all major actors eventually acquiesced. This mode of transition—protracted polarization eventually resolved through military victory of one side rather than through a negotiated

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pact—scarred Russia's young democracy. Legacies of this kind of transition include a superpresidential system, a weak party system, a depoliticized civil society, the slow development of the rule of the law, and a poorly performing political system. Though only hinted at in this article, the Soviet and Russian transition suggests a more nuanced relationship between the mode of transition and the kind of democracy to emerge. If a transition is pacted or negotiated, then the democratic system to emerge is likely to be a liberal democracy. If the transition is not pacted, then the democratic regime to emerge is likely to be an electoral or partial democracy.[101]

This article has suggested that uncertainty is not necessarily a positive condition for the emergence of a new, stable institutional order. Under conditions of uncertainty, actors have incentives to negotiate better democratic institutions, which enhance the separation of powers and checks and balances more generally. Paradoxically, under conditions of uncertainty, actors also are least likely to negotiate such deals.

Stalemate and the equal distribution of power have been oversold as a necessary condition for a successful transition. Mutually accurate understanding of the actual distribution of power may be more important than the actual distribution itself as a facilitating condition for successful transitions.

Finally, this article has suggested the benefits of seeking to develop hypotheses that can account for both failed and successful democratic transitions. By selecting the dependent variable, many studies of democratization have failed to identify a clear causal relationship between variables. The argument in this article not only outlines a way to account for both failed and successful transitions, but offers a set of simple, generalized, and testable hypotheses that can provide a framework for comparing a whole range of other instances of transition and institutional design beyond the limited empirical probe of the Soviet and Russian experience.*

[101] On these kinds of relationships, see Karl and Schmitter, "Democratization around the Globe."

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A Review Essay of H. R. McMaster's *Dereliction of Duty*

JAMES J. WIRTZ

Few events in recent memory have received as much scholarly and popular attention as the history of the U.S. policy-making process leading to the Vietnam debacle. But one question remained unanswered in this long documentary and narrative record: Exactly what role did senior officers, especially the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), play in this disaster? In hindsight, what is remarkable about the American military record in Vietnam is not its varied performance in battle but the performance of those charged with devising strategy and advising politicians about U.S. military prospects in Southeast Asia. The U.S. military blundered into what would become the quagmire of Vietnam, executing strategies best suited to high-intensity combat in Europe or the deserts of the Middle East.[1] It went with no clear strategy to achieve victory.[2] The U.S. Army was particularly traumatized by the Vietnam experience. It was in every sense of the word bankrupted by its land war in Asia. Things go badly in war; but why did it go *this* badly for the U.S. military?

[1] Andrew Krepinevich, *The Army and Vietnam* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).

[2] Harry Summers, *On Strategy* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1982). At the time, the failure of the American military to devise a strategy to achieve victory in Vietnam was clear to senior officials. When former Secretary of State Dean Acheson asked General Earle Wheeler, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in March 1968 about the status of our plan to win in Vietnam, the general responded curtly that we had no plan to win in Vietnam, we were only helping the Vietnamese avoid a communist victory. Acheson responded: "[W]hat in the name of God are five hundred thousand men out there doing—chasing girls? This is not a semantic game, General. If the deployment of all those men is not an effort to attain a military solution, then words have lost all meaning." Clark Clifford with Richard Holbroke, "Annals of Government, Serving the President: The Vietnam Years—II," *The New Yorker,* 13 May 1991, 78.

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H. R. McMaster, a cavalry officer of some note who taught at the Command and General Staff College at Ft. Leavenworth, the heart and soul of the army, addresses fundamental questions about the Joint Chiefs' lackluster performance in the planning and conduct of the Vietnam war. *Dereliction of Duty* constitutes an important contribution to the literature on America's involvement in Vietnam.[3] From the perspective of a field-grade officer, however, McMaster's depiction of American military leaders is disturbing because it highlights the Joint Chiefs' fundamental incompetence. The faith that officers achieve high command because of their accomplishments and an ability to succeed in war sustains those who must actually risk their lives on the battlefield. To confront the possibility that nothing but incompetence, neglect, and disorder characterize senior ranks is almost too much to bear for officers who must lead soldiers into battle.

Making Strategy Circa 1965

To say that civil-military relations were suboptimal in the Robert McNamara Pentagon is a bit of an understatement. On the one hand stood the JCS, whose members served as field grade and even senior officers during World War II. With the notable exception of their chairman, Army General Earle Wheeler, all were war heroes and some were even architects of the Allied victory and the very institutions they served: Harold K. Johnson, Army chief of staff, survived the Bataan Death March; while Air Force Chief of Staff Curtis Lemay led his bombers not only over the skies of Germany and Japan but into the nuclear age as commander of the Strategic Air Command. These men were not just experienced military experts, they were living legends. On the other hand, the "Whiz Kids" of the McNamara Pentagon served as junior officers during the war. Armed with "systems analysis," McNamara could shift the debate over military strategy and budgets away from arguments based on "military judgment" to calculations of cost and benefit. McMaster is insulted by the fact that Alain Enthoven stated repeatedly that military experience actually was detrimental to making strategy; but in reality, Enthoven and the other Whiz Kids had little choice.[4] If military expertise alone was allowed to stand as the lingua franca of defense planning, then McNamara and his civilian colleagues would have failed in their effort to lead the Department of Defense before they even started.

Interservice relations inside the McNamara Pentagon, however, were what proved catastrophic to Vietnam policy making. Repeatedly, the secretary of Defense would pose a question concerning military strategy to the JCS only to receive nothing in return. Debate over roles and missions, especially the peren-

[3] H. R. McMaster, *Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam* (New York: Harper Collins, 1997).

[4] Ibid., 19.

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nial issue of winning wars through air power alone, produced deadlock in the pre-Goldwater-Nichols JCS. In the 1960s, each of the Chiefs, including the chairman, had an equal say on issues of policy and strategy. As a result, debate in the JCS reflected little more than bitter interservice rivalry. Unworkable interpersonal relations, the absence of a mechanism to end debate, and the fact that they needed to reach consensus before offering corporate advice often prevented the JCS from "answering the mail." Others—Maxwell Taylor, John McNaughton, McNamara—filled the void created by the Chiefs' inaction. But the JCS were not cut out of decision making about the war: they took themselves out of the policy-making process when events in Vietnam unfolded faster than they could respond to them. Indeed, it is difficult to escape the impression that McNamara wanted JCS input into decisions about Vietnam, if for no other reason than to provide political cover for the Johnson administration, and in the end apparently abandoned hope of ever receiving advice from the Chiefs.[5]

McMaster is quite clear that the Chiefs never really focused on the situation in Vietnam until it was too late. Their opinions about the war were determined by efforts to advance bureaucratic interests or to guard institutional positions that they had come to personify. Less credible, however, is McMaster's conclusion that early in the war the Joint Chiefs seemed to realize that the United States was headed for disaster in Vietnam. By January 1965, according to McMaster, the Office of Naval Intelligence warned Admiral David Mcdonald, the chief of Naval Operations, that the United States "should be prepared at an early date to either commit U.S. forces in sufficient strength to ensure victory or get out before it is too late." Army Chief of Staff General Johnson never believed that bombing would bring peace to Vietnam: At the start of 1965 he believed that it would take one-half million American troops five years to stop the communist insurgency. Marine Corps officers estimated that seven-hundred thousand troops would be needed to win in Vietnam. By July 1965, General Johnson embraced the Marine Corps estimate. In McMaster's view, senior officers in the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps believed these estimates during the summer of 1965 and still did not inform civilians in the Johnson administration that the planned deployment of 200,000 troops to Vietnam was inadequate.[6]

McMaster is correct to note that doubts existed about American involvement in the conflict, but to claim that a clear image of looming disaster was widespread is not supported by the evidence. Negative assessments, hidden away in some long-forgotten file, can often be discovered after a disaster. But the impact of these warnings, so clearly significant in hindsight, must be assessed against the flow of day-to-day events that usually suggest to participants that policies, while not perfect, are not spinning disastrously out of control.

McMaster suggests that a July 1965 report issued by an ad hoc committee headed by Major General Andrew Goodpaster, who served as de facto deputy

[5] Ibid., 82, 103, 110, 113.

[6] Ibid., 261.

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chairman for the Chiefs, was the last best opportunity for the JCS to influence U.S. strategy in Vietnam. The Goodpaster study highlighted fundamental differences in the way civilians and officers in the McNamara Pentagon approached the conflict in Vietnam. McNamara's instructions to Goodpaster indicated that the Johnson administration wanted to determine the minimum forces needed in Vietnam to show the communists that they could not prevail. To succeed, according to Assistant Secretary of Defense John McNaughton, the United States had only to demonstrate to the Vietcong that they could not win. By contrast, officers were primarily interested not only in determining the maximum number of troops that could be sent to Vietnam, but in eliminating such obstacles to victory as civilian unwillingness to invade North Vietnam. McMaster suggests that in the end the Goodpaster report failed to satisfy the parties involved, which explains why it failed to make much of a policy impact. The divergence in strategic perspectives, evident in hindsight, apparently escaped Goodpaster and his colleagues as they wrangled over their study's terms of reference with the secretary of Defense.[7]

A 15 July 1965 meeting between the Chiefs and members of the House Armed Services Committee in Chairman Mendel Rivers's office marks the denouement in McMaster's narrative. In response to representatives' questions about mobilization, troop strength in Vietnam, and the desirability of striking the North Vietnamese port of Haiphong, the Chiefs answered evasively. McMaster suggests that out of loyalty to the president, they did not tell members of Congress what they really believed. They described a war that could be won by limited forces, in a limited area, and at a limited cost. After the meeting, Marine General Wallace Greene called John Blanford, a congressional staffer, to tell him that he was concerned because the Chiefs had left the members of Congress with the wrong impression about the conflict in Southeast Asia. Greene told Blanford that the United States was on the verge of a "major war" that would require five years of intense fighting, 500,000 U.S. troops, and the immediate intensification of military action against North Vietnam. American forces, warned Greene, would suffer many casualties.[8]

Nothing Fails Like Success

McMaster never states what became of Greene's warning, but his purpose is to demonstrate that at a relatively early stage in the conflict, the Chiefs recognized that the United States was about to become involved in a long and bloody war without the benefit of an effective strategy. Here McMaster's analysis is overly influenced by hindsight: the Chiefs might have had their doubts about the prospects for success in Vietnam, but these doubts and a few pieces of supporting analysis appear prophetic only in the aftermath of the Vietnam debacle. In es-

[7] Ibid., 306–308.
[8] Ibid., 309–312.

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sence, McMaster is suggesting that a few individuals, in this instance the Joint Chiefs, knew that America was headed for disaster in Vietnam, but did or said nothing about it. General Greene did speak up on one occasion, but he "told the truth" to a rather odd candidate; it is hard to imagine how a lone congressional staffer could somehow fix U.S. policy in Southeast Asia in the summer of 1965.

By contrast, McMaster's description of how the infighting among the Joint Chiefs produced policy paralysis is far more persuasive. In fact, it can also explain Marine General Greene's reluctance to pick a more influential audience in expressing his doubts about the war: he would have been denounced by fellow officers, especially supporters of air power, who expected that the United States could influence events in Vietnam at a modest price in blood and treasure. McMaster is horrified by his own description of the policy-making process, because officers value loyalty, honesty, and order above other desirable qualities.[9] The reason for this preference lies in battle itself: the orderly conduct of a suboptimal strategy or campaign generally prevails over a badly executed, but superior strategy. But the Joint Chiefs were disloyal to their troops and dishonest to their fellow citizens and elected officials. They were disorderly: they bickered for bureaucratic advantage, while civilians were left alone to devise military strategy.

It might be easy to dismiss *Dereliction of Duty* as history. No longer is the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff first among equals; he now outranks his fellow chiefs because of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act. The Chiefs no longer need to reach consensus before advising civilian policy makers; if necessary, the chairman can answer the mail.[10] Relatively good U.S. civil-military relations prior to the Gulf War and the quick success achieved by Desert Storm suggest that officers have learned from past mistakes.

The apparent ease of the coalition victory also can lay the groundwork for future disaster by creating the impression that U.S. forces are invincible or are at least able to win any conflict at a token price in lives and treasure.[11] After all, it was the military heroes of World War II who presided over military disaster in Vietnam. Here, there is much irony in *Dereliction of Duty*. McMaster is not the first soldier to attempt to explain the Vietnam debacle; but his critique

[9] McMaster's rather emotional response to the apparent "disunity" in American government (p. 66) shows his bias as a member of the U.S. Army, which serves him well in evaluating the performance of the officers in question. Occasionally, this bias leads him astray. He seems surprised to learn that the president and his civilian staff were primarily interested in the domestic politics of American involvement in Vietnam (pp. 128, 272) and that President Johnson was very interested in winning elections (pp. 87, 117). He also is scandalized by the fact that President Johnson did not much like or trust the military (p. 52).

[10] For a discussion of how the Goldwater-Nichols Act solved many of the problems identified by McMaster, see Peter J. Roman and David Tarr, "The Joint Chiefs of Staff: From Service Parochialism to Jointness," *Political Science Quarterly* 113 (Spring 1998): 91–111.

[11] Others have already voiced these concerns. See David Adams, "We Are Not Invincible," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* (May 1997): 35–39.

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of the Joint Chiefs' performance will be all the more compelling to Army officers because of his battlefield record. During the Gulf War, McMaster was in command of the lead troop of the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment (about thirty armored vehicles) that encountered the 18th Mechanized Brigade of the Republican Guard's Tawakalana Division (about 100 armored vehicles). Instead of waiting for the rest of his regiment, McMaster led his unit in an unsupported attack, completely destroying the larger Iraqi armored unit at the cost of only one vehicle destroyed and one crew member killed. The imagery conjured up by the tactical success enjoyed by McMaster at the so-called Battle of 73 Easting (26 February 1991) will live forever in the myths that comprise the folklore of the U.S. Army. In other words, there is every reason to expect that although it is sometimes misleading, McMaster's explanation of why "they got it wrong in Vietnam," will exert an enormous appeal, because he is a soldier who has demonstrated that he can "get it right."*

* The author would like to thank Timothy Lomperis, Douglas Macdonald, and Elizabeth Skinner for their comments.

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Book Reviews

Saddam's Word: Political Discourse in Iraq *by Ofra Bengio. New York, Oxford University Press, 1998. 266 pp. $49.95.*

Anyone who doubts the corrupting effects of totalitarianism on political language—if such a person could exist at the end of our century of totalitarianisms—should read this book. Bengio, a research fellow at the Dayan Center of Tel Aviv University, has compiled exhaustive evidence from the Iraqi sources to show how the Ba'thist regime in general and Saddam Hussein in particular have debased the political vocabulary of Iraq in ways almost comical (on subjects like "democracy" and "revolution") but more often chilling (the glorification of violence, abject hero worship, the dehumanization of enemies, and the corrupt use of religious imagery). She breaks no new theoretical ground in asserting the relationship between the degradation of politics and that of language, a theme well developed by students of fascism and communism and demonstrated in the case of Ba'thist Iraq in earlier works by Kannan Makiyya. What she does is marshal overwhelming evidence of the phenomenon in modern Iraq. She also traces the opportunistic shift in Saddam's own rhetoric from the secular nationalism of the 1960s and 1970s to his increasing (and increasingly cynical) appropriation of Islamic rhetorical tropes and images in the 1980s and 1990s, as things started to go badly for his regime.

Bengio is less successful in establishing causal links between this degraded political vocabulary and political action, admittedly a much harder task. Did the constant drumbeat of Saddam's propaganda actually work at convincing Iraqis of the indispensability of his leadership? At times Bengio suggests that it did, arguing that such "packaged expressions placed the individual mind under tutelage and eventually enslaved people" (p. 205) and that "such constant repetition of ancient themes had a cumulative effect on the way Iraqis conceived of their political experience" (p. 77). Yet these are merely assertions, as she can offer no evidence of what Iraqis really thought about politics and Saddam. She also admits that the widespread uprisings against the regime in 1991 call into question the effectiveness of over twenty years of its propaganda.

The author is also on slippery ground when she states that Saddam's rhetorical excesses were more than simply justifications for his policies, that they drove him through some unspecified feedback mechanism to take the disastrous decisions he did in the 1990-1991 Gulf War. She states that "those who initiate the use of this particular brand of language end up its prisoners. This view is fully borne out by the chain of events leading up to the Gulf War" (p. 206). But such a conclusion requires a detailed analysis of that chain of events to establish

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that Saddam was a prisoner of his own rhetoric rather than a risk-taker responding to the threats and opportunities he perceived around him. Bengio does not provide that analysis.

This book leaves no doubt that totalitarianism's corrupting effects on language are as severe in a non-European environment as they have been in the blood-stained experiments of European totalitarianism. It is less convincing when trying to argue that such language is as much a cause of the politics of those regimes as a consequence.

F. GREGORY GAUSE III
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The Brink of Peace: The Israeli-Syrian Negotiations *by Itamar Rabinovitch. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1998. 283 pp. $24.95.*

1993 was a year of surprises for most Middle East watchers. The Oslo Accord, negotiated in secret with the help of the Norwegians, brought long-time adversaries, Israel and the PLO, to the threshold of peace. As surprising, and less well known, was the parallel negotiation that came close to opening the way for Israeli-Syrian peace. Itamar Rabinovitch is perfectly qualified to tell part of that story. In July 1992, he was chosen by the newly elected Yitzhak Rabin to head the Israeli team in peace talks with the Syrians. The choice was one of those rare moments when a diplomat is chosen for his genuine expertise. Rabinovitch is an Israeli historian who specializes on Syria. An earlier book concentrates on the first attempt to bring peace between Israel and Syria.

Rabin entrusted Rabinovitch to conduct the very sensitive negotiations with Syria and seemed to place more hope in them than in the secret opening to the PLO that his foreign minister favored. No one knows the Israeli side of this story better than Rabinovitch. The reader will find much that is new in this straightforward, nonpolemical account.

First, we learn how close the two sides came to reaching a broad framework agreement. There was no moment of breakthrough, but there was convergence on basic issues. Second, we learn that Rabin was willing to go quite far in returning the Golan Heights in exchange for peace and security. Third, we learn about the steady, but rather cautious, American role in facilitating these exchanges. Fourth, we learn how Likud opposition figures tried to mobilize American public opinion against a deal with Syria by lobbying key members of Congress to oppose the stationing of American troops on the Golan Heights, a key element of Rabin's plan. Finally, we learn that Rabin engaged in what the author calls a "hypothetical" style of negotiation.

In what should be the most revealing moment of the book, Rabinovitch tells us about a meeting that Rabin had with U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher on 3 August 1993. There Rabin offers his "hypothesis": "on the assumption that [Assad's] demand would be satisfied," would Syria be prepared for a bilateral peace with Israel and could some elements of that peace go into effect before the completion of withdrawal? This formulation certainly leaves the impression that Israel is at least willing to consider full withdrawal, but Rabinovitch is at pains to argue that this is a misreading. No such commitment was made, although he does indicate that Rabin would have gone very far toward full withdrawal if Israeli conditions on peace and security were met. In brief, Rabin was engaged in the kind of conditional negotiating ploy that most leaders pursue. And normally a conditional offer is considered to be a serious commitment, although it need not be acted upon until the other side has met

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the specified conditions. Rabinovitch seems to be saying that a "hypothetical" offer is less binding than a "conditional" one, although he later uses the two words as if they are synonymous (p. 179).

What we do not know from this account is what Christopher made of this offer in his subsequent talks with Hafezal-Assad, nor do we know exactly how Assad reacted. We are told that Rabin was dissatisfied with Assad's response. Feeling that he could only proceed on one negotiating track at a time for domestic reasons, Rabin then immediately decided to go with the Oslo secret channel. Rabinovitch reports this without really explaining it, perhaps unwilling to voice overt criticism of Rabin. Such discretion creeps in again when the American role is discussed. Referring to President Bill Clinton's first term, Rabinovitch terms American involvement in the Middle East peace process as a "comparatively small investment and limited risks" (p. 259). He seems to be saying that Christopher erred in writing a letter to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu saying that an agreed "non paper" that had resulted from the Israeli-Syrian negotiations was not binding on the new Israeli government, but his wording is so gentle that one senses that the diplomat's desire not to offend won out over the academic's commitment to analyze and explain.

Despite these few drawbacks and a surprising number of misspellings of the names of American diplomats, the book is a major contribution to our understanding of a very important moment in recent Middle East diplomacy, a moment that does not seem likely to recur any time soon. Rabinovitch is convinced that eventually the two parties will have to return to the negotiating table, but that does not seem to be the view of the current Israeli government.

WILLIAM B. QUANDT
University of Virgina

America's Imperial Burden: Is the Past Prologue? *by Ernest W. Lefever. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1999. 196 pp. $24.00.*

This short but ambitious book is intended as a tract for our times. Writing from an analytically clearcut and historically broad position, Ernest Lefever proceeds to make four fundamental points with respect to U.S. foreign policy. He reviews the American role in world affairs over the last century with clear application to current as well as future events.

First, given its relative power (as Lefever's opening sentence tells us) as "the mightiest and most influential imperial power in history," the United States has a primary responsibility for the character of world history, an ability to influence events for good or ill that cannot be denied, try as nay-sayers or isolationists might.

Second, whatever America's shortcomings, it has a right both from the point of view of self-preservation and from the perspective of the relative superiority of its democratic government and Judeo-Christian morality to assert its interests and values in international relations. The United States is, in Abraham Lincoln's phrase, "the last, best hope of earth" (p. 156). While mistakes have and will be made by Americans in world affairs, Lefever calls for a self-confident exercise of power that serves both national and international ends.

Third, while military strength is the most direct way to assert American values and interests in world affairs, America's spiritual and ideological sense of greatness, purpose, and worthiness are the indispensable bedrock of the ability to carry this "imperial burden" (pp. 139ff, 158ff). Ideas have consequences, world views matter, and Lefever has a reasoned perspective that he feels should be widely adopted.

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Fourth, Americans should not be blinded by the extent of U.S. power or by a sense of virtue to assume that U.S. influence is unlimited or that its hands can always be clean. Lefever identifies himself as a "humane realist" in the tradition of Rheinhold Niebuhr and as such deplores not only isolationists but also "liberal crusaders" (any variant of Wilsonianism) that would make us forget how treacherous world affairs remain after the cold war and how unlikely schemes of human rights or democracy promotion are to add to American security or to world stability.

Given the sharpness of Lefever's world vision, different reviewers will surely have different reactions to his core assumptions. I find refreshing his crisply stated recognition that to have power is to have responsibility, combined with his recognition of the inevitable limits of power and his understanding that no great power can be innocent. Here is a book to be reckoned with in any national debate over the lessons of the twentieth century for the making of U.S. foreign policy.

But on closer inspection, the book is far from a perfect guide to either past or future American foreign policy. Confident in the rightness of his vision, Lefever looks at the world in black and white terms that are highly partisan and that, ironically, are moralistically antimoralizing about the proper use of American power.

The partisanship is baldly evident throughout the study: Republican Presidents Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan, and George Bush always got it right, while Democrats Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton never did. To be sure, some of the isolationists that Lefever attacks are presumably Republicans, while some of the realists he cites could work with Democrats. But blatant partisanship leads Lefever into a thicket of dubious historical judgments.

Thus, to a reasonably dispassionate historian the realism that Lefever embraces might appear at least as responsible for setbacks to American policy as the liberalism he denounces. But our author's partisanship forces him into a grossly one-sided account of events. For example, multilateralism is recommended by "doctrinaire idealists" while only a few pages later embargoes that are unilateral and fail to engage the community of nations are called self-defeating (p. 143 vs. p. 151). Or again, although President Dwight Eisenhower and the CIA were wise to back the shah's "principled pragmatism" in the 1953 coup, eventually his was a "tragic fate" because of "the mischief of American (that is, Carter's) moralism" (pp. 93ff). Similarly, Vietnam was a set-back for the United States, but its good intentions and courage were undermined by "global meliorists" (pp. 105ff, 139, 141).

Moreover, how solid are the grounds for Lefever's antimoralizing moralism? Not only does he completely overlook the benefits the United States gained from the democratization of Japan and Germany under American auspices after 1945, but his account of his favorite president, Ronald Reagan, is simply bizarre, for who has better represented modern Wilsonianism and the "liberal crusading" spirit in foreign affairs, both of which Lefever so despises, than Reagan?

Lefever's adamant partisanism makes not only for bad history but also for bad politics. Because he believes that U.S. greatness depends upon a national consensus behind an idea of America that supports a willingness to shoulder its "imperial burden," he is at pains to warn against the "barbarians within the gates" as well as those without. And they are easy to identify: from "the countercultural 60s" to the "multiculturalists" of the 1990s, they are those who would question U.S. greatness and its imperial pretensions (pp. 158ff). As Lefever is a super-patriot—ending his book with citations from the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and Abraham Lincoln, no less—his enemies are as much internal to the United States as they are external. For example, declaring that the "partial paralysis of American power was and still is more dangerous and immoral than the alleged arrogance

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of American power," Lefever calls for "a more cohesive national memory of Vietnam, approximating that of our three victorious wars of this century (World Wars I, II, and Korea)" to exorcise "the Vietnam Syndrome" (pp. 105–7).

For the time being, hypernationalist tracts such as Lefever's probably will have little impact. But such arguments have a staying power likely to resurface in a sterner period, when once again challenges to the nation's vital interests will appear abroad. Then Lefever's writings may be dusted off; the warning that the country needs an ideological consensus committed to a leadership role in world affairs will be again heard—and woe to those who may hesitate to agree.

TONY SMITH
Tufts University

How to Be a Cheap Hawk: The 1999 and 2000 Defense Budgets *by Michael O'Hanlon. Washington, DC, Brookings Publications, 1998. 178 pp. Paper, $16.95.*

This is an excellent book, first and foremost for being as trim and efficient as the Pentagon force structure it proposes. It runs only 172 pages (34 of which contain well organized tables and figures) but manages a comprehensive discussion of the defense budget, including recommended adjustments to Trident missile loads, Commanche and Raptor production runs, the U. S. Marine Corps presence in Okinawa, military pay, navy deployment procedure, and a variety of other components of force structure and philosophy. It begins with a clear, concise argument that fiscal realities will leave the force planned by the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review significantly underfunded, then proceeds to examine force structure, acquisition, and readiness issues, systematically combining informed analysis and prescription. In the chapter on readiness, for example, the author reviews the data on operations and maintenance expenditures per active duty member of the military and explains not only how the numbers have changed but how the accounting has changed (for example, jet engines have moved from procurement to O and M). He then proceeds to argue for a substantial reduction in the Army National Guard. Finally, the book succeeds in moving smoothly from the big picture (proposing a Desert Storm plus Desert Shield plus Bosnia force capability to replace the current two regional war force) to the details (arguing for significant and rapid expansion of military day care, for example).

The title may be a bit awkward, partly because it recalls the campaign of the military reformers of the Reagan buildup years, when the defense budget was expanding by double digit percentages. But it does convey the author's quest for a kind of middle ground. On doctrine, for example, the author downplays the revolution in military affairs by characterizing it as an ongoing evolution, but elsewhere he emphasizes the potency of modern airpower (more than even the Pentagon currently does), ultimately settling on an acquisition recommendation of "rapid incrementalism." But the middle ground is presumably a no man's land, and one can easily imagine that the author's thoughtful and cross-cutting recommendations perturb virtually every constituency in the defense realm. The Marines will undoubtedly be troubled by his proposed cut of 13,000 personnel, the navy will be outraged by his proposal of only eight carrier battle groups, the air force will object to his preference for Tomahawks over more B2's, the new disarmament lobby will be upset that nuclear weapons remain prominent, arms controllers will be irked by his conditional support for

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national missile defenses, and the NATO European allies will hardly embrace his instruction to increase spending by 50 billion dollars over the next five to seven years for a genuine power projection capability.

The book has its imperfections to be sure; one of the charts (3-1) confuses the reader with a column that simultaneously states "suggested alternative" and "suggested cuts"; the second should be ignored; he goes on to give the number nine for Trident subs when the text gives the number ten. But these are tiny glitches. A more substantial difficulty with the book is that it's argumentation is so often based on reassuring rules of thumb (for example, force to space ratios) and probabilities (the chemical threat in Korea is "significant . . . but unlikely to be the determining factor" p. 68). The author regularly includes insurance margins in his recommended force levels, but the discussion consistently seems to assume a minimum of friction and fog of war. Contrary to the muddy picture of the Gulf War that has emerged from recent books like *The Generals' War* by Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor, O'Hanlon extrapolates the data on the Gulf War to show that "500 US attack aircraft could probably destroy 1000 moving enemy vehicles per 24 hour period" (p. 56). On a more political level, military planners might legitimately discount the author's generalization that "in true emergencies, most allies will in the end come through" (p. 81). Consider Suez. Indeed, in his discussion discounting the possibility of simultaneous regional wars, the author refers to theorist Geoffrey Blainey to emphasize the difference between crisis and war, but the same theorist has also highlighted the pattern of fishermen casting their nets while waterbirds fight (for example, Budapest during Suez). In so many ways—providing information, offering thoughtful prescriptions, and generating controversy—this is a lot of book for the buck.

RANDY WILLOUGHBY
University of San Diego

Stealing the State: Control and Collapse in Soviet Institutions *by Steven L. Solnick. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1998. 337 pp. $49.95.*

When the Soviet Union collapsed, it left many pondering why a regime that made Russia a superpower did not survive a reform initiated when all major institutions of administrative and political control were seemingly intact and when economic conditions, while causing serious concerns, were anything but threatening the existence of the state. The strand of research that ensued produced a number of explanations, ranging from a failure of a command economy to support international ambitions of the country's leadership and at the same time maintain acceptable living standards of the population, to growing popular discontent that burst out when the lid of totalitarian control over the Soviet society was even slightly opened.

Steven Solnick explores another theory: the system was destroyed from within by opportunistic bureaucracy that participated en masse in stealing the state, instead of reforming it. While this diagnosis was known earlier, Solnick is the first to systematically pursue and convincingly corroborate it by employing modern tools of neoinstitutional approach and by testing his hypotheses against well-organized sets of empirical evidences.

The formal framework of Solnick's analysis is the agency relationship within a hierarchy, where mid- and lower-level bureaucrats (agents) interact with top leadership (principals).

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Behavior of agents is driven by prevailing ideologies and incentives, ability of the principals to punish offenders, opportunities to exploit informational asymmetries, access to assets that hold their value outside of the hierarchy, etc. Solnick pieces these factors together to study the transformation of the devoted and obedient cogs-in-the-wheel that formed the cornerstone of the Stalinist state machinery into self-interest players pursuing their personal agendas by preying on the ailing command-administrative system. In the words of Russian economist Victor Bogachev, when engineer Anisimov gave way to engineer Pronchatov (Russian literacy characters that exemplify the trend), the system was doomed. Solnick explains this process in details, stressing inter alia the bank-run phenomenon: when the incidence of predatory behavior grows, it makes others follow suit, and the hierarchy unravels in a chain reaction.

To test his theory of institutional change in the Soviet Union, Solnick considers at length three case studies—the *Komsomol*, an official political organization of Soviet youth; the *raspredelenie*, a job assignment system for university graduates; and the *prizyv*, universal military conscription. The choice of these case studies is not entirely convincing. After all, none of these institutions played as important a role as the machinery of state administration and economic planning, or the apparatus of the Communist party. But the cases are all centered around the common theme of youth mobilization in the USSR, and as such are important for understanding the dynamics of Soviet institutions.

The case studies, which form a bulk of the volume, are well documented with original sources ranging from official transcripts to youth underground; and this makes the book useful reading for those interested in youth sociology. But perhaps more importantly, the methodology developed in the book offers a unifying analytical framework with a strong explanatory power, which reveals the common institutional underpinnings and systemic trends behind the relatively narrow phenomenon.

Steven Solnick has succeeded in his attempt to apply the formal theory of neo-institutionalism to the analysis of one of the most dramatic events of the century. On occasions he seems to be excessively meticulous. For example, one of Solnick's hypotheses, subject to verification later in the book, is that "punishment of offenders will retard disintegration, while acquiescence will accelerate the level of changes" (p. 38). Still, the book should be commended as evidence that even the most bizarre and idiosyncratic events can be explained and understood on universal premises of bounded rationality and institutional change.

LEONID POLISHCHUK
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Without Warning: Threat Assessment, Intelligence, and Global Struggle *by Mikhail A. Alexseev. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1997. 348 pp. $45.00.*

Because nations engaged in global struggles often badly err in estimating the strength of their adversaries, world politics can change rapidly and without warning. This is the thesis of Mikhail Alexseev's interesting but sometimes awkward book. For cases he examines the Mongol challenge to the Chin and Sung empires at the beginning of the thirteenth century, the French bid for hegemony after the French Revolution (only Britain is seen as the defender, which obviously does not do justice to the historical record), and the end of the cold

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war. The first case is almost completely unknown to political scientists, and so any analysis of it is welcomed, and the author brings to the third the interesting perspective of having been a Soviet journalist at the time.

Alexseev argues that far from the parties having understood the situation in the same way—the common knowledge assumption often made in game theory—they inhabited different intellectual and perceptual worlds and measured threats and opportunities by quite different yardsticks. Basically, defenders looked at capabilities, often in a quite mechanistic fashion, whereas challengers scrutinized intentions, resolve, discipline, and political vulnerabilities. Thus the Chin and Sung leaders were confident they could defeat the Mongols while the latter, fully appreciating that their armies were outnumbered, believed that their superior unity and discipline, combined with the defenders' political weaknesses, would allow them to prevail. The French similarly counted on their ideology both to mobilize unprecedented numbers of soldiers and to undermine their adversaries, who at least initially calculated the military balance in more conventional terms. As a result, the defenders were surprised by the challengers' aggressiveness and ability to overturn the status quo. In the case of the end of the cold war, the Americans overestimated Soviet strength by concentrating on military capabilities, whereas at the start of the Reagan administration the USSR was unduly alarmed because it placed excessive credence in Reagan's disturbing rhetoric. The argument is interesting but not without difficulties.

The discussion of competing theories of international relations in the first chapter is amateurish, although fortunately it is irrelevant to most that follows. While the claim that global adversaries often see the situation quite differently is plausible, this may be true as well for rivals engaging in less titanic struggles. It is also not clear how well Alexseev's generalizations will hold up in other cases of global challenge. For example, in the 1930s Great Britain paid a great deal of attention to German intentions as well as to capabilities. The author's understanding of the end of the cold war is also problematic, although he gives us much interesting information about intelligence reports. I think his claim that the reassuring Scowcroft report on ICBM vulnerability greatly reduced the Reagan administration's fears of Soviet military power is not only misleading but indicates a general weakness in his analysis. He incorrectly equates the state's perceptions of the other side with formal intelligence and overestimates the context in which intelligence drives policy rather than the reverse being the case. Thus I believe the Scowcroft report was largely a political document designed to allow the administration to proceed with its desired defense policies. At many points in the cold war, American intelligence was influenced at least as much by the American political climate as by evidence of Soviet activities. Alexseev discusses these influences but dismisses them too quickly.

Even with its shortcomings, *Without Warning* teaches the valuable lesson that states differently positioned or of different types may well not only reach different conclusions, but look at quite different indicators.

ROBERT JERVIS
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Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power *by Anatol Lieven. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1998. 436 pp. $35.00.*

The full story of Russia's two-year war with Chechnya, 1994-1996, has yet to be told. Nevertheless, Anatol Lieven, a journalist with significant experience in Chechnya, is keenly insightful as to the probable causes of that ill-conceived conflict. More importantly, his book sets Russia's defeat at the hands of the Chechen separatists in the larger context of the socio-

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economic and political ills besetting the Russian state and society today. The author's vivid descriptions and scholarly analysis are both fascinating and highly informative. The unusual combination of eyewitness account and solid theoretical grounding in comparative approaches and nationalities studies make Anatol Lieven's work stand out against most other books that try to explain Russia's de facto defeat in Chechnya.

The book is divided into three parts, which may be read separately. The first consists of an account of the author's personal experiences in Chechnya. While many writers might be tempted to make grand generalizations based on personal observations, Anatol Lieven is careful to note the subjective nature of his descriptions. The author enjoyed unusual entree into Chechen rebel and Russian security circles. Moreover, as the author points out, being bombed does yield certain special insights. The careful reader will certainly benefit from Lieven's vivid depictions of life in Grozny at the height of the conflict.

The second section of the book examines the roots of Russia's defeat in Chechnya, not from the perspective of the Chechens' strength but the Russians' sociocultural, political, economic, and military weakness. Part II is so far ranging and inclusive that it is easy to lose sight of the book's focus—the Chechen war as the "tombstone of Russian power." Indeed, this section would provide enough fodder for three more volumes of comparable length. However, Part II places the Chechen conflict in comparative perspective with other national conflicts in history. The author's treatment of the Cossack revival in postcommunist Russia as a manifestation of Russian paramilitary nationalism is intriguing if not entirely salient.

The third section of the book focuses on the strength of nationalism, Sufi Islam, and clan loyalties in Chechnya. Clearly, the Chechen fighters were inferior in terms of military equipment and training compared to their Russian adversaries. The author traces Chechen superiority to its social and cultural origins. Unfortunately, Anatol Lieven's pro-Chechen bias becomes intrusive, his analysis often descending to the level of Chechen warrior as noble savage: "Achilles with a rocket-propelled grenade" (p. 329). Despite such overwrought descriptions, the author's analysis is generally well informed and based on solid research. Endnotes are extensive, and his bibliography is helpful to both generalist and specialist.

The author's concluding chapter is disappointing, because he falls into the familiar trap of attempting to predict Russia's future—the likelihood of Russian socioeconomic and political stability in the foreseeable future, as well as the potential danger to European order caused by resurgent Russian nationalism. Lieven's analysis is strongest in noting the absence of any unifying ideology in contemporary Russia. Moreover, he looks to the decline of the British empire and British identity, and the rise of Turkish ethnic nationalism under Ataturk as possible models for the future development of a Russian sense of ethnic identity. However, the author does not explore these cases in any depth. The issue of future stability in the European order is left largely unaddressed except to note that history has not ended and globalization is likely to affect all of us in a not so pleasant way. Surely the author could have drawn together the many strands of his work in a more satisfying manner than by suggesting new analytical directions but not pursuing them in any meaningful way. Despite these shortcomings, Lieven's latest book provides one of the most thorough surveys of the origins of the current crises affecting Russia. Certainly, Russia's failure in Chechnya was symptomatic of a systemic failure when the country was confronted with the determined resistance of ethnic nationalism. Ultimately, Lieven's work teaches a much larger lesson for the ages.

LAURA V. SWARTZ
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The Enigma of 1989: The USSR and the Liberation of Eastern Europe *by Jacques Levesque. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1997. 257 pp. Cloth, $35.00; paper, $29.95.*

With the benefit of some hindsight, scholars now have the opportunity to assess the truly historic events that occurred at the end of the last decade in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Perhaps one of the more intriguing phenomena relates to the enigma of the behavior of the Soviet leadership vis-à-vis Eastern Europe in the crucial year of 1989, or the surprising permissiveness of the Soviet Union, especially when considering the strategic importance of the region to the USSR. This permissiveness allowed for the fundamental transformation to take place peacefully, which led to the unraveling of the communist regimes there and ultimately the demise of the Soviet Union itself.

In this impressive work, Jacques Levesque argues that the explanation for Soviet permissiveness lies with the transformation of the Soviet world view in the 1980s, combined with traditional Leninist political form. Together these features defined the ideology of transition, which included the social democratization of the Soviet political elite, in particular the acceptance that: socialism could be achieved through democratic means; political pluralism imbued with Western values was not incompatible with Leninism; violence was to be avoided to achieve socialism. This shift to the ideology of transition was itself caused by a variety of factors, especially attaining strategic parity with the United States, the fundamental reevaluation of the party's role in the face of economic stagnation, and the existence of successful social democratic models in Europe.

Yet the form this social democratization took reflected the nature of Leninism or the "genetic code of Gorbachev's pattern of behavior" (p. 18). This involved the tendency for Leninist regimes to give primacy to politics in all matters, to promote heroic deeds, and to emphasize permanent struggle to obtain developmental ends. Yet this synthesis between social democratic substance and Leninist form led to contradictions within the ideology of transition, causing the Soviet leadership to seriously misjudge events in Eastern Europe.

Through this prism the Soviet leadership under Mikhail Gorbachev viewed the changes in Eastern Europe. Indeed the changes, when they did occur there, were perceived as an acceptable means to achieve socialism. It was always assumed that socialism would be triumphant in Eastern Europe (perhaps with the exception of Poland) albeit now through peaceful democratic transition. Political opposition and competition were now seen as acceptable political means to achieve socialism in true Leninist form. This explains why the Soviet leadership allowed the events of 1989 to take place.

Although a truly impressive work, there is one minor conceptual matter: the single most important variable the author employs to explain the shift in Soviet approaches to Eastern Europe—the social democratization of the Soviet leadership—is never defined. Other than some reference to the acceptance of pluralism and political competition, there is little in the way of what defines this all important process. Clearly there were differences in the extent to which various communist parties had social democratized themselves in 1989. The process that occurred in the Soviet Union was qualitatively different from, for instance, the Hungarian party which arguably was far more social democratized in 1989 than the CPSU. This is not merely a definitional point; without knowing what the author means by social democratization, it is difficult to judge the extent to which the Soviet leadership had social-democratized itself or not; it's no small problem if the bulk of the argument hinges on this concept.

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Nonetheless, this book is an invaluable resource for those who wish to make sense of one of the greatest political sea-changes in world history.

JOHN T. ISHIYAMA
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Deng: A Political Biography *by Benjamin Yang. Armonk, NY, M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1997. 360 pp. Cloth, $59.95; paper, $21.95.*

Deng Xiaoping's death in 1997 marked the end of Communist China's second era, as Mao Zedong's demise in 1976 demarcated its first. The two men were vastly different, both in appearance and ideology. Mao, robust and charismatic, was the architect of the Chinese revolution. When faced with a choice between equality and prosperity, he tended to opt for equality. Deng, diminutive and retiring, is credited with rejuvenating the stagnant economy that characterized China in the mid-1970s. His preference was decidedly for prosperity over equality. While Deng's reforms arguably prolonged the rule of the Communist party, they did so by removing the ideological underpinning of its legitimacy: "socialism with Chinese characteristics" strikes outside observers as thinly disguised market capitalism. The contradictions—to use one of Mao's favorite terms—created by these policies may prove the undoing of the party, as opponents of his policies pointed out long ago. Others criticize Deng for failing to link his economic reforms with political reforms.

Benjamin Yang's study examines Deng and his policies against the broad background of Chinese history and culture. Nothing in his early years suggested that Deng would one day be his country's paramount leader. Less than five feet tall, he was plain in appearance, an indifferent student, and no orator. Although Deng studied and worked in France for four years and in the Soviet Union for another year, he learned neither French nor Russian. He was a trend-chaser rather than a path-breaker. Unlike Mao who, despite his public contempt for intellectuals, read voraciously and thought hard about doctrine, Deng apparently was never deeply committed to Marxist-Leninist precepts. As Yang points out, this made it much easier for him to shake them off when practice indicated that the precepts were not producing the desired results.

Deng followed Mao from 1935 through the 1950s and was promoted into the central leadership. After the failure of the visionary but disastrous Great Leap Forward of 1958, says Yang, Deng's respect for Mao's power was tinged with deepening contempt for his mentor's benighted policies. He was by no means the sole creator of the post-Mao "revolution of the revolution," but simply swam with the tide of reformist upsurge in the 1980s, which Mao had held back for thirty years. His success reflected no deep knowledge of economics or of military affairs: the author portrays a man who knew a little about many things but was an expert in only one—politics. Deng proved himself a master manipulator of personal relationships and organizational power, and that was all that was needed.

Deng was an avid bridge player which, says Yang, gives insight into the man: a few cards, good or bad, are received by chance; a few quick ideas are generated to deliver the cards. Hopefully, one receives a bit of cooperation from one's partner and can occasionally finesse one's opponents. Win or lose, one goes on to the next game. The author also sees his subject as a practitioner of Taoism, whose many aphorisms included such advice as "inaction is the best action," "governing a large state is like cooking a little fish," and "the greatest way is the unspoken way."

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In his prologue, Yang advises that his topic will of necessity not be easy reading. Happily, I found the book fascinating, though most—myself included—will be bothered by the frequent use of exclamation points. Despite frequently chiding Western authors for making too much of unverified crumbs of information, Yang falls victim to the Chinese equivalent thereof: reporting unverified gossip as proof while offering no corroborating information. While the general reader will be little bothered by whether Deng was or was not at a meeting in Wuhan at the time of the Tiananmen incident, or whether a particular current leader is or is not Deng's unacknowledged son, other statements are potentially dangerously misleading. For example, to state that Marshal Lin Biao planned in 1971 to occupy Guangzhou as a base from which to confront Mao in Beijing is to treat as fact something never verified and quite shocking. Still, this is as objective a biography of Deng as we are apt to get.

JUNE TEUFEL DREYER
University of Miami

Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea *by Leon D. Sigal. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1998. 288 pp. $29.75.*

Among the works published in Korean and English on the 1994 nuclear crisis between the United States and the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea (DPRK), this book is the most authoritative and comprehensive account. Utilizing extensive interviews and daily newspaper coverage, Leon Sigal meticulously pieces together the story of how the United States resolved a critical post-cold war case of nonproliferation, but not without almost going to war. The irony if the latter outcome had obtained, Sigal argues, is that war would have been unnecessary. Although the author is ambiguous on the North's initial intentions regarding its facilities at Yongbyon, he contends that Pyongyang was later willing to negotiate away its nuclear weapons-prone gas graphite reactors for more modern, proliferation-resistant designs and a new relationship with the United States. Moreover, it undertook a subtle strategy of conditional reciprocity, "floating compromises on a sea of threats" (p. 231) to achieve this goal. For a variety of reasons related to misperception, domestic electoral cycles, bureaucratic politics, and alliance mismanagement, the United States only recognized this opportunity to defuse the crisis after coercive diplomacy failed and after a personal intervention by former president Jimmy Carter.

Disarming Strangers is less theoretically rigorous than other recent books dealing with Asia in Princeton's International History and Politics series. Passing references to game theory and the tit-for-tat literature do not suffice as the book's overarching analytical framework. Nevertheless, Sigal's richly detailed process-tracing of the nuclear negotiations offers useful illustrations of how a concatenation of different conceptual factors put the United States and the DPRK on a collision course in early 1994. For example, preexisting images of the North as a rogue regime informed Western assumptions that coercion was the only way to deal with the North's nuclear ambitions. Cognitive biases also caused U.S. officials and the media to completely dismiss as aberrant North Korean conciliatory proposals for a deal in 1992, the contents of which in essence would form the basis of the Agreed Framework two years later.

Although U.S. dialogue with the North resulted in episodic cooperation in 1992–1993, the dominant policy template remained coercion, because senior administration officials

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had neither the time nor inclination to undertake a wholesale interagency review of Korea strategy. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) similarly preferred coercing the North, for any negotiated compromise undercut the legitimacy and authority of the body. Informing all of these participants about the DPRK were intelligence organs motivated to avoid the embarrassingly failed assessments experienced just prior to Iraq. These factors precipitated a game of deadlock that culminated with the U.S. mobilization for sanctions in June 1994.

Sigal's account of how the United States and DPRK reached compromise in October 1994 after stepping so close to the brink is interesting for the empirical details (for example, the White House's reactions to Carter's intervention). But a more systematic focus on what this case teaches regarding the overall strategy of engagement—one of the most overused and understudied terms in post-cold war international relations—might have been useful. For example, as the Korea case shows, engagement is not appeasement by the weak but a proactive strategy chosen by the strong. It is a long-term policy that requires the initiator to have the patience and domestic support to sustain unrequited rounds of cooperation. Inducements are initially more expensive than threats, but if those threats require fulfilling, the discounted cost of engagement is cheaper than coercion. Inducements seek robust rather than episodic cooperation from the target state by transforming the target's preferences rather than imposing mere material constraints on behavior.

Finally, successful engagement in the post-cold war era requires the United States to accept certain new beliefs. Among these is that American leadership can be exercised by having others cooperate with its promises rather than just bow to its threats. The more productive way to view proliferation and countries like North Korea is not through value-laden, cold war-type lenses as pariahs but as "problems" that require pragmatic solutions. Sigal raises some of these points at discrete moments in the text, but because of the centrality of the engagement concept to his case, he might have done better to cull them together in a larger, coherent conceptual discussion. The author's intentions may not have been theoretical but rather to provide a comprehensive account that undercuts the conventional and largely uninformed wisdom of this complicated crisis. On these grounds, Sigal succeeds quite well.

VICTOR D. CHA
Georgetown University

Battling Western Imperialism: Mao, Stalin, and the United States *by Michael M. Sheng. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1998. 272 pp. $39.95.*

This is an ambitious and in some respects valuable book. Michael Sheng tackles key questions pertaining to the development of the communist movement in China and strives to stake out his own distinctive interpretation. The author's thesis is straightforward. He challenges those who would stress the importance of nationalism in Mao Zedong's thought during the 1930s and 1940s. Rather than national interest, Mao was guided by the ideology of proletarian internationalism, which put close alliance with and support of the Soviet Union at the center of his strategic vision. This assumption not only fostered a shared outlook between Mao and the Soviet leader, Josef Stalin, it also affected the tactical choices made within that shared framework. Sheng contends that Mao "religiously" followed Stalin: ". . . when Stalin speaks, Mao listens and complies, willingly or not" (p. 124).

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This thesis informs Sheng's detailed discussion of major events in the history of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) from 1935 to 1949, such as the decision to call for a united front, the Xi'an Incident, the CCP's wartime dalliances with the United States, the struggle for Manchuria, and the Marshall mission. Sheng concludes that because Mao followed Stalin's correct advice and moderate counsel the CCP was successful. Without such counsel the Chinese leader ran amuck. After Stalin died, we are told, "Mao's grandiosity and megalomania were set loose, and his personality cult ruined the CCP in the process of the Great Leap Forward, and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" (p. 32).

This thesis appears to return to assertions of the 1950s regarding close ties between the CCP and Moscow. However, in contrast to earlier works, Sheng's argument is empirically based. It draws from the informative biographies, memoirs, and histories published in China since the mid-1980s. Although these materials are no substitute for access to unvetted archival data, they furnish a storehouse of information that over the past decade has changed the way scholars look at certain aspects of CCP-Soviet and CCP-American relations in the period before 1949. They provide much information that was previously unknown and furnish additional, even contradictory, data on other issues. Unfortunately, Sheng relies almost exclusively on these documents and offers little assessment of their reliability or the ways in which they complement/contradict other materials. Still, the study makes an important contribution by making these data available to a wider community of scholars.

Sheng is less successful in contributing to an understanding of the meaning and significance of such material. He takes on big questions. Yet, they are also questions that have been discussed before. One example is the role of ideology in CCP foreign policy. This has been extensively debated along a number of axes, and it is disappointing that Sheng barely addresses this large literature. The result is a discussion that either begs or ignores central questions.

It is difficult to accept Sheng's view of the sharp polarity in the policy dispositions of Mao and Stalin and of Mao's reliance on the Soviet leader for policy guidance. Certainly the two had a common world outlook, and Mao had enormous admiration for the Soviet leader. However, Sheng still lacks the data to claim near-total obeisance. To substantiate such an assertion requires more information about critical junctures and a greater sense of the intensity with which each leader held and/or asserted his views.

Sheng's analysis also suffers from his determination to stake out a distinctive perspective. As with his discussion of ideology, his historical presentation takes little account of previous studies of the events and issues at the core of this book. Although some of these studies are listed in the bibliography, they are either sparsely used or not used at all in the book's arguments. The few secondary works that are cited are criticized to demonstrate the author's originality. Unfortunately, these sometime turn out to be straw men, as the view being critiqued constitutes only a part of the body of literature on the subject. Some aspects of Sheng's argument are consistent with and do not contradict earlier scholarship.

The strength of this work is that it presents in a clear and intelligently argued manner a considerable amount of information from the Chinese side about critical junctures in the development of the communist movement. However, Sheng's tendency to ignore, rather than to build upon, a considerable body of previous scholarship makes it difficult for the reader to assess not only the significance, uniqueness, and reliability of these materials but also the novel elements in his own interpretation of the events they report.

STEVEN M. GOLDSTEIN
Smith College

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Building Democracy in Latin America *by John Peeler. Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998. 239 pp. Cloth, $55.00; paper, $19.95.*

This is a very good book that pulls together many strands in the recent literature on Latin America. Many edited volumes are either broader in scope or more detailed in their analysis. However, the single authorship of this book makes for a more tightly presented and better-organized discussion. This book will probably stand for some time as the best introduction to Latin America's complex experience with democracy.

Building Democracy in Latin America can be divided into three distinct parts. A first part consists of two chapters. One provides a survey of philosophical debates on the meaning of democracy. Another introduces some basic actors and themes from Latin American history—caudillos, liberals, centralism, constitutions, corporatism—that provide an essential backdrop to the discussion of twentieth-century politics.

A second part consists of three chapters in which Peeler offers a careful comparative analysis of the variable success of Latin American countries in attaining and maintaining democracy. One chapter studies the trajectory of cases with the longest democratic experience: Costa Rica, Venezuela, Colombia (with some caveats), Chile, and Uruguay. The divergent paths followed by these five cases in the 1970s is duly noted and analyzed. A second chapter studies the recent wave of democratization, covering the 1978-1997 period. Here a total of fourteen cases are studied. The analysis is less detailed than in the previous chapter, focusing primarily on the extent to which pacts and foreign influences shaped the transitions. A third chapter considers the failed cases: Paraguay, Mexico, and Cuba. The discussion is fairly detailed, stressing reasons why these countries have not had transitions to democracy. These three chapters are the heart of the book, focusing broadly on Latin America's experience with democracy throughout the twentieth century.

The third part of the book moves fully into the 1980s and 1990s. One chapter focuses on economic issues, stressing the variable response to the crisis of the old import substitution industrialization model and the impact of neoliberal reforms on democracy. Another chapter discusses the institutions of current democracies, emphasizing parties and party systems. These two chapters consider the region as a whole, aiming primarily at uncovering significant differences among nearly twenty cases. Finally, a conclusion restates some of the main points made throughout the book.

The merits of this book notwithstanding, I would make two main criticisms—one theoretical, the other methodological. First, Peeler states that he is adopting a structure/agency framework. But when he seeks to draw conclusions from his comparative analysis, he simply states that existing frameworks that focus on either elite choices, economic and social structure, or foreign pressures, are inadequate. If this is so, then Peeler should have shown how his alternative framework provides a better explanation. But in this regard Peeler has very little to offer. There are a number of ways in which Peeler might have sought to integrate an emphasis on both structure and agency. Yet nothing along these lines is pursued. In short, this book is fairly weak inasmuch as theory building is concerned.

The other main weakness is methodological. The discussion throughout the book is organized around cases that have been more or less successful at attaining and maintaining democracy. These distinctions are systemically formulated. Indeed, Peeler is very clear about how his cases vary along his dependent variable. However, while different chapters provide information on different explanatory variables, at no time does Peeler bring his various arguments together and attempt an overall analysis. We are left with a number of suggestive

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insights. But just as we are not offered an overall theory of democratization, we are also not offered a systematic testing of the purported elements of such a theory.

GERARDO L. MUNCK
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China's Transition *by Andrew J. Nathan. New York, Columbia University Press, 1997. 313 pp. $27.50.*

One of the most intriguing questions scholars have been asking about China is how much its political system has evolved since the end of the Maoist regime in the late 1970s. Has the country's rapid economic development in the last two decades improved the political fundamentals for democratic transition? Is there evidence that the underlying obstacles to democratization are giving away under the pressures of market reform, opening to the outside world, and bottom-up demands for political change?

Few observers have followed China's political transition as closely as Andrew Nathan, whose previous works, such as *Chinese Democracy* (1985) and *China in Crisis* (1990), are standard texts on the topic of democracy and democratization in China. Nathan's latest volume on Chinese democracy, *China's Transition*, contains fifteen essays and articles he has written or co-authored in recent years and published in journals like *World Politics, Journal of Contemporary China,* and *The Washington Quarterly.*

Although Nathan's essays cover a wide range of topics that touch on the politics of mainland China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, he is chiefly concerned with the underlying changes in Chinese political institutions and values. On China's institutional changes, Nathan's essays do not seem to convey excessive optimism. One essay (Chapter 5) explores various factors that contributed to the persistent failure of democracy and democratic movements in modern China. Another (Chapter 15) cautiously speculates on various possible constitutional reforms China might undertake in transforming its political system. Nathan's prescriptions include enhancing the National People's Congress, strengthening the electoral processes, and increasing the independence of the judiciary. He regards these proposed changes as essentially conservative and may possibly help the Chinese regime in averting a political catastrophe caused by stagnation.

The most important contribution of *China's Transition* is its findings on China's changing political culture that are reported in two chapters Nathan co-authored with Tianjian Shi of Duke University (Chapters 11 and 12). Relying on survey data collected in 1990, Nathan and Shi attempt to ascertain whether Chinese political culture is antidemocratic.

Nathan's analysis of the survey data suggests that China's culture is "distinctive, but only distributionally, not categorically" (p. 172). This conclusion is arrived at by adopting the same methodology used in Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba's *Civic Culture* and comparing the results of the Chinese survey with those reported in *Civic Culture.* Specifically, Nathan's study shows that Chinese respondents scored lower on indices measuring political efficacy, tolerance, and perception of the impact of the government. Although Nathan acknowledges that his findings suggest some potential difficulties for democratization in China, he is quick to reject the notion that Chinese political culture is inherently hostile to democratic values for two reasons. First, the measured attitudinal difference between China and the countries sampled in *Civic Culture* (such as the United States, Italy, and Mexico)

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is not very large. Second, such differences are likely to become narrower as the level of education of the Chinese population rises with economic modernization. Indeed, Nathan provides some tentative evidence for cautious optimism. Analysis of the same survey data, reported in Chapter 12, indicates that ideological changes in China are closely related to the formation of interest-based cleavages. The more liberal elements in Chinese society tend to be more educated and have received more benefits from the reform, while the more conservative elements are less educated and appear to have suffered under the reform. These cleavages, Nathan contends, may form the political basis of a party system capable of sustaining democratic politics in the future.

Such rich, thoughtful, and rigorous analysis makes *China's Transition* an important book in the study of contemporary Chinese politics. It represents a remarkable methodological achievement that should be the envy of all students of Chinese politics.

MINXIN PEI
Princeton University

From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role *by Fareed Zakaria. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1998. 216 pp. $29.95.*

Current debates over American grand strategy center on conflicting views about the geopolitical consequences of the Soviet Union's collapse and the emergence of new powers in Europe and Asia. Will a united Germany pursue an expansionist foreign policy? Will China seek to convert its enormous economic potential into international influence? These are big and important questions, and analysts pondering them would be well advised to read Fareed Zakaria's stimulating and thoughtful study of the rise of another power in another time—America in the age of empire.

Why, Zakaria asks, do some rich nations turn their wealth into power while others do not? The answer, he argues, has a great deal to do with how authority to make decisions is organized within states. Working within the realist tradition, Zakaria advances a statist model of foreign policy making. In this model, the state's capacity to extract resources from society is the critical force propelling rising nations into "great powerdom." Nations with a strong state structure are more apt to realize their geopolitical potential than those in which the authority to make foreign policy is divided and dispersed.

To test the argument, Zakaria reviews the record of American diplomacy between the Civil War and World War I, examining fifty-four instances in which state officials contemplated expansion. This strategy provides analytic leverage on prominent realist theories. If rich nations routinely convert their wealth into power, as some realists suggest, then how do we explain the fact that the United States, already an economic colossus by the 1880s, acted like a minor power in world affairs? Similarly, if nations expand out of fear and suspicion, as others believe, then how do we explain America's decision in the 1890s to exploit its power in the absence of any serious security threats? The answer to this puzzle, we are told, lies in the American state's increasing autonomy and power.

While the American economy grew spectacularly after the Civil War, the state remained weak and incapable of mobilizing the resources for an active foreign policy. Congress, jealous of its prerogatives, reigned supreme. That changed as the pace of industrialization quickened and the need arose for an extensive regulatory state. Power shifted from the legis-

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lative branch to the executive branch, and from the states to the federal government. Control of the state and its vast resources passed into the hands of expansionist-minded leaders, and American diplomacy grew more ambitious and assertive. William Henry Seward's "expansionist pipe dreams" in the Caribbean and Pacific were transformed into the far-flung informal empire of William McKinley.

Zakaria's study has considerable strengths and deserves to be read by a wide audience. In the end, however, it may raise critical questions it cannot answer. If state power is so crucial in explaining foreign policy, how, for instance, do we explain America's strange inactivity after World War I? The American state in the 1920s, even with its limitations, was still much stronger than it had been in the 1890s. How can a theory that hinges on a secular trend of modernization of the American state explain pendulum swings such as the backlash against executive authority and the foreign policy retrenchment of the 1970s?

Like most realists, Zakaria may draw too sharp a distinction between state and society. Using state capacity in the service of foreign policy depends on politics—that is, on state officials' ability to obtain the support of powerful political and economic interests. When they enjoy such support, as American officials did in the 1890s, the state will have the power to act decisively in foreign affairs. When that support is weak, as it was in the 1870s and again in the 1920s and 1970s, policy making is indecisive and often incoherent. It turns out that state power cannot be so easily divorced from politics. Expansionist-minded leaders cannot be seen as the passive agents of a destiny pre-ordained by the growth of state capacity. Defining the national interest is a process far more political than that.

PETER TRUBOWITZ
University of Texas at Austin

Politics of Illusion: The Bay of Pigs Invasion Reexamined *edited by James G. Blight and Peter Kornbluh. Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998. 284 pp. $49.95.*

Blight and Kornbluh apply the technique they pioneered in several books on the Cuban missile crisis to the earlier Bay of Pigs fiasco. "Critical oral history" (p. 4), as they call it, involves assembling a group of key participants and arranging for a group of scholars to guide their discussions. The inevitable conflict in the way the participants recall the events, together with the scholar's confronting them with available documentary evidence, is designed to ferret out the truth.

The concept is attractive in theory but proves deeply flawed in this case. First, the refusal of the Castro regime to take part because of deteriorating U.S.–Cuban relations in 1996 robs the discussion of a vital perspective. Even more troubling is the way the tendency of the assembled scholars and low-level decision makers to defer to the most distinguished participants—in this case, Author M. Schlesinger, Jr., and to a lesser extent, Wayne S. Smith. Instead of a consensus emerging out of the clash of competing views, the group tends to defer to the version put forward by its most highly respected members. In this case, the deference shown to Schlesinger makes a mockery out of the concept of "critical" oral history.

Another major structural flaw in this volume lies in the make-up of the scholarly contingent. All are respected historians and political scientists, but nearly all share the same ideological perspective—self-proclaimed liberal Democrats who unite in denouncing recent U.S. policy toward Cuba, especially the Helms-Burton Act. The conference badly needed

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more dissenting voices—someone like Stephen Ambrose to defend Eisenhower the way Schlesinger defends Kennedy, or John Lewis Gaddis to give a post-revisionist view of the cold war context of the Bay of Pigs, or a military historian such as Trumbull Higgins to offer an objective strategic analysis.

The book does have a few redeeming features. Rafael Quintero and Alfredo G. Duran [Dura'n] speak movingly as survivors of Brigade 2506, and Lino B. Fernandez [Ferna'ndez] and the late Enrigue A. Baloyra offer fascinating insights into the internal Cuban resistance. The last two are particularly enlightening on a key historical point—the naive CIA expectation that the landing at the Bay of Pigs would spark a massive uprising of the Cuban people to topple Fidel Castro. They point out that the resistance, centered in the Escambray Mountains, consisted of only a few thousand (their estimate is 2 percent of the Cuban people), but they believe that the great silent majority of Cubans, as many as 90 percent, were uncommitted, doubtful about Castro, but unwilling to risk their lives in an uprising. The people of Cuba watched events unfold in 1961, and when Castro so easily repulsed the invasion, they reluctantly accepted his rule. So the Bay of Pigs, designed to rally the Cuban people behind a new, American-sponsored democratic government, instead solidified Castro's hold on power. A former Soviet official at the conference confirmed this interpretation, saying that it was not until Castro had proved himself at the Bay of Pigs that the Kremlin began giving him arms and economic aid. Thus the United States only succeeded in creating its worst nightmare, a Soviet ally in Cuba.

The most striking feature of the book is the effort to exonerate John F. Kennedy. Led by Arthur Schlesinger, the American participants and sometimes even the Cubans in attendance look everywhere but the White House in assigning blame for the fiasco. Arthur Schlesinger accuses Eisenhower and Allen Dulles of "trapping" Kennedy by bequeathing him a covert action plan too far along to stop. The favorite scapegoat is the CIA's Richard Bissell. The legendary architect of the U-2 is accused of misleading both his superiors and subordinates, particularly by not passing on to those actually conducting the operation the fact that Kennedy had ruled out any direct use of U.S. armed forces. And the Cubans, as well as the editors, end up blaming John Wayne—the resistance leaders in Cuba as well as members of Brigade 2506 had seen too many movies where Wayne had defeated the enemy singlehandedly. They felt they did not need to do much. Once Brigade 2506 had secured a beachhead at the Bay of Pigs, U.S. forces (including 2000 American Marines aboard ships off the coast of Cuba) would land, rout Castro's army, and lead a triumphal march into Havana.

The only really heated exchange at the conference came when Wayne Smith defended Kennedy's decision to limit the first air strike and call off the second, saying the cancellation was "almost irrelevant" (p. 101). An outraged Jacob Esterline, who directed the operation for the CIA shot back, "When you put men on shore you protect them if you are any kind of man" (p. 102). Later in the conference, during a discussion of Operation Mongoose, Peter Kornbluh finally gathered the courage to challenge Schlesinger's attempt to deny that the Kennedy brothers were obsessed with getting revenge on Castro.

Despite these isolated instances, the only clear voice of dissent comes from Piero Gleijeses, who reminds the others of the simple truth that the Bay of Pigs was a clear-cut case of U.S. aggression against a neighboring state—a violation of international law. Who was responsible for what Trumbull Higgins so aptly labeled "a perfect failure" (in a book that is not cited by the editors)? Not Richard Bissell, not Dwight D. Eisenhower, not Allen Dulles, certainly not the brave Cuban exiles and resistance leaders within Cuba who placed so much faith in their American friends, and not even John Wayne. It was John F. Kennedy, who as president was responsible. As Harry Truman tried to remind all future occupants of the White House,

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"The buck stops here." And unlike his admirers, Kennedy did have the courage and honesty to take full responsibility in a nationally televised speech in April 1961. Unfortunately, he apologized only to the American people for this failure to topple Castro, not to the world community for a flagrant act of aggression. If, as the editors suggest, we should stop looking for one person to blame, then perhaps the real culprit was the centuries-old belief in American omnipotence. Kennedy was acting out of a glaring defect in the American character—the belief that whatever is good for the United States is good for the world or in the words of Senator William Fulbright, one of the few men in Washington who opposed the Bay of Pigs, "the arrogance of power."

The editors express the hope that their book will help lead Castro to relent and send representatives of the Cuban government to a follow-up conference on the Bay of Pigs. Perhaps in an effort to escape the charge of American ethnocentrism, that venture could focus not on the mistakes made by the United States but rather on Castro's masterful moves in thwarting his powerful neighbor. If so, the resulting book could be entitled, *Shining Success*.

ROBERT A. DIVINE
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Constructive Conflicts: From Escalation to Resolution *by Louis Kriesberg. Lanham, MD, Rowman & Littlefield, Inc., 1998, 320 pp. Cloth, $65.00; paper, $24.95.*

We are currently being inundated with new books about ethnic conflict and civil wars. One of our problems is to sort the wheat from the chaff. The author understands that conflict is not necessarily a bad thing and that the status of conflicts changes over time; those two insights alone elevate this book above many others.

Kriesberg summarizes the current state of knowledge about how conflicts emerge, escalate, and decline—an essential task if we are to move forward. He is one of the few people equally at home with the literatures of conflict resolution and international politics, of psychology, sociology, and political science, moving readily back and forth between them. His judgments are insightful and judicious; he is particularly good at avoiding the unrealistic calls for people and governments to change their ways of operation in order to solve problems of conflict.

The book is organized in terms of stages of conflict, although the author notes the potential danger of such a strategy. Each chapter begins by focusing on a few theoretical issues; the relevant literature is summarized, examples are discussed, and suggestions are made. This has the advantage of allowing us to focus on particular sets of literature and their issues at different times, but it also results in something of a laundry list of factors that may influence the development of conflicts.

Kriesberg has produced an impressive statement of where we are now in conflict resolution. Indeed, he may reflect the field a little too well. My major complaint is that the commitment to mediation as a way of avoiding violence limits the analysis in significant ways. There is no discussion of the role of either repression by governments or the use of force by third parties in deescalating conflicts. This is unfortunate since both have sometimes been successful, and probably necessary, and discussions about these issues are high on the agenda of potential interveners. It would be instructive to know what conflicts have been resolved without outside assistance; Colombia in 1958 and Yemen in 1970 come to mind.

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Some discussion of the ethical problems in negotiating settlements would have been helpful; how, for example, would we now regard outsiders who in 1862 helped negotiate an end to the American Civil War, leaving the institution of slavery intact? The role of outsiders in deliberately attempting to transform Germany after World War II by remaking its politics, economics, and culture in a few years with relatively limited resources is ignored. But these omissions probably accurately reflect the condition of the field and do not detract from the worth of this very impressive book.

The writing style is clearly social science professional but good of its kind. The sweep and balance of the analysis make it a good choice for a textbook in a graduate or undergraduate course on conflict resolution, particularly since Rowman and Littlefield was good enough to simultaneously publish paperback and hardcover editions.

ROY LICKLIDER
Rutgers University

War and the Media: A Random Searchlight *by Miles Hudson and John Stanier. New York, New York University Press, 1998. 338 pp. $35.00.*

In the media-hyped age in which we live, this is a timely and perceptive look at the way the people who deliver the news have handled mankind's enduring scourge of war. If it does not break new ground, it surely offers media practitioners, politicians, and the military a sober, balanced view of how all three groups act and interact in war situations.

For American readers a caveat at the outset. The authors are both British, one a former chief of the British Army's general staff and the other a former officer with later service in diplomacy. Understandably, their focus is heavily tilted toward British media and wars involving Great Britain. The U.S. press is given a once over lightly, with only the *New York Times* and *Washington Post* quoted extensively. Nonetheless, the principles and judgments offered are valid in both countries, since both share similar views on what the public ought to know in a democratic society.

As a starting point, the authors pick the Crimean War to illustrate the help that the media can provide to the military, citing the often stinging reports from the front by the *London Times*' special correspondent, William Russell. His revelations of the medical and organizational shortcomings of the British Army forced the British high command into radical changes of an outdated and slumbering military establishment. Needless to say, the high command in any nation is not happy to see its sins exposed, but Hudson and Stanier clearly endorse the watchdog role of the media.

A more difficult problem is wartime censorship. Some measure of control over what is made public about military actions is necessary. The British historically have exercised a light hand on war correspondents, allowing critical reports from the front lines, while providing the media with a list of no-nos that can bring on prosecution if published. But the most obvious means of control is through access. The military decides who will be accredited to report, how they will get to the scenes of action, and how much information will be released on results of action. In geographically restricted conflicts like the British action in the Falklands against Argentina and the American action in Grenada, the military has all but total command of what is reported.

What gets reported from the front, however, is not ultimately what matters. What matters is what gets printed or broadcast, and here Hudson and Stanier make their soundest and

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most critical judgments on modern media. They note that the media are driven ultimately by a commercial interest in attracting and holding the largest possible audience. So the story is shaped to appeal to that audience. If the audience is disinterested or becomes bored, the story is dropped.

This point is made over and over in dealing with the nasty internal conflicts that have afflicted the globe since modern weaponry made World War III all but unthinkable. The tribal wars of Northern Ireland, Somalia, Rwanda, and Yugoslavia have yielded graphic pictures for television audiences, who respond to the horror by demanding that governments do something to end the carnage. This is what television can do. What it can't do, because it can't afford the time and its audience won't provide the attention, is dig deep into the roots of the conflicts, explain the origins and the ambivalent principles involved, as well as the uncertainties in solutions proposed to end the fighting. Modern society can't be bothered with such details.

The authors very properly find it regrettable that TV pictures and commentary often set an international agenda based on illusions of truth and oversimplifications that drive politicians to act unwisely. In a free society, however, they acknowledge we must allow the media, though flawed and hardly infallible, to make its own choices of what to present.

JOHN J. SMEE
Fordham University

The Dynamics of Enduring Rivalries *edited by Paul F. Diehl. Champaign, University of Illinois Press, 1998. 248 pp. Cloth, $49.95; paper, $21.95.*

International conflict and war are among the few areas in international relations that have featured a lengthy history of scientific analysis. The pioneers in the field, including L. F. Richardson and Quincy Wright, broke the path of collecting statistics and generating hypotheses that explained variations in the incidence of war. J. David Singer continued this work in the Correlates of War (COW) project at the University of Michigan. We now have profiles and patterns of war incidence and severity that go back to 1816, but only a few explanatory generalizations that successfully account for variations. The COW project sought to explain the main patterns of warfare by examining systemic variables such as the extent of polarity or numbers of alliances.

The third wave of scholarship on war is based on the view that history and context matter; war is not just a random or isolated event. It takes place within a diplomatic/perceptual/action universe that may be unique to a pair of states. Researchers have labeled these "enduring rivalries," operationalized by six or more militarized disputes occurring over a twenty-year period. Contemporary cases would include India-Pakistan, Greece-Turkey, Ecuador-Peru, and Israel and its neighbors. Almost one-half of all militarized disputes, wars, and violent territorial changes have occurred within the context of such rivalries. Considering that rival pairs of states constitute only a fraction of all possible state dyads, the relative incidence of war in these contexts is extremely high.

This collection of essays brings us up to date on the state of research. The chapters address some critical questions or puzzles about the morphology and dynamics of enduring rivalries: How do domestic political structures and processes impact on interstate rivalry (Jack Levy and Salvatore Ali; John Vasquez)? Are enduring rivalries stable (meaning an

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enduring pattern of conflict) or unstable (Claudio Cioffi-Revilla)? Do the patterns of conflict fit with a "volcano" model of constantly increasing tension and hostility, culminating in an explosion of war and violence (Gary Goerz and the editor)? What kinds of games and strategies evolve during the course of a rivalry (Zeev Maoz and Ben D. Mor)? Do wars within rivalries break out more often within a context of rough military parity, imbalance, or rapidly changing power configuration (Daniel S. Geller)? What are the effects of multiple rivalries and domestic politics on the path to war (John Vasquez)?

The authors provide answers to these and other questions via both statistical and historical analysis. This volume represents both an interim report on the state of knowledge about enduring rivalries and an exploration of unanswered questions. It also points the way to future research. The contributions are models of how scientific and historical analysis can lead to authoritative knowledge and to cumulation, not an insignificant achievement in an era when postmodernism and epistemological narcissism have invaded the field. The collection also demonstrates the real gains that can be achieved by combining quantitative and historical analysis.

Several questions arise from the collection. Given that there has been a marked decline in the incidence of interstate war since 1945, do the patterns and dynamics of rivalries in other eras remain relevant? There may be as many militarized disputes as ever, but fewer of them result in war. Why is this the case? What kinds of constraints operate today that did not exist in earlier eras? Here is an area for further exploration. Most of these studies use systemic or national attributes, as well as rational choice approaches, to help explain the dynamics of enduring rivalries. But what about individuals? International conflict is not just a materialist domain, as most of these studies suggest. Ideas, values, beliefs, and perceptions may be no less important in explaining the origins and development of rivalries. They should be added to the future research agenda.

K. J. Holsti
University of British Columbia

Global Diaspora: An Introduction *by Robin Cohen. Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1997. 228 pp. Cloth, $50.00; paper, $19.95.*

Robin Cohen's book on diasporas reintroduces a concept whose time seems to have come again. Very little recent research on international migration even mentions the term diaspora, and most frequently the concept has been used to delineate what one was not talking about. See, for example, Nina Glick-Schiller, Linda Basch, and Cristina Blanc-Szanton's *Nation Unbound*. Scholars working on globalization also slighted the concept, analyzing economic and other processes transcending the nation state but excluding from analysis forms of sociocultural organization—such as diasporas—that transcend and even predate the state, itself a relatively new form of political organization born about 400 years ago. Recent events, such as religious fundamentalism throughout the world or transnational migrant communities, have made clearer the need for a concept that analyzes communities of national sentiment transcending nation states. Cohen's book offers a timely overview of diasporas. The book is also engagingly written, with Cohen's personal anecdotes adding zing rather than self-indulgence to the analysis.

Cohen's book introduces a series on diasporas, and he provides a topology, an overview of the concept, and a history of cases. He uses the classical notion of diaspora based on the

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Jewish tradition to engage other theory and compile an inclusive list of common features of diasporas, instead of an exclusive definition. This wise strategy enables him to sidestep debates on what is or is not a diaspora, and instead juxtapose many historical experiences that would not make sense to compare using a narrow, exclusive definition. He pursues his analysis through five types of diasporas and two sets of contemporary conditions: "victim" diasporas, such as Jews, Armenians, and Africans; "labor and imperial" diasporas, such as the Indians and British, respectively; "trade" diasporas, such as the Chinese and Lebanese; "cultural" or postmodern diasporas such as those in the Caribbean; relations between diasporas and homelands in the case of Sikhs and Zionists; and diasporas stemming from globalization and the formation of world cities.

Cohen has read widely and synthesizes well, enabling him to draw widely from history without having his analysis become too thin. An interesting chapter analyzes the relation between homelands and their diasporas, comparing the failed case of the Sikh diaspora with the successful case of the Zionists; success is defined by the establishment of a homeland, which highlights the role of the differing dispositions of the international community toward these two projects. He also insightfully discusses the diasporic entanglements of the Israeli state, due in large part to the fact that its creation conflicted with and helped create the Palestinian diaspora.

Cohen's book recalls other recent works on the topic, such as Garbiel Sheffer's *Modern Diasporas in International Politics*, though it is better in presenting a more flexible and problematized definition of diaspora and frame of analysis. Still, there are a few things wanting. One is that despite his wide survey, Cohen does not really discuss contemporary or historical attempts of migrant-sending states to create diasporas out of their emigrant populations for foreign policy reasons. For example, Cohen sees Caribbean diasporas as cultural, mainly residing in hybrid or postmodern identity and cultural practices. Yet these Caribbean states are the site of extremely interesting diasporic experimentation, with Mexico, Colombia, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and other states attempting to cultivate and institutionalize relations with what one Mexican official called their "global nations." Cohen's sin of omission is not damning, given his broad focus, and the thorough and engaging treatment he gives diasporas. We owe him a debt of gratitude for reintroducing this concept and this series of books.

ROBERT C. SMITH
Barnard College, Columbia University

Freedom's Ordeal: The Struggle for Human Rights and Democracy in Post-Soviet States
by Peter Juviler. Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998. 283 pp. $47.50.

Peter Juviler has written a detailed survey of the slow and uneven progress of human rights and democracy in the successor states of the USSR. The author marshals a wide array of published sources and engagingly supplements these with personal experiences and discussions with Russian specialists, accumulated over many years of scholarly visits to the USSR and the Russian Federation. His perspective is liberal-democratic; his assessment is balanced and judicious; his prognosis counsels cautious optimism.

The initial chapters of the book offer a political history of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union pitched around the issue of democracy. Since so much is included here, the

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coverage is necessarily sketchy and sometimes one-sided. The best chapter in this section is that on *perestroika*, which delivers a sympathetic yet critical account of Mikhail Gorbachev's project. But even here the treatment is thin and phenomena central to the book's subject matter—for instance, the emergence of a mass democratic movement and the watershed elections of 1989—receive less attention than might be warranted.

Subsequent chapters, employing Freedom House's classifications, outline developments in the newly independent states (sans Russia). The narrative is informed and provides a wealth of information. Although not all students of the area will accept the author's characterizations—is it meaningful, for example, to label Kyrgyzstan a "near democracy"?—the taxonomy does enable him to compare the experience of the new states with respect to human rights and democracy. Along those lines, we learn that Ukraine, Moldova, and the Baltic States (despite the ethnocracies that have emerged in Estonia and Latvia) lead the pack, while Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan have lapsed into full-scale dictatorship. The other new states fall between those poles, but most are closer to the dictatorial than to the democratic one.

The final three chapters concern Russia and represent the book's real strength. Following a survey of the postindependence conflict between president and parliament, which ended with Boris Yeltsin's 1993 coup d'etat, and of the constitution adopted (or imposed) thereafter, the author reviews developments in a number of issue areas related to human rights and democracy. Whether the proverbial glass is half-empty or half-full would depend here on one's frame of reference. Compared to the standard practices of the Soviet era, one can rightly accent the progress recorded; measured by a universalist yardstick, however, the situation looks far more dismal as Russia remains a state in which law counts for little more than an instrument of coercion. This section of the book concludes with empirical investigations of a number of related sub-areas: economic and social rights, the rights of women and ethnic minorities, religious freedom, and the work of nongovernmental organizations.

One of the interesting aspects of this book is the frame thrown around its subject matter by the liberal-democratic perspective that informs it. That perspective brings a number of important phenomena—government accountability, democratic rights and freedoms, the rule of law—into sharp relief and enables the author to reach reasoned and persuasive conclusions about them. But highlighting the threat to these same desiderata posed by the state, other sources of trouble, such as unaccountable economic power, slip by unnoticed. On one hand, this category would include Russia's financial oligarchy that now dominates the mass media. The many millions of dollars that turned TV news and press reporting into an arm of Yeltsin's election campaign in 1996 would be a case in point, as would be the subsequent flow of public largess to that same oligarchy.

On the other hand, it would refer to unaccountable foreign actors: international lending agencies and foreign governments. These Juviler rightly rebukes for effectively supporting Yeltsin's monstrous war against Chechnya. But the author neglects the backing displayed by these same organizations for the Russian executive's usurpation of authority. The readiness of Yeltsin's government to implement directives from the International Monetary Fund or the U.S. Treasury Department that contravene Russian law (not to mention the disastrous results of Western advice for the country) provides a prima facie case that international capital finds easier and more suitable access behind the closed doors of executive agencies than it would in the more public world of parliamentary politics. But an adequate analysis of that problem—one with profound consequences for both human rights and the

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prospects for democratic government—would likely underscore the limitations of the liberal-democratic perspective.

MICHAEL URBAN
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The Unfinished Presidency: Jimmy Carter's Journey Beyond the White House *by Douglas Brinkley. New York, Viking, 1998. 586 pp. $29.95.*

Historian Douglas Brinkley has written the final volume of a planned three-volume biography of Jimmy Carter, but the first two volumes have not been written. Readers of volume three, who know little about Carter, will ask themselves about the origins and character of this man who presents himself to the world as an irresistible force, even if the objects of his action appear immovable. How do you know they are immovable, he might ask, if you don't try to move them?

This was the question Carter asked as president when he was advised that a Panama Canal treaty was a second-term issue. But, Carter asked: What if I don't have a second term? Carter met Manachem Begin and Anwar Sadat at Camp David with ambitions that far outstripped his White House and State department advisers. Politicians play to their strengths, and the Camp David success reinforced Carter's understanding of himself and his strengths.

Brinkley does not give us a separate, coherent analysis of Carter's political personality, but such a profile is apparent across a large number of narratives. Carter combines moral drive and religious optimism; with God as his guide, all things are possible. This self-confidence is reinforced by his pride in his intellect and persuasive skills. He does his own homework and is better prepared than anyone in the room, and then he turns on the charm and intellectual power. Add to this mix a disdain for conventional politicians and diplomats, and you get Jimmy Carter.

According to Brinkley, Carter sees his work at the Carter Center as a direct extension of his purposes in the White House. The center was initially established to permit Carter to replicate the work he had done as peacemaker at Camp David. A few conferences were tried, but they proved to be less important than the solo excursions of Carter into diplomatic tangles. The institutional work of the Carter Center was devoted to projects like freeing central Africa of the guinea worm and mobilizing the poor of Atlanta to face their social problems.

Public perception of Carter's post-presidential career was perhaps only of his work as a carpenter with the Habitat for Humanity. Carter as a public figure gradually surfaced as he directed the monitoring of a number of elections around the world—in Panama, the West Bank of Palestine, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti. During Bill Clinton's first term, Carter deliberately interjected himself into a number of thorny diplomatic situations with great, even brazen confidence. His first opportunity came in 1990, when he went beyond his responsibilities of monitoring the presidential election in Nicaragua to persuade Daniel Ortega to accept defeat. Carter then began to inject himself into foreign troubles by a combination of homework and direct contact with the foreign principals involved. Thus his mission to North Korea followed considerable private contacts on which he could build and in which he could present himself as mediator at a moment of American diplomatic stalemate. Over

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and over again he out-maneuvered the White House and the State department to get himself sent to the West Bank of Palestine, Haiti, and Bosnia. In each case, official diplomats saw him as a loose cannon who would damage conventional avenues of diplomacy. President Bill Clinton and Secretary of State Warren Christopher held their breath and hoped for the best. Carter did succeed in North Korea and Haiti, but he failed in the West Bank and Bosnia, because in both cases he permitted himself to be used by Yasir Arafat and the Serbian leader Radovan Karadzic. In all cases, Carter used exaggerated language to paint tinpot despots as men of peace. This was a tactic of appealing to the best in others, but it could also be very naive.

Carter overstepped the line and tried to play president in these situations. But this was in character. He was freed from the constraints of conventional politics. As a former president he had an immediate entree to any leader in the world, and he used it. He never let politicians and bureaucrats stop him when he was president. Why should he be different now? He even offered to mediate the baseball strike. These diplomatic forays, successful or not, suggest that ex-presidents may do good things but must also realize that they are no longer president.

Brinkley's book is too long and diffuse and will thus discourage readers, but the individual narratives are rich.

ERWIN C. HARGROVE
Vanderbilt University

Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy *by Robert R. Bowie and Richard H. Immerman. New York, Oxford University Press, 1998. 336 pp. $49.95.*

In reconstructing American foreign policies, scholars do best when they combine archival research with close attention to the recollections of participants in the policy-making process. Robert R. Bowie and Richard H. Immerman meet these goals impressively in tracing the antecedents, development, and components of President Dwight D. Eisenhower's New Look national security policy. Bowie served as director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff during Eisenhower's first term and was a key participant in the shaping of the New Look. Immerman, a diplomatic historian, is well versed in combing through archival sources, particularly of the Eisenhower administration. Together, the two authors have thoroughly researched and elegantly analyzed Eisenhower's basic national security strategy; they argue its "central concepts served as enduring guides for the later stages of the Cold War" (p. 247).

This study has two major purposes: to analyze the key principles of the New Look and to examine the decision-making process that influenced its development. Far more than President Harry Truman's containment policy, the New Look carefully integrated U.S. national security goals and the means to achieve them, thus producing a long-term strategy for the cold war. As Bowie and Immerman write, "While the cold war originated under Harry S. Truman, it took its mature form under Eisenhower" (p. 3). The decision-making process behind that strategy merits attention because of Eisenhower's firm belief that "process and product were inseparable and interdependent" (p. 256).

The dual focus on substance and process is maintained throughout the book, which begins by examining such antecedents of the New Look as Truman's containment policy and

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the national security views of Eisenhower and his secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, before Eisenhower became president. Next, Bowie and Immerman discuss the national security decision-making system instituted by Eisenhower and its effect on the development of his cold war strategy. The process included weekly National Security Council (NSC) meetings and the creation of an NSC staff system to prepare agendas for those meetings and implement decisions. (Bowie represented the State Department on the NSC Planning Board, which met twice a week or more to prepare policy papers for the NSC to review.) Another key decision-making procedure analyzed in great detail is "Project Solarium," a residentially initiated, three-team study in the summer of 1953 of the major national security policy alternatives under consideration.

Bowie and Immerman then examine the substance of the New Look. They discuss such basic principles as Eisenhower's increased reliance on nuclear deterrence and his emphasis on fiscal moderation in defense spending, but they do so in a more comprehensive analysis of Eisenhower's national security policy. They examine the Eisenhower administration's appraisal of the Sino-Soviet threat; its evaluation of U.S. strategic objectives in countering that threat and U.S. military force structures needed to meet those objectives; and Eisenhower's commitment to supporting noncommunist nations and arms control efforts. Understanding how Eisenhower addressed these concerns is essential to a complete explication of the New Look, which, after all, developed in the context of conditions that would have a lasting effect on the cold war, such as the death of Stalin, the growing Soviet nuclear arsenal, and tensions within the NATO alliance.

The authors do an admirable job of analyzing the vast range of declassified sources on the Eisenhower administration and distilling their findings from it. Political scientists might want to see more discussion of the general implications of Eisenhower's decision-making style and national security strategy for other administrations, but the authors present their points and supporting evidence on the Eisenhower administration so clearly that it is not difficult to draw larger conclusions. This book provides an invaluable contribution to scholarship on Eisenhower, American foreign policy, and presidential decision making, and will be of great interest to faculty and students alike.

MEENA BOSE
Hofstra University

Turkey's Kurdish Question *by Henri J. Barkey and Graham E. Fuller. Lanham, MD, Rowan Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998. 256 pp. Cloth, $65.00; paper, $19.95.*

This is a first-class analysis of Turkey's continuing Kurdish problem, based mainly on a wealth of journalistic accounts from the Turkish press, books published in Turkey, and interviews with "well over one hundred people . . . Kurds and Turks concerned with the Kurdish problem" (p. xvi).

The two authors cover the origins of the problem, analyze the Kurdistan Workers party (PKK), which has galvanized the Kurdish movement in Turkey since the 1970s, and discuss the resurrection of the Kurdish national consciousness, Turkish public opinion and government policies on the Kurdish issue, the effects on foreign policy, and possible solutions. "Continued costs—economic and political—together with diminished expectations that the insurgency will soon end is ultimately what will move the state to seek political solutions" (p. 207).

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Repeatedly the authors demonstrate how the Turkish state has largely, but unwisely treated the entire Kurdish issue as if once PKK violence and terrorism were eliminated by the most drastic of military measures, the overall Kurdish problem would be solved without further ado. Their prescriptive discussion of solutions moves beyond the usual litany in broaching strategies of unilateral state-led and democratic arbitration processes that could lead to major reforms guaranteeing Kurdish rights within the preexisting Turkish borders.

To accomplish this, the authors call for further evolution of Turkish civil society. In particular, "the business community has a vital role to play [because it] . . . has strong links with the West and also has a great many incentives to see the situation resolved for its positive impact on Turkey's economic fortunes" (p. 214). They also argue that "Turkish leaders are very sensitive to U.S. pressure. . . . The U.S. Department of Defense has access to many levels of the Turkish military" (p. 216), where ultimate power still lies. These able recommendations demand careful attention.

Barkey and Fuller have thoroughly mastered their subject and write well. Most importantly, while recognizing the economic, terrorist, and foreign elements of the Kurdish problem, they also correctly conclude that "it is essential to recognize that the problem is fundamentally an ethnic one, thereby requiring an ethnic solution" (p. 179). Heuristically, they broaden their study by seeking parallels between the Kurdish situation in Turkey and other ethnic conflicts such as the Israeli-Palestinian problem. They also point out that the Kurdish issue is important, "because Turkish aspirations to gain full membership in the European Union raise questions about the kinds of societies and ethnic makeup that are compatible with European norms" (p. 4).

Given the quality of their study, it is disappointing that—while the authors state in their preface that "few Western scholars have written about the Kurds of Turkey" (p. xviii)—they chose completely to ignore this reviewer's earlier book, *The Kurds in Turkey: A Political Dilemma*, 1990, while burying in one obscure note his more recent analysis, *The Kurds and the Future of Turkey*, 1997.

Similar treatment is also meted out to a third useful study of Turkey's Kurdish problem—Kemal Kirisci and Gareth M. Winrow, *The Kurdish Question and Turkey: An Example of a Trans-state Ethnic Conflict*, 1997. In this case Barkey and Fuller mention the book's existence in three obscure notes as being published in Turkish, neglecting to mention that it was first published in English. Clearly Barkey and Fuller need to mention these two other studies up front in their own study, rather than burying their existence in a few obscure notes.

As with most academic analyses, one could find many small points with which to quibble. I, for example, found Barkey and Fuller at times repetitious. Although briefly mentioning it, the two failed to consider fully the implication of the Susurluk scandal that, among many other things, clearly demonstrated how the Turkish state used right-wing hitmen to murder several thousand of its own citizens of Kurdish ethnic heritage because of their suspected support for Kurdish cultural rights. In another place the authors incorrectly declared that Abdullah "Apo" Ocalan (the longtime leader of the PKK) "himself does not speak Kurdish" (p. 90n6). Actually he does; he did so for more than six hours during the first day I recently interviewed him over a two-day period. Although the authors' rich documentation implies one, they also chose not to include even a minimal bibliography. These points and others that could be made, however, do not detract from the important contribution this book will make to the existing literature.

MICHAEL M. GUNTER
Tennessee Technological University

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The Peruvian Labyrinth: Polity, Society, Economy *edited by Maxwell A. Cameron and Philip Mauceri. University Park, Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997. 272 pp. Cloth, $55.00; paper, $19.95.*

If you seek to navigate through the complex, often confusing terrain of contemporary Peruvian politics, *The Peruvian Labyrinth* is an essential guidebook. The volume's essays, grounded in solid empirical research, are full of analytical insights that will be of interest not only to students of Peruvian politics but also to theorists of state-society relations, institution building, and democratization.

The opening section, with chapters by Mauceri, Cameron, and Carol Wise, does a superb job of laying out the institutional context of the past four decades, providing a crucial background for understanding the dramatic and often surprising twists and turns of Peruvian politics. Mauceri highlights the conservative and elitist nature of Peru's transition to democracy in 1980 and its failure to build a consensus around democratic norms and procedures. His examination of the historical roots of Peruvian democracy's fault lines is crucial to understanding the behavior of political and social actors during the turbulent decade of the 1980s as well as the virtual absence of protest after President Alberto Fujimori announced his self-coup in April 1992.

Cameron convincingly dispels the notion that Fujimori's coup was a necessary outcome of institutional gridlock between the executive and legislative branches. He carefully documents the process leading up to the coup, showing that the president's decision to shut down parliament was not the result of congressional opposition to Fujimori or his neoliberal program. Rather, it was a calculated move by Fujimori, who knew that while he might be able to obtain support for his legislative agenda, Congress would not agree to his hidden agenda-constitutional changes to permit his reelection.

Wise argues that Peru is an example of the shortcomings of the strong-executive, weak-state model currently in vogue in neoliberal circles, presumably because this formula allows government technocrats to implement painful but necessary adjustment measures on reluctant populations. By writing checks and balances out of the equation, Wise notes, such a model cannot assure coherent policy outcomes and undermines any pretense of accountability, usually with nefarious consequences for the poorest.

The next section looks at social actors, with a chapter on changes in the rural sector by Christine Hunefeldt and an informative chapter by Carmen Rosa Balbi on the labor movement. Balbi explains how a series of structural changes in the economy, including the explosive growth of the informal sector, and specific government initiatives to "flexibilize" the work force, combined to decimate Peru's once-powerful labor movement. As the power of labor declined, the Right—a moribund political and social force in the 1970s and 1980s—saw a dramatic resurrection, the subject of the final chapter in this section by Francisco Durand. The Right's growing intellectual, policy-making, and cultural influence was not accompanied, however, by the development of effective political organizations, partly because its project was coopted by Fujimori and partly because of internal discrepancies over Fujimori's authoritarian tendencies—tensions which are growing as the regime becomes more abusive and autocratic.

The book's final section examines violence and human rights, with a smart chapter by Carlos Iván Degregori on how the capture of Shining Path leader, Abimael Guzmán, broke the aura of invincibility surrounding the organization and a comprehensive look at the human rights crisis provoked by the country's internal war by Kenneth Roberts and Mark Peceny. Notwithstanding the merits of both chapters in this section, it is the part of the book

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that least satisfies, as it leaves unanswered the fundamental question of how, if the Shining Path was as isolated ideologically and politically as Degregori suggests in his chapter, it was able to build such a powerful movement.

The Peruvian Labyrinth is an accessible volume that effectively unravels some of the enigmas of Peruvian politics—no small feat in a country in which political analysis is often overrun by events.

JO-MARIE BURT
Columbia University

The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some Nations Are So Rich and Some So Poor
by David S. Landes, New York, W. W. Norton, 1998. 597 pp. $30.00.

Like a good historian, David Landes is not given to single variable explanations. After his wide ranging romp through the economic history of the modern world, we don't know precisely why some nations are rich and others poor, but we have some ideas about what is likely to work and what won't.

Some rulers made "big mistakes," while others behaved in ways that furthered growth. For Landes, cultural differences matter, but they are not ironclad constraints; cultures change and develop. The primary engine of growth is innovation—both scientific and organizational. Countries that are open to those who invent and develop new ideas have a better chance of growing than those that aren't. Landes blames the Inquisition for the decline of Spain and Portugal. For a time they were in the forefront of scientific development and international exploration, but eventually scientific talent was lost as Jews and Jewish converts to Christianity were banished and persecuted, and free intellectual inquiry was discouraged. Changes in the scientific frontier can also change the appropriate constitutional response. Countries that were in the forefront in one period can fall behind if their institutions do not adapt to reflect changes in cutting-edge technology. Thus Landes argues that England lost its early lead in industrialization to France and Germany by failing to build up the research capacity of its universities. Pragmatic trial and error by those with practical experience sufficed for the first stage of the industrial revolution, but were not adequate when new developments were based on chemistry. Experimentation in self-contained research laboratories was now the way to make rapid advances.

Landes's view of the state is nuanced. He recognizes that the state must leave space for individual initiative to provide incentives for entrepreneurship and invention. But he acknowledges that the state itself is sometimes a crucial force for maintaining such an environment. Thus in the late Middle Ages in Europe, the cities are widely viewed as islands of freedom in a world otherwise controlled by repressive landlords. The cities' freedom, however, could not have been maintained without the countervailing power of Europe's monarchs who had an interest in building up power centers independent of the large landlords. Similarly, although voyages of discovery required individuals of bravery and daring, they also needed the financial backing of kings and queens. Unlike some libertarian students of economic history, Landes recognizes that private power can be as oppressive as public power, and the state is the only entity capable of exercising control over private oligarchs.

Governments, however, frequently follow counter-productive policies. Landes rightly criticizes functionalist explanations that claim a relationship between dysfunctional consti-

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tutions and social forces that bring about their transformation. The history that he relates is full of behavior that turned out to be deeply mistaken yet persisted for decades or even centuries and produced slow decline or vulnerability to conquest and foreign domination.

For example, the Chinese empire was contemptuous of sea trading and failed to develop its own capacity as a shipper or a naval power. This made it vulnerable to the incursions of sailors from Western Europe when they arrived. The Spanish in Latin America focused on the extraction of gold and silver, neglecting agriculture and extensive permanent settlement. They were scornful of the Northern European emphasis on agricultural production, but in the end agriculture proved the more durable productive choice. Sometimes mistakes are so grievous that there is no time to correct them. Landes reports that the Indians in Mexico believed that Cortes could be induced to go away and leave them alone if only they gave him especially lavish gifts. As Landes says, "big mistake."

Landes appears to have completed his book just before the Asian crisis broke out. The weakness of the Asian economies are not prefigured in his analysis. To him, Japan is a model of development, although he acknowledges the harsh conditions experienced by many workers as the country industrialized. The weaknesses of the Asian political-economic system escape his notice as they escaped the notice of most everyone else. Nevertheless, the problems of a system based on close links between a favored group of businesses and the state might have particularly aroused his concern in the light of his own historical analyses.

The Wealth and Poverty of Nations is a good deal of fun to read. You can have it on your bedside table for several weeks as you dip into a different chapter each night. One night you are in England at the turn of the nineteenth century. Later you are contemplating the economic success of the Japanese or trying to understand how the Turkish empire survived for so long in a weakened condition. Although even for a nonhistorian like myself, the descriptions of the industrialization of England and the United States covered much familiar ground, the overall scope and range of the book gives one a fascinating sense of the powerful forces at work over the last several centuries and the way they left the people of the world in vastly unequal circumstances.

SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN
Yale University

Citizenship and Civil Society *by Thomas Janoski. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1998. 316 pp. Cloth, $50.95; paper, $19.95.*

The wave of nation building that attended the collapse of communism has created challenges that require us to reexamine basic assumptions about the idea of citizenship. Fundamental questions about the rights and obligations of citizenship and its relationship to civil society are at the root of state and society and yet, as Thomas Janoski points out in *Citizenship and Civil Society*, curiously little attention has been paid to them in the social science literature. In the face of this enormous gap Janoski develops a complex theory that not only aims to define citizenship but also to show the appropriate balance between the rights and obligations of citizenship and to illustrate the development of these rights over time. By connecting these notions to different ideas of civil society, Janoski wants to show what forces bring about cooperative versus competitive citizenship patterns.

Drawing on legal and political theory as well as empirical tools of social science, Janoski explains how liberal, communitarian, and social democratic political communities treat citi-

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zenship rights and obligations differently. Citizenship, in his view, refers to a relationship individuals have to the nation-state that entails certain universal rights and obligations at a specified level of equality. Using Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld's categories of rights, Janoski ultimately chooses a form of social democracy that he calls expressive democracy for its ability to balance both citizenship rights and obligations and the needs of state and civil society.

Expansive democracy, in his view, gives the greatest scope to participatory political rights as well as the legal, political, and social rights that citizenship requires. Liberalism, on the other hand, emphasizes individual rights but pays little attention to obligations. Its individualistic, atomistic approach grounds rights on a contractual basis in Janoski's view, where people only agree to recognize a right for some concrete quid pro quo. This restricted type of exchange fosters greed and competitive citizenship patterns, because it doesn't generate the complex web of social obligations a community requires. Communitariansim, conversely, demands too much of individuals by focusing almost exclusively on the obligations people owe each other at the expense of individual autonomy. Here, rights play a relatively little role, according to Janoski, and hence, generate a coercive relationship of the state to the individual. Only social democracy in its expansive form balances individual rights and obligations by empowering people to exercise their participatory rights within cooperative citizenship patterns.

These are enormously important issues, but the reach of this ambitious book occasionally exceeds its grasp precisely in those areas that Janoski claims have been ignored by social science. Even though the book relies heavily on ideas concerning the nature of rights, law, and politics, his discussion of these concepts often does not support the global assertions he makes. Janoski's concept of rights relies on a very brief discussion of Hohfeld, which is a rather slender reed for such a vast topic. For example, Janoski's distinction between claims and liberties seems flawed. With the possible exception of universal moral rights, which he dismisses as unenforceable by the state, liberties entail a right to a certain outcome that includes a claim that the state or other individuals are obligated either to provide that outcome or not obstruct it. Hence, a liberty requires the positive and supportive action of others that Janoski supposes is limited to claims. Indeed, this claim applies to every sort of right and so collapses his own distinction between legal, political, social, and participation rights.

Similarly, the political models he creates to balance rights and obligations will give many political theorists some pause. His reduction of liberalism to atomistic contractual exchange is rather perfunctory and fails to capture the rich web of mutual understanding and commitments necessary for liberal tolerance. It seems as if he takes the idea of contract literally, rather than as a heuristic device to ascertain principles of justice. Janoski's description of communitarianism also glosses over ideas that undermine his argument. He claims that communitarianism views liberalism as "too rights centered" and so focuses on obligation to the community at the expense of rights. In fact, communitarianism does not eschew rights for obligation. That model is as committed to positive rights of self-realization as liberalism is committed to negative rights. One might reject positive rights as utopian or dangerous, but Janoski only mentions them in passing in a brief footnote.

Disagreement among liberals, communitarians, and social democrats isn't really about the proper balance between rights and obligations. One can't have rights without others having concomitant obligations to respect them. The dispute that keeps these groups at each others throats is over which rights people ought to have. That question of justice has been at the root of state and society at least since Plato. While Janoski's model does not advance

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this issue directly, his ambitious attempt to fuse social, legal, and political thought will challenge people to think about the nature and scope of citizenship rights.

DAVID FAGELSON
American University

Democracy and Elections *by Richard S. Katz. New York, Oxford University Press, 1997. 344 pp. $60.00.*

Richard S. Katz's fine book represents a notable advance in our understanding of elections. It will be of great interest to electoral systems scholars as well as to anyone concerned with the relationship between elections and democracy.

For students of U.S. politics, the book is very timely due to the growing critique of our near-universal use of single-member plurality districts for the election of national and state legislators. The book provides a solid base from which to compare our current electoral arrangement with the principal alternatives (for example, the single transferable vote, instant runoff voting, and cumulative voting) presented by reformers such as the Center for Voting and Democracy. Katz demonstrates that no single electoral system can satisfy all democratic values. However, he provides sound advice about which electoral arrangements are most useful in achieving specific democratic goals.

The first half of the book argues that electoral systems scholars have neglected the existence of different definitions of democracy in the evaluation of electoral laws and their political consequences. Katz analyzes four prominent democratic values and their link to electoral institutions. Separate chapters explore the tenets and origins of what he terms: popular sovereignty, liberal democracy, participationist democracy, and communitarian democracy.

The second half of the book takes as its starting point the different goals of the four distinct democratic values and highlights the manner in which electoral institutions can be utilized to achieve these objectives. Katz first examines the roles played by elections as well as provides a detailed discussion of the key dimensions of an electoral system. He then examines five topics fundamental to any comprehensive evaluation of an electoral system: first, the link between electoral laws and the translation of votes into legislative seats; second, the influence of the electoral system on the party system, and in turn the influence of the party system on cabinet formation, cabinet stability, and government support in the legislature; third, the creation of legislative districts and the related topics of apportionment and gerrymandering; fourth, the degree of electoral choice enjoyed by the voters; and finally, the composition of the electorate, that is, suffrage rights and those factors influencing voter registration and turnout.

The book's discussion of these topics will be invaluable to anyone engaged in a global evaluation of an electoral system. A minor criticism, however, of a few of the empirical chapters is that they are written primarily from a parliamentary democracy perspective. In presidential democracies, the rules governing the election of the president exercise a fundamental influence over the legislative elections, which in many instances is stronger than that of the rules regulating the legislative elections. While some of the analysis in these chapters takes into account whether or not a country has a presidential form of government, it employs only a binary classification of regime type—parliamentary or presidential. It, therefore, does not consider the important differential effects that factors such as the formula

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used to elect the president (plurality versus majority runoff) and the timing of the presidential and legislative elections (concurrent versus nonconcurrent) have on the number of parties in the party system, the percentage of seats held by the executive's party in the legislature, and the degree of electoral choice enjoyed by voters.

This very small omission does not, however, detract from an excellent book that will be of tremendous use to scholars. This utility stems from the book's exceptional linkage of democratic theory to the empirical study of electoral systems as well as its detailed empirical analysis.

MARK P. JONES
Michigan State University

Presidential-Congressional Relations: Policy and Time Approaches *by Steven A. Shull. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1997. 178 pp. $42.50.*

This book contains and discusses a variety of measures of presidential-congressional relations, such as presidential support scores, partisan support scores, presidential success rates on important votes, etc. Although most of these measures can be found elsewhere, a student of interbranch relations might consider this compilation and discussion of the relative merits and weaknesses of each measure as a handy reference volume.

This book, however, has three important shortcomings. First, it is lacking much theoretical punch. To be sure, it discusses theories of presidential success, including policy typologies proposed by Aaron Wildavsky, Theodore Lowi, and Gary King and Lynn Ragsdale; but no new theories are proposed nor is any clear support given to any of these existing theories. We see that each typology can be supported by different types of measures, but no strong argument is made that the expansion of the number in policy categories suggested by Lowi or King and Ragsdale justifies the loss in parsimony.

Second, and perhaps more importantly, the book contains no statistical tests to identify whether any of the possible patterns in presidential success over time, across party, or at different points in the electoral cycle are in fact significantly different from chance. It is odd that a book that is almost completely dominated by numbers, having thirty-five tables in 129 pages of the main text, has no statistical tests to help us interpret the significance of all of these numbers. The author has a tendency to treat all patterns and differences as significant, and readers may be tempted to do the same. But as can be seen in the next point, eyeballing the numbers for patterns without any tests of statistical significance can lead to a number of false conclusions.

Third, one of the few strong conclusions that the book does make is that presidents have encountered more conflict and more partisanship from Congress in recent years than they did in the past. The trouble is that none of the thirty-five tables contains evidence to support that conclusion. I only know this because I entered the data reported in the tables into a statistical package and ran my own regressions to see if there was any statistically significant trend over time in the conflict or partisanship that presidents experienced from Congress. None of the numerous ways in which the author measures interbranch conflict and partisanship have a statistically significant positive or negative coefficient over time.

A book about how none of the interbranch conflict measures shows a significant trend over time would have had much more original, theoretical appeal. Instead, the book we

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have does not strongly challenge existing theories or propose new ones and can best be used as a handy reference.

JAY P. GREENE
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The Chicago NAACP and the Rise of Black Professional Leadership, 1910–1966 *by Christopher Robert Reed. Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1997. 257 pp. $35.00.*

This book adds to our understanding of the role of the Chicago NAACP as a vehicle for the black professional middle class in Chicago to attain the American Dream and broader national efforts to attain first class citizenship for all African Americans. Created in 1910 as the association's first affiliate, the branch's success depended on its ability to achieve organizational stability, programmatic relevance, and ideological acceptance. According to Reed, this process entailed "three distinct phases of hegemonic change." The first phase, 1910–1932, reflected the national office's elite-driven organizational model and featured a biracial patriarchy of men of high socioeconomic status. During this period, activism was avoided, and both social and physical distance was maintained between the leadership and rank-and-file membership. Indeed, under white patriarchy rule, the leadership "wished to minimize participation in the running of the organization because of their distrust of the judgment of the rank and file among the small, predominantly black membership" (pp. 34–35). By 1925, a black patriarchy replaced white leadership. During this period, the branch broadened its base of support, including women and postal employees and had one of its most dynamic phases programatically. However, the isolation between the rank and file and the organization's leadership remained.

During the second phase, 1933-1946, a black middle class emerged to lead the branch to a new level of activism and increased membership. The organization aggressively pursued court action, legal suits, picketing, and lobbying. By 1946, the branch began its transition into its third and final phase of hegemonic change (1946–1966), when it elected a member of the working class as president. This leadership moved the branch from a moderate programmatic strategy to a more militant approach and concern for the little man's problems. However, as the branch "positioned itself as a vehicle for social change, it threatened groups and organizations heavily vested in protecting the racial status quo" (pp. viii). Competition and an ongoing antagonism with the William Dawson machine eventually neutralized the Chicago NAACP as the city's primary civil rights organization and committed black political energies and resources to a "party first, race second strategy."

Reed chronicles the history, goals, thinking, and struggles of the Chicago branch, using archival data (NAACP papers at the Library of Congress and other materials housed in Madison and Chicago) and interviews with members and other participant observers as primary sources. Political scientists may find this material merely descriptive and unsatisfying in their thirst for theory. However, Reed aptly uses historical method to explain significant outcomes in the rise of the Chicago NAACP and its attainment of institutional status. For readers who have a weakness for tidy explanations, it is plausible to suggest that the Chicago NAACP developed as Mancur Olson's incentive theory generally predicts, although with some variation due to the mistrust between the races. The change in the incentive structure transformed the organization from an elite-driven organization to an activist civil rights

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group. Indeed, Reed thoroughly shows how the Chicago NAACP was able to adjust its incentive structure and become more programatically diverse and relevant, thus increasing its fund-raising capacity and membership.

Reed's book provides a solid contribution to the literature and is far richer than can be captured in this short review. It is well written and researched and carefully thought out. It is recommended to students of Chicago politics, urban history and politics, and African American politics.

DESIREE S. PEDESCLEAUX
Spelman College

The Soviet World of American Communism *by Harvey Klehr, John Earl Haynes, and Kyrill M. Anderson. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1998. 378 pp. $35.00.*

Harvey Klehr and his co-authors make their point powerfully: throughout its history the Communist Party of the United States (CPUSA) was controlled politically by the Soviet Union. This control was direct and thorough on big issues and routinely included secondary and tertiary matters. I imagine that these points sound unsurprising to most people. They gain meaning in the context of debates over the last two decades about relations between the American Communist party and the Soviet Union. Many analysts of the CPUSA have emphasized the distance between the two. Sometimes this has meant claiming that formal ties between the two were looser than is usually imagined. More often, relatively sympathetic historians of American Communism have focused on the local and regional activities of Communists in civil rights, labor organizing, and elsewhere, arguing that in these areas Soviet views were not routinely a guide to Communist activists.

The authors have made extensive use of ex-Soviet records to show more than the close organizational and financial relations between the CPUSA and the Soviet Union. They demonstrate the breadth and depth of political ties. The book consists of significant documents plus extended explanatory discussions. The documents underline the extent to which party strategies were framed by the Soviet and Comintern leadership. The CPUSA played little more than a consulting role in defining Communist strategies in the United States. Major policies and policy changes were devised at the international level, and these decisions invariably produced rapid shifts in the United States.

Analytically there is a problem, one familiar from all the famous arguments about power. In trying to gauge how power is organized between x and y, if x gives the order and y never disagrees or resists, it is hard to make a full judgment. Is y powerless, complicit, or an enthusiastic partner with real power? The Communist party's lack of resistance to Soviet strategic directives requires making judgments about what would have happened had a significant disagreement arisen and CPUSA leaders refused to accept the Soviet position. The evidence provided in *The Soviet World of American Communism* makes it reasonable to expect that if this had occurred, the Soviet leadership would have made sure to wreck the CPUSA, perhaps splitting it to start a new and reliably pro-Soviet group.

Whether enthusiastic, reflective, or grudging—and there is more indication of the first than the others—the CPUSA carried out instructions from the leadership of the international Communist movement. The results of this political subordination were striking. First, there was a loss of anything like independent judgment on the part of CPUSA; this was

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especially notable in the decade beginning in 1939, when so many major international conflicts required difficult choices, and the Communist party simply echoed Soviet judgments. Over time, that organization became unable even to simulate independent judgment, even when doing so was greatly to its advantage.

Second, the reliance of the CPUSA on Soviet political leadership was indiscriminate and lacked any balance. Thus, from the standpoint of the CPUSA leadership every change in Soviet policy was momentous and deeply insightful. Every Soviet position was not only radiantly true, but a direct articulation of basic Communist principles. And every political rival or adversary was an unqualified force of evil.

Beyond this loss of judgment, another grave form of corruption was a willingness to countenance political evil. This aggressive defense of the indefensible was always linked to claims of high principle. Some of the most damning documents in the book concern the refusal of the CPUSA to raise a critical voice about the imprisonment and murder not only of Soviet victims of Stalinism in the 1930s, but of American Communists who found themselves inside the Soviet Union.

I previously reviewed in this journal a companion work by Klehr and Haynes, *The Secret World of American Communism* (PSQ 111 [Winter 1996–97]: 730–32). That work focused on Soviet efforts to enlist American Communists and their allies in espionage on behalf of Soviet aims. I found that book's political critique of the CPUSA more compelling than many of its claims of espionage by particular individuals. Ironically, the present book strengthens part of the authors' earlier case insofar as its account of political subordination is so persuasive. The ferocious and unquestioning attachment of CPUSA leaders to their Soviet allies makes espionage appear more comprehensible. Given these political relations, a substantial number of American Communists might have regarded spying for the Soviet Union as a reasonable choice, if not an honorable task. This does not prove a case against any particular individual, but it makes more plausible the ability of the Soviet Union to manipulate an American political organization for its own security aims.

These characterizations of the Soviet Union and the CPUSA are not new. Some reviews of the book have judged it as definitive regarding political debate about the history of the CPUSA. This is not likely. For some analysts a generally sympathetic attitude toward the Soviet project can be expanded to include the patterns of dependence detailed in *The Soviet World of American Communism.* If one is prepared to accept the violence and lack of democracy of the Soviet experience in the first few decades after the Russian Revolution, the political subordination of small parties like the CPUSA will not require much further reflection. It was, after all, a tough century. Others may want to dig deeper and deeper into local Communist party activity to find activists working solely on behalf of civil rights or union organizing. The evidence of political subordination in Klehr's book is not apt to cause proponents of either approach to reconsider their position. A pro-Soviet view of the twentieth century and a romantically local view of Left politics are apt to endure as intellectual if not political currents, and they may converge in a hazy nostalgia for the days before the "end of history."

If Klehr's work is unlikely to make converts, it is useful in clarifying the historical record. And it may encourage discussion of significant issues. First, how far down into the Communist party did an awareness of the basic shape of political relations between the CPUSA and the Soviet Union extend? Klehr et al. demolish any notion that these relations were known only to a handful of top leaders. The CPUSA's dependence on Soviet leadership was widely known among the majority of officials of the Communist party at all levels, and among a good portion of its active membership. People who retrospectively claim ignorance about where CPUSA policy was made and how, or about the nature of Soviet politics may

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have forgotten their own uncertainties and ambivalence. Many active Communists of the 1930s and 1940s knew enough about the party and the Soviet Union to be uncertain or skeptical. But those who remained with the party chose not to dissent, due to their dedication to large political goals and to a judgment that raising hard questions would have soon resulted in their being pushed outside of Communist political life.

Second, notable questions about American political and social life are raised by the book's account of John L. Lewis's deliberate use of Communist organizers to build the CIO. Given the liabilities of association with the CPUSA, why did Lewis make this choice? The answer was mainly about a lack of alternatives: Lewis could not call on the Democratic party, or noncommunist organizations of the socialist Left to furnish such cadres. This decision might be explored further in considering relations between democratic institutions in the United States and forms of social and economic power that even under a reform Democratic administration could not be reached by normal political processes.

DAVID PLOTKE
New School for Social Research

Interest Groups and Judicial Federalism *by Donald J. Farole, Jr. Westport, CT, Praeger, 1998. 224 pp. $57.95.*

This book suggests that state judicial systems have not provided a panacea for those who are still concerned with norms of protection of individual liberties and "justice." This conclusion should not come as a surprise, since the state court systems tend to be even more embroiled in the process of judicial politics than are their federal counterparts. Many state court judges are actually elected, rather than appointed.

During the period believed to be hostile to rights-oriented litigants, because of appointment of more conservative justices to the U.S. Supreme Court and lower federal bar, a strategy of necessity forged by litigation-oriented interest groups saw them increasingly from the late 1980s to the present involved in litigation in state court systems.

I have two major problems with the methodology. First, why does the highest level of analysis consist only of cross-tabulation? Why are there no descriptive accounts? What about controlling factors? Second, why do we see a comparison only of eminent domain and obscenity cases? There seems to be no rationale for this choice. Perhaps data sets were simply made available to the researcher?

Still, the overall observations seem to be provocative. Interest groups certainly will have many obstacles to obtaining beneficial policies through the states' judicial systems. Major obstacles include the losses associated with duplication; costs involved in becoming familiar with the rules and procedures of fifty different state court systems; the increased costs, energy, and increasingly uncertain outcomes.

Of course, the net result is that the state court systems will leave litigants even more confused, since fifty different state court systems can produce fifty different legal outcomes, which is one of the great strengths and weaknesses of federalism. Of course, the advantage of the federal courts is that at least they are not subject to local politics, and that they have in the post-1930s period been most committed to individual rights, justice, and liberty.

BARBARA M. YARNOLD
Florida International University

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Bold Relief: Institutional Politics and the Origins of Modern American Social Policy *by Edwin Amenta. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1998. 356 pp. $39.00.*

In *Bold Relief*, Edwin Amenta brings welcome attention to the wide range of social services promulgated in the mid- and late 1930s. The author shows that the social security system—what most consider the core of the American welfare state—was only one of the many social policies initiated by the Roosevelt administration, where Old Age Security Assistance (providing individual retirement accounts) was outmatched by the benefits of Old Age Assistance (providing federal and state cash benefits for the elderly poor). Both programs were overshadowed by the scale of relief offered through the Works Progress Administration (WPA).

The author makes a convincing case that the large variations existing in the scope and trajectory of the social provisions offered in the forty-eight states can be best explained by the structure of each state's political system, where the states differed from each other on voting rights, presence of patronage parties, politics of the ruling regime, administrative power, and presence of social movements. The unrepresentativeness of both state and national institutional politics, the author argues, accounts for the short season of social policies' blossoming. Amenta concludes by briefly looking at the British welfare state to illustrate the distinctiveness of U.S. social policies.

Amenta's account has serious problems. It takes its argument of the exceptional condition of American institutional politics much too far. Amenta denies that the Great Depression caused the New Deal and that World War II caused the redefinition of New Deal reforms. Yet he scarcely touches on the extraordinary turmoil that lay behind the reform—as well as behind the formation of the CIO and the rise of John L. Lewis, the Townsend Movement, Huey Long, and Father Coughlin. The Great Depression persisted longer and cut more deeply than its predecessors of the 1870s and 1890s. The WPA and other social policies were not subversive to the market economy but supplementary to a manifestly deficient market. Once the war restored the economy, the reforms lost their appeal and necessity.

Between 1940 and 1950, individual and national incomes almost tripled, and industrial production almost doubled—economic growth that continued during the 1950s and 1960s. The war brought about permanent change in the scale and sophistication of the U.S. economy, not merely a "short run" mitigation "of the domestic problems New Deal social policy was designed to solve" (p. 208). And the war did in fact adversely affect social security reform and the labor movement, contrary to the author's claims (pp. 226, 216). The war undermined pressure to expand the social security system in 1940 and 1941, resulted in no new social security legislation, and kept GI benefits separate from social security. Furthermore, labor started to lose union-organization votes, the percentage of nonagricultural workers in unions peaked, and the unions began to lose popularity.

Amenta rightly points to the importance of the 1942 election, with the subsequent scrapping of the National Resources Planning Board, WPA, National Youth Administration, and the Civilian Conservation Corps. But the reasons for the decline in turnout (left unexplored) were very much war-related: voters moved to where the jobs were and often did not register to vote; rising employment and incomes eroded support for reform politics; and business revived. Even if the American polity was not fully representative of popular will, social policy was hardly divorced from public opinion, as the elections of the 1930s and 1940s suggest.

The author also neglects presidential politics. Roosevelt did not simply "stand for social policy" (p. 250). Not only did FDR neglect the reform agenda during the war, but he endorsed the expansion of veterans' programs, withdrew support for public health, and aban-

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doned organized labor. He also tolerated racial discrimination in government, in contrast to his successor, Harry Truman. Instead of offering a nuanced account of FDR's political strategy, the book offers an apologia.

Bold Relief offers a useful and often insightful overview of the origin of and limits to U.S. social policy. But by taking the reformist policies of the late 1930s as the benchmark for U.S. social policy, the author marginalizes the relevance of his own analysis for a broader understanding of U.S. social policy.

BARTHOLOMEW H. SPARROW
The University of Texas at Austin

Basic Interests: The Importance of Groups in Politics and in Political Science *by Frank R. Baumgartner and Beth L. Leech. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1998. 223 pp. Cloth, $55.00; paper, $15.95.*

Frank Baumgartner and Beth Leech summarize and critique the literature on interest groups in American politics. As they aptly demonstrate, the literature has changed its focus and stature several times. At the height of its prominence in midcentury, scholars focused attention on group power, pluralism, and the behavior of lobbyists. The authors argue convincingly that this literature foundered on its ambition and its own internal contradictions. Following Mancur Olson's arguments about collective action, scholars for a time mostly studied the reasons individuals joined or did not join interest groups. The scope of research narrowed, and the behavior of the groups themselves became less frequently studied. Recently there has occurred a resurgence of research on group behavior, partially because of the availability of data due to several large-scale, quantitative studies in the early 1980s. Unfortunately, these studies and the literature spawned by them have failed to return the literature to a central place in the discipline. Instead, we have a "contradictory and noncumulative literature" (p. 176).

According to the authors, this is because scholars have limited the scope of their studies to few groups, have failed to incorporate in their studies the larger political context surrounding interest groups, and have not coordinated on a common set of research questions. In a review of journal articles on interest groups, the authors find that many studies are incomparable and that scholars often make unjustifiable inferences from limited data. The literature on interest groups is less than the sum of its parts and certainly less prominent than its subject matter warrants.

This book is a valuable addition to our discipline. It will be useful for all scholars who study American politics and for most political scientists. Graduate students especially will benefit, not the least because of the many ideas for dissertation topics. The lasting contribution of the book for many readers will be the pointed explanation of the current confusion in the interest group literature. The authors do a good job of relating the trends in this literature to a mix of intellectual and professional constraints on the scholars who produce that literature.

In an otherwise fine book, there are weaknesses. The authors give little space to the contribution of economists like Gary Becker and George Stigler, and virtually none to recent rational choice models of interest groups by political scientists. The quantitative literature on the effects of campaign contributions and lobbying is criticized for contradictory results without a thorough examination of specific studies. It could be that well done studies yield coherent and valuable results, while poorly conducted studies yield contradictory results.

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The most glaring omission, however, is apparent in the authors' explanation of the recent failure of the interest group literature to retain its previous glory. A main reason the study of interest groups has not been central to the discipline is the increasing emphasis on the study of institutions in political science. Interest groups are less constrained by electoral, legislative, or administrative institutions than are, say, legislators, candidates, presidents, or voters. Naturally, those who want to understand the effects of institutions will focus on those actors most constrained by them; and relative to other political actors, interest groups operate in a fairly institution-free environment.

This point is related to another omission in the book. For some reason, the interest group literature has not attracted the most technically skilled scholars and graduate students in the profession. These scholars, with formal theoretic and statistical skills, have instead studied Congress, political economy, electoral systems, voting behavior, and international relations. Given the overall trends in political science, this could be a cause of its relatively low status.

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Reference Books and Other Publications of Interest Received

Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 1, 1998 *edited by Nelson W. Polsby. Palo Alto, CA, Annual Reviews, 1998. 479 pp. $60.00.*

CATO Handbook for Congress: Policy Recommendations for the 106th Congress *edited by Edward H. Crane and David Boaz. Washington, DC, CATO Institute, 1999. 618 pp. Paper, $18.95.*

Civic Education: What Makes Students Learn *by Richard G. Niemi and Jane Junn. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1998. 224 pp. $27.50.*

The Columbia Guide to the Cold War *edited by Michael Kort. New York, Columbia University Press, 1999. 366 pp. $40.00.*

The Constitution and Campaign Finance Reform, An Anthology *edited by Frederick G. Slabach. Durham, NC, Carolina Academic Press, 1998. 448 pp. $30.00.*

The FBI: A Comprehensive Reference Guide *edited by Athan G. Theoharis with Tony G. Proveda, Susan Rosenfeld, and Richard Gid Powers. Phoenix, Oryx Press, 1998. 432 pp. $85.00.*

German and Danish Security Policies towards the Baltic Sea Area: 1945 until Present *edited by Gunnar Artèus and Bertel Heurlin. Copenhagen, Denmark, Danish Institute of International Affairs, 1998. 107 pp. 50,00 DKK.*

A Global Agenda: Issues Before the 53rd General Assembly of the United Nations, 1998–1999 *edited by John Tessitore and Susan Woolfson. Lanham, MD, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998. 345 pp. Paper, $24.95.*

The Legacy of the Monroe Doctrine: A Reference Guide to U.S. Involvement in Latin America and the Caribbean *by David W. Dent. Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1999. 418 pp. $59.95.*

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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